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David Cohen*

THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONTRACTUAL
REMEDIES T O POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
STATUS: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY?

'And you see', Trollope makes Archdeacon Grantley say, 'land gives so
much more than rent. It gives position and influence and political power,
to say nothing about the game."
What things 'give' is the very heart of the law of property. And what
agreements 'give' is equally at the heart of the law of contract. No legal
system could hope to develop at all unless it established rules defining the
remedies available to enforce agreements or, put another way, insisting
that one 'gets what one has been promised.' However we choose to define
the substance of consensual obligations, we must include a reference to
enforceability.'
An individual who has had his contractual expectations shattered and
goes to law in order to obtain compensation or performance premises his
claim on the destruction of his perceived wealth, represented by his
personal expectation of profit created at the instant of agreement.3 Both
parties stand to gain by the exchange through the enjoyment of their
respective profits which did not exist prior to the bargain. This loss of
expected profit - which inheres in every exchange,4 but which need not
necessarily take the form of financial reward - may be protected through a
variety of legal and non-legal means; the former include the application of
punitive sanctions, the imposition of a specific legal duty on the promisor
ordering him to perform, or the imposition of a general legal duty
mandating a transfer of money damages, in an amount objectively
assessed by public authority. Traditional contract law has shown a
well-entrenched predisposition towards the imposition of liability to pay
damages, reflecting, one suspects, a philosophy of individualism which,
while it provides the foundation for freedom to contract, at the same time
nurtures a concomitant freedom to breach.5
Thus even a preliminary inquiry as to the legal consequences of
contractual failure reveals that the choices open to an individual to whom
a consensual obligation is owed, upon discovering that the promised
performance is not forthcoming, are both limited and well established.
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He can, in some cases, demand that the promise be performed precisely
(leaving aside the issue of temporal dislocation) as agreed - the archetypical suit for delivery of the subject-matter of a contract of sale and the
complementary action for the price. More commonly, society may limit
contractual redress to a claim for monetary compensation for losses
. ~ one might ask,
suffered as a consequence of the failure to p e r f ~ r mWhy,
does society, through the medium of the law, sometimes restrict the
choice to a substitutionary damage claim and yet in other cases allow,
indeed in some instances compel, the claimant to insist on performance?
A number of related theories have been proffered with varying degrees
of success as possible analytical foundations for the primacy of damages in
the common law of contract. The arguments have ranged from the
protection of third-party claims in the case of executory contracts,'
tautological reliance on the recognition of equitable interests protected by
equitable remedies,' protection of individual liberty,g administrative
costs,1° judicial deference," and costs of valuation of market and
non-market goods1' to the distributive implications of specific performance with respect to the relative wealth of the contracting parties.'S
A recent contribution to this collection of doctrinal and interdisciplinary theories, or at least a different way of posing the question, has been
offered by Calabresi and Melamed.14 They suggest that one can identify
the nature of legal entitlements (or rights) as a consequence of the legal
rules - including property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules which have evolved to protect and regulate the creation, use, transferability, destruction, and other attributes of entitlements. A right or
entitlement, let us say the right to privacy, may be said to be protected by a
property rule if we allow appropriation of it by another only after
bargaining; the taker must, before he deprives the present possessor of
the entitlement of it, negotiate a purchase price. Thus when society
protects a property right, it is not simply granting the owner of the right
certain privileges with respect to the entitlement; it is actively forcing
non-owners to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the right by
its owner, unless the owner voluntarily consents to the interference. This
consent to interference, if it is exacted in return for money, goods,
services, or any other thing of value, consists of a bargained exchange
whereby property is distributed and allocated among members of society.
When we insist on this kind of negotiation we may be said to recognize a
property right in the object. Other entitlements (or in other instances, the
same entitlement in a different setting) are protected by liability rules, in
which case the taker need not negotiate a price but must compensate the
owner for the harm occasioned by the taking or interference. The classical
examples given of this kind of entitlement are nuisance and negligence,
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where, in many instances, because of the numbers of interested parties,
the unintentional nature of the taking, or the imbalances in negotiation
brought on by free riders and holdouts,'5 the costs of negotiation are
prohibitive, foreclosing any realistic attempt at imposing property rules to
protect entitlements. Finally, some entitlements, such as the right to life
under most circumstances, are protected further by inalienability rules the owner cannot sell, and the taker cannot lawfully take, with or without
bargaining or ex post compensation.
In a recent article, Kronman carried this analysis one step further,
applying Calabresi and Melamed's thesis to contract entitlements:
In contract law, a liability rule permits a promisor to breach his promise provided
he compensates the other party by payment of money damages. The fundamental
alternative to money damages, in the law of contracts, is specific performance. A
promise may be said to be specifically enforceable when the law gives its owner,
the promisee, a right to require the actual (or 'specific') performance of the
promise. The right to positively enjoin a promise, like the right to negatively
enjoin a nuisance, may be viewed as an entitlement protected by a property rule.
In both cases, the owner of the right is in a position to force the would-be taker to
negotiate a voluntary transfer of the particular entitlement. If the taker acts
unilaterally (by simply refusing to perform, or by continuing to pollute), he can be
compelled by an injunctive order to honour the owner's entitlement; and if he
then refuses to honour the injunction itself, he may be forced to make a payment
(not necessarily pecuniary) to the state or the promisee greater than that required
to compensate the promisee for this loss.16

Bentham long ago made a similar point: 'Property is nothing but the basis
of expectation: the expectation of deriving certain1advantages from a
thing, which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which
we stand towards it.'' Applying Bentham's thesis to the thing of contract,
one can quite readily perceive that contractual expectations are accorded
widely diverse treatment in law. There is no doubt that all contractual
entitlements are, at least in theory, valuable - the owner can assign the
entitlement, receiving an immediate return rather than engaging in the
risk and delay inherent in an executory transaction. He may, if a stranger
interferes, obtain compensation for inducement of a breach of his contract which interferes with his expectations coming to fruition. And if his
promisor fails to perform, he can often recover damages to compensate
him for his losses. This wealth, however, is not property. It is property
only if the law offers him the right to its continued existence, rather than
mere compensation for its loss. As I have noted, however, this is not
usually the case: 'Expectances are for most purposes not treated as
property."8
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Yet Calabresi and Melamed's contentions, with respect to the low cost of
negotiation operating as an overriding incentive to the recognition of
property rights (ie, the protection of entitlements by property rules),
seem particularly apt in the contractual context. As Kronman points out, a
priori the parties to the contract know one another, and thus one need not
concern oneself with questions of search and identification,'g and many
contracts, since they involve only two parties, obviate the difficulties
caused by holdouts and free riders. For these reasons and others, one
might have suspected that specific performance would have evolved as
the preferred remedy in contract law. This has not been so, and it is
obvious that other forces have been at play in the recognition and
protection of contractual expectations through liability rules. The only
species of contract that conforms to Kronman's analysis is the contract for
the purchase and sale of real property. The most prominent exception to
liability rules in contract - the specific enforcement of contracts relating to
land - constitutes perhaps the final vestige of the historical subordination
of contract to property.'" Contracts relating to land create performatory
But,
' of course, land is not 'unique' in
obligations 'as a matter of ~ o u r s e . ' ~
any sense which would deny absolutely the capability to assess damages.
Market prices (of a sort) are available to the courts in determining value,
and notwithstanding ample evidence that the protection of entitlements
by property rules may be explained by institutional limitations reflected in
a judicial disinclination to engage in valuation in the absence of a market,
incongruities in the law suggest that the foundation for the evolution of
property rules to protect contractual entitlements must be found elsewhere."
Perhaps specific performance in respect of land - the protection of real
contractual entitlements by property rules - is not grounded in 'uniqueness,' liberty, or the avoidance of valuation errors. When one looks
beyond the boundaries of specific performance one is immediately struck
by the variety of relationships ranging from the treatinent of par01
contracts under the Statute of Frauds's and special rights made available
to defaulting mortgagors24 to the application of criminal sanctions to
violations of contractual expectations,'5 which, where they involved the
transfer of land, were so often imbued with bizarre legal characteristics.
This diversity of judicial and legislative behaviour suggests that the
rationale for the creation of property rights in contracts relating to land
must be found elsewhere than in mere difficulties in assessment of value.
Too many of us have been naively comfortable with a rule which
authorizes a court to order specific performance (that is, to recognize
property rights in contract) whenever it is just, or fair, or equitable, or
reasonable to do so. Justice, fairness, equity, and reasonableness are, of
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course, values to which the law has aspired and which it will seek to achieve
for eternity. The obvious difficulty with reliance on what we may call
justice language is that the meaning of these concepts to one person is
often precisely the opposite to that attributed to them by another. The
language ofjustice and fairness is meaningless unless one gives it content.
The traditional jurisprudence touching on the remedy of specific
performance does offer some insight as to the underpinnings of justice.
As I have outlined briefly, the 'uniqueness' of the object of the contract,
the administrative costs of assessing damages, the risks of overcompensation or under-compensation, difficulties of mitigation, and the
'inadequacy' of damages are the most common judicial rationalizations
for ordering specific performance. More recently, as I have described,
followers of economic analysis of law have offered more detailed
explanations for ordering performance of contractual obligations. I hope
in this essay to offer a somewhat different perspective on the foundations
for the creation of property rights in contracts relating to land. No doubt
the common law and economic explanations (assuming a difference to
exist) are not entirely without merit. Nonetheless, the ancient and pervasive relationship of land ownership with political identity, legal authority,
and social status suggests that the rules relating to bargained exchanges of
land may have some deeper meaning. My assumption, of course, is that
the law of contract could not have developed in total isolation from the
political, economic, and social values of the society which gave meaning to
property. My task, however, is not merely of academic or historical
relevance. If in fact the law has protected expectations under land
contracts through specific performance, in implicit recognition of the
non-economic political and social attributes of such exchanges, then if
other kinds of contracts are now imbued with political and social
attributes, we must seriously question whether property rules should be
extended to reflect this transformation in cultural values.
This paper has, then, two major themes. In the first part I hope to
elucidate the relationship of political, legal, and social status associated
with land ownership to the unique legal remedies - specific performance
and non-recovery of damages - which society created in respect to exchanges of land (and thus exchanges of status) for money. In the conclusion I examine the transformation of legal rules applied to agreements in
which labour is exchanged for money. If, in fact, property rules in contract evolved in response to the political, legal, and social attributes of land
ownership, then one may be able to perceive a metamorphosis in the
nature of labour entitlements as the meaning and place of labour in
society has evolved. I should point out as well that the purpose of this essay
is not to deny that land contracts ought no longer to be protected by
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property rules. It is less ambitious than that. My intent is to point out that
many of the underlying social and political forces which created the
traditional boundaries of specific performance are no longer extant.
Other contracts which have nothing at all to do with real property may
have replaced, or at least joined, land contracts as the focal point of social
expectations and obligations. Wealth exists in numerous guises, many of
which were unknown or even illegal when contract law developed in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Private property, be it in tangible
assets or contracts, is a delicate institution. If the law closes its eyes to social
change and protects only one form of wealth to the exclusion of all others,
it exists only to protect those who possess the former.
Where, then, does one look for guidance in order to uncover the forces
underlying the evolution of property rules in contract? What is this vast
difference, this great 'moment' or 'special or fancy value' which justified
the protection of contractual entitlements through property rules even
where market value was ascertainable? One must search, it seems, outside
the sphere of economic expectations - to understand the place of land in
the constitutional, political, and social institutions of England during the
formative stages of its legal development - if one is to appreciate fully the
significance and role of property rules in respect of promissory entitlements. Maitland, writing in 1908, remarked that England's 'whole constitutional law seems at times to be but an appendix to the law of real
property."6 One might equally posit that England's law of real property
and contract is but a reflection of its constitutional law. This curious
admixture of property rights, civil status, and political authority born of
centuries of feudal economy and government remains hidden beneath
the surface of the law, resulting in an intricate intermingling of private
and public rights (and law). Only when it is examined closely does one
grasp the subtle interests and influences which lie beneath apparent
irrationality and arbitrariness.
Our starting point in such an inquiry must be to acknowledge at least
two implicit assumptions under which money damage awards are made.
First, the protection of promissory entitlements by liability rules may
presuppose an economic foundation for the contract." Second, it
presumes the acceptability, in terms of popular cultural and social values,
of public and collective monetization of the value of the owner's losses. If,
in fact, we do not find the objective valuation of certain objects acceptable
in terms of our social and cultural mores, or if the promissory entitlement
has as its object the transfer of something other than economic wealth,
then liability rules, involving an award of money damages, may succumb
to the institution of property. The protection of promissory entitlements
involving land evolved during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
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indeed had become fixed, as property rules, by the turn of the nineteenth
century; and if one is to appreciate fully the rationale for this unlikely
occurrence, one must understand the cultural, social, economic, and
political values of those times.28
We begin with the obvious. Few would argue with the proposition that
land constituted the most important form of economic wealth prior to the
industrial revolution in England: 'A wealthy man was one who had
~
extonsive holdings in land, the landless man was of little a c c ~ u n t . "The
prccection of promissory entitlements in respect of land evolved in an age
where the leading authority on real property could write in terms almost
incomprehensible to the modern mind:
In the early ages of Europe, property was chiefly of a substantial and visible, or,
what lawyers call, a corporeal kind. Trade was little practised, and consequently
debts were seldom incurred. There were no public funds, and of course no
funded property. The public wealth consisted principally of land, and the houses and
buildings erected upon it, of the cattle in the fields, and the goods in the houses. Now
land, which is immovable and indestructable, is evidently a different species of
property from a cow or a sheep, which may be stolen, killed, eaten; or from a chair
or a table, which may be broken up or burnt.
There is now perhaps as much personal property in the country as real; possibly there may
be more. Real property, however, still retains many of its ancient laws, which invest
it with an interest and importance to which personal property has no claim.sO

Protection of entitlements in respect of land evolved in a society whose
entire economic foundation was 'based and centred on land.'g1
Of equal or greater importance is that the economic characteristics of
land as they existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were
radically different from those which exist today. It has been said, for
example, that the aggregate value of land in the i 800s 'remained in real
money terms, about the same as it was in ... 1066,'s' and Dicey, explaining
the failure of nineteenth-century land reform in England, wrote at the
end of that century that 'land is not a lucrative investment.'ss Corbin's
rationale for the emergence of the rule in Bain v Fothergill34 denying
recognition of a purchaser's expectation interest on breach of a contract
for the sale of land suggests that land in England was not purchased in the
hope of a rapid appreciation in price.35 In 1894Mayne, writing of the time
at which damages are to be assessed for breach of an executed contract to
sell land, was unable to find any English authority on the right of the
purchaser to recover the appreciated value of the land at the time of
eviction, instead reviewing the considerable American authority on
point.36 This stability in land prices was openly acknowledged by the
judiciary. In 1786, the Supreme Court of Connecticut justified its
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reluctance to adopt an English principle restricting damage remedies in
respect of land contract in the following terms: 'the diversity ... between
British practice and ours is undoubtedly founded in the permanent worth
of their land, as an old country, and the increasing worth of ours as a new
country.37
While land may have been in demand during the seventeenth and
eighteenth c e n t ~ r i e sthe
,~~
incentives for contracting were apparently not
pecuniary.
The seventeenth century merchants who bought land were diverting capital into
an investment that promised no better than a five percent return. Had they left
their money in the city, they could have been assured of a ten percent return.
These individuals were willing to accept a lesser income because they coveted the
prestige that went with the land. The new men were more interested in behaving
like landed gentlemen than in earning the kind of profit that would lure a true
capitalist. The landed gentlemen remained the ideal to which all propertied
classes aspired.39

For the most part expected economic returns on capital investment in
land were generally 'not as high as those to be earned from commerce,
finance and office-holding.'4" The agricultural purposes to which land
was put, the practice of granting only leases at will which destroyed any
incentive in the landlords' tenants to improve their lot, and the doctrine of
primogeniture which gave the land to the landowner's eldest son only,
while allocating the capital resources which would allow its improvement
to the younger children, led Mill to conclude the 'Landed Property in
England is ... very far from completely fulfilling the conditions which
render its existence economically justifiable.'4'
The stability of land prices in England can be contrasted with the
speculative characteristics of the land economy in North America. In
America, land was bought and sold in relative freedom, at least in part
because of its seemingly infinite supply during the post-revolutionary era
in the United States and, until far more recently, in Canada.4' As early as
1824, a majority of the New York High Court of Errors noted that 'every
member of this Court must be well aware how much property is held by
contract; that purchases are constantly made upon speculation; that the
value of real estate is fluctuating,'43 and Chancellor Kent spoke of the
ruinous and oppressive injury which would be incurred by a seller of land
if he were to be held liable to a purchaser for the rise in value of the land if
a defect in title were discovered in the future.44 Land in Canada was
subject to similar appreciations in price brought on by the combined
forces of urban development and immigration during the nineteenth
century.45
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As history all too clearly teaches us, the agrarian economy of preindustrial England, the political and social exploitation of the non-landed
citizen,@ the stagnation of land, as a matter of both insecurity of
ownership and retrenchment by the landed aristocracy and gentry,47 and
the 'burdensome expenses imposed on transactions in land by the
common law and its lawyers'*8 reflect a political, social and economic
climate far narrower in focus than today. Lord Jeffrey's 'earth hunger'49
and Lord Nottingham's reaction to the plight of a mortgagor which 'cried
aloud for the protection of the Court of Chancery'5O call attention to the
emotional reactions evoked by land ownership during the formative years
of contract law.
This status, which underlies the discontinuity between the legal
treatment of land contracts and all others, may rest to a large degree on
the political attributes of land ownership - ownership which, for over four
centuries, was inextricably entwined with political power and identity.
The purchase of land was, to put it in its most graphic form, the purchase
of the right to vote. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the rights of the holder of
legal title to land in 1752, described '[a] special privilege of the highest
benefit annexed by the common law to the possession of land ... the right
of voting for coroners, sheriffs and members of parliament.'s1 Daniel
Defoe, writing half a century earlier, felt it necessary to withhold political
rights from mere inhabitants. The right to enact law through representation was vested 'upon the Freeholders; the Freeholders are the proper
Owners of the Country ... the other Inhabitants ... ought to be subject to
such Laws as the Freeholders impose upon them ... because the Freeholders having a Right to the land, the other have no right to live there
but upon sufferance.'5*
The identity of the franchise and ownership of land had its source in
legislation enacted in 1430 which restricted53 the English parliamentary
franchise in county elections to residents who held title to 'free Land or
Tenement of the Value of Forty Shillings by the Year.'54 The enactment
was demonstrably for the purposes of political stabilization, its avowed
intent being to eliminate the disorder which then accompanied elections.55 The express reason for the act was to disenfranchise the
'outrageous and excessive Number of People ...of small substance and no
value' who would otherwise have participated in the electoral process.56
Others have suggested the reactionary mood of the king and Parliament
and political self-interest on the part of the fifteenth-century parliamentarians as foundations for the restriction.57
To ascertain the import in modern terms of a forty-shilling annual
income from land in the fifteenth century is almost impossible. Not only
has the meaning and value of money changed, but if one assumes that
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value is determined by the choices made by individuals in choosing among
various goods, the transformation of society from a local agrarian
economy to an international industrial, commercial, and consumer
economy forecloses meaningful comparisons. Nonetheless, attempts
have been made. Blackstone calculated that forty shillings in the region of
Henry VI (1422 - 60) was equivalent to twenty pounds in 1765,58and in
1898 the fifteenth-century franchise requirement was estimated at thirty
to forty p0unds.5~While there have been a number of similar rough
estimates, if not outright guesses, at the meaning of a forty-shilling
0 , import
~
can best be understood if one considers
freehold in 1 ~ ~its true
that it is said to have disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of
leaseholders, copyholders, and freeholders of land with annual rents of
less than the stated requisite, leaving an electorate of perhaps ten
t h o u ~ a n d . Similar
~'
legislation today would be nothing less than dictatoria1.6z Although the forty-shilling freehold voting requirement applied
uniformly in the counties, suffrage in the boroughs, which in time
returned a far greater percentage of the Commons, was notoriously
idiosyncratic.63Franchise qualifications were determined autonomously,
in some cases extending to members of the borough council, in others to
all freemen, and in still others to holders of burgage tenements, to
potwallers, or to those who paid 'scot and lot.'64 In general the franchise
was restricted, the traditional philosophy being to retain political power in
the hands of the f e ~ . ~ 5
An unquestionable consequence of the forty-shilling freehold voting
requirement was the establishment of a narrow class of enfranchised
landowners; one historian estimated the average county electorate at only
The
~ aggregate
4000, returning two members of Parliament in 1 7 6 0 . ~
county electorate in 1760is said to have consisted of only 170,000 persons
and had risen to 188,000 in 1831.67 Although increases in population and
the practice of transferring land to create votes did operate to enlarge the
electorate to some degree during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, the consensus seems to be that the numbers enjoying the
electoral franchise in fact failed to keep up with the expansion of the
population.68 While the real value of forty shillings per year, measured in
terms of the goods which it could purchase, may have fallen dramatically
over the centuries, 'the decline in the number of individuals holding land
by Freehold, because of the growth of vast landed estates, tended to keep
The picture drawn of the
the rural electorate comparatively ~ma11.'~9
borough electorate is no ~ r e t t i e r . ~
One
" of the more generous estimatesof
the electorate suggests that 3 or 4 per cent of the population was
enfranchised prior to 1832,'' while another concludes that only 465,000
persons of a population of over 24,000,000 were enfranchised in the
election of 1830.~'
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The disenfranchisement of all but a narrow political elite was mirrored
in the nature of land ownership - hardly a startling discovery when, in
essence, ownership of land constituted, and thus parallelled, ownership
of the vote. One likely explanation of the limited membership of the
political and land-owning class is that vast tracts of land were held by
copyholders, who were not enfranchised until the nineteenth century.73
Pollock has suggested that in the sixteenth century a third of England was
copyhold,74 and copyholders, through sheer numbers, constituted an
important class of the English population.75 While the nature of land
holdings evolved over the centuries, the purchase of freehold land
remained the only avenue of entry to the narrow political elite. Even
during the latter part of the nineteenth century the claim was made that
'the great English nation is tenant at will to a few thousand landowner~.'7~
Bonbright concludes that in 1874 there were only 150,000 citizens who
owned more than one acre and argues that this accords well with others
who suggest that the entire population of landowners numbered some
160,000.77 Whatever the true numbers may have been, there can be no
doubt that land ownership and the supply of votes were kept to an
absolute minimum. The result was, as we shall see, precisely what one
might have expected in the case of any valuable good whose supply is kept
down by artificial means.
The limited franchise remained in force, with but one exception during
the Commonwealth from 1653 until 1660,7' for almost four centuries. In
1832,the county franchise was substantiallyextended and some degree of
uniformity established in the borough franchises, under the Reform Act,
183279which, while it left extant the forty-shillingqualification, extended
the franchise to a wider range of real property interests.'"
Constitutional law in Canada suffered from the same inegalitarianism.
The Constitution Act of 179189 was not far removed from its English
parent - while it did not institute a property qualification for membership
in the Legislative Council or Assembly, it limited the franchise in counties
to freeholders of land with a yearly value of forty shillings or its equivalent
in any tenure.go In non-rural areas, suffrage depended upon ownership
of a dwelling house and land valued at five pounds, or tenancy at ten
pounds per year and residency for at least one year.9' Persons disqualified
under provincial legislation were not entitled to vote for members of the
Legislative Assembly.g2 No reforms were instituted under the Canada
Union Act,g3 and in 1849 the earlier acts were consolidated,94 with the
property franchise and provincial disqualifications continued without
substantial modification. The franchise was extended in 1853and 1854 to
owners, tenants, and occupiers of land with an assessed value of $200 or a
yearly value of $20 in townships, or with an assessed value of $300 or a
yearly value of $30 in towns.95
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At Confederation, these qualifications were in force in Ontario and
Quebec,@and similar property qualifications were required of voters in
After Confederation, the federal
Nova Scotia97 and New ~runswick.9~
electoral franchise continued to be determined according to provincial
franchise qualifications, which for decades remained co-extensive with
ownership of real property.99 Ward has calculated that the electorate in
the federal parliamentary elections in 1872 approximated only 15 per
cent of the populations of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick.lo0 This form of representational democracy based on land
ownership was hardly ameliorated by minor reforms in electoral laws
(and, one may presume, by reforms in land ownership), and a decade
later the parliamentary franchise remained strictly circumscribed, ranging from 20.2 per cent in Ontario to 11 per cent in British Columbia and
to 16.6 per cent in Quebec.'"'
The provincial tendency to abrogate property qualifications and the
federal government's illiberal views on electoral democracy'"' led to the
introduction of the first federal Electoral Franchise Act1"3 in 1885,which,
with minor exceptions in British Columbia and Prince Edward Island,1°4
instituted a nation-wide property qualification. Under section 2 of the act,
the franchise was vested in any male who owned real property in his own
right, or in right of his wife, and who was in actual possession of the land
or in receipt of the rent and profits from it.lo5 A woman's vote (or rather
the vote of a woman who may have held land as a beneficiary) was
exercisable by her husband.lo6
Constitutional jurisdiction to regulate the allocation of the federal
parliamentary franchise after 1885 - since the franchise continued to
depend on ownership of property'"' (traditionally a matter within
provincial jurisdiction) - raised some debate during the early years of
Confederation. However, in 1891 the issue was resolved in favour of the
federal government when the Ontario Divisional Court, Chancery
Division, affirmed federal legislative authority:
This legislation does not trench upon 'property and civil rights in the Province' ...
The subjects of this class of legislation are of a political character, and ... distinct ...
from matters of civil rights in the Provinces which regard mainly the macm and
tuurn as between citizens. It is in my view rather confusing to speak of the right of
voting as comprehended under the 'civil rights' mentioned in sec. 92 sub-s. 13 of
the B.N.A. Act. This franchise is not an ordinary civil right; it is historically and
truly a statutory privilege of a political nature, being the chief means whereby the
people, organized for political purposes, have their share in the functions of
government. lo*

Provincial authority to determine the federal parliamentary franchise was
restored in 18g81°9 and retained until ig17.l'" In 1920 a new federal act
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was promulgated, and civil personality became the touchstone of political
identity."'
The political philosophy that land, not civil personality, was represented in Parliament is presented most vividly by the political status of women
who held land. Although there is some dispute as to the absolute right of
women to exercise the vote in England, a number of commentators take
the view that, until the nineteenth century, women did 'return ...
members of parliament,"" and several cases decided during the seventeenth century make this point without reservation.113 Whatever may
have been the case in England, there is little doubt that women did enjoy
the franchise in the Canadian provinces during the early years of the
nineteenth century.114Those who adopt a more conservative stance admit
that prior to 1832 a woman could transfer her vote to her husband, a son,
or another close relative1'5 and that 'a vote in respect of the property"16
could not be cast away merely on the gender of who might have owned or
possessed the land at issue. A husband could vote in respect of his wife's
property unless the land was vested in trustees for her separate welfare, or
where, after marriage, the property was settled on trustees for her
separate use. In these cases the male could 'by no means vote in respect
thereof."17 Legislation enacted to void the creation of votes through the
vehicle of land transfer was never thought to have extended to the case of
an estate which descended to 'any number of females, the husband of
each having a right to vote if his interest amounted to forty shillings a
year." '* In 1780, after disputes arose as to the exercise of the franchise in
respect of dower rights, legislation was promulgated which expressly
enfranchised the husband of a woman who held dower rights at common
law in respect of her former husband's estates.llg With the reformation of
the franchise and the transformation of the right to vote from a function
of land ownership to an attribute of civil status, women were disenfranchised. ""
The political history of land ownership in England and Canada is
central to an understanding of the development of contract remedies at
common law and equity. The promissory entitlement represented by the
contractual expectations inherent in an agreement to purchase land was
defined not by the transformation of the purchaser's money into
economic wealth in another form, and thus compensable in moneydamages, but rather by the achievement of political identity: '[Mlere
wealth does not entitle a man to vote unless the wealth is converted into
occupancy or a tenure of land.'"' The Commons represented not the
public but rather property in the form of land, and a contract to purchase
land represented a licence to political representation through property
ownership. Although we would be wise to heed Holmes' admonition to
take sceptically the axiom that 'land is capable of having rights,"" the
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social and political fabric of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England lends considerable strength to the image that landed property was
imbued with political rights exercised by the owner of fee, as it were, by
proxy. As recently as 1885, Anson could write of 'the modern theory, that
Property as such ... is entitled to representation,'"g and in Anelay v.
Lewz(i124Jervis cj said: 'There is a qualification arising out of this piece of
land.'"5 The concept of the franchise as equivalent to - one might even
say indistinguishable from - ownership of freehold land has been said to
be 'typical of the eighteenth century,"26 and one suspects that the
assimilation of one to the other was such an integral part of political and
social mores that few would think it necessary to make the point explicitly
when recognizing political expectations through the enforcement of
contractual rights in law.127 Nonetheless, legal actions and legislative
intervention involving the franchise can be found, and it is here that we
discover an express acknowledgement of the degree to which rights to
vote, rights in land, and contract law had become inextricably entwined
with one another.
considered the
Holt cj, in the now famous case of Ashby v
county freeholder's right to vote by reason of his ownership of land as a
'real Right, [and] in boroughs ... a real Right annexed to the tenure of
burgage ... a noble privilege, which entitles the subject to a share in the
government and legislature.'12g Ashby v White involved a claim for
damages arising on the malicious refusal of the plaintiff's vote by a
returning officer in a parliamentary election; Holt cj understood this
illegal interference with the right to vote as giving rise to a 'cause of action
on the property of the subject"3" and thus being within the jurisdiction of
the common law courts notwithstanding that it touched upon parliamentary matters. The identity of political status and title to land and the real
nature of both were affirmed by the House of Lords:
[Tlhere is a great difference between the right of the electors and the right of the
elected: the one is a temporary right to a place in parliament, pro hac vice; the other
is a freehold or a franchise. Who has a right to sit in the House of Commons may
be properly cognisable there; but who has a right to choose is a matter originally
established, even before there is a parliament. A man has a right to his vote, having
annexed the right of voting to his freehold, it is of the nature of his freehold, and
must depend upon it. The same law that gives him his right must defend it for
him, and any other power that will pretend to take away his right of voting may as
well pretend to take away the freehold upon which it depends.'3'

Contractual rights to vote, if seen as rights of freehold or real rights,
would have been enforceable by specific remedies - the distinguishing
mark between real and personal rights: '3' 'The Plaintiff has a right to the
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franchise and therefore the law would give a remedy for breach of that
right."ss
A second area where the intersection of contract law and political rights
is evident is that of mortgages and the enfranchisement of purchasers of
land prior to completion. From 1430 until close to the end of the
seventeenth century only holders of legal title to land were entitled to
exercise the franchise. This prerequisite left two substantial classes of
persons disenfranchised, notwithstanding that they enjoyed inchoate
rights in land. Neither purchasers of land whose contractual rights had
not yet crystalized into full ownership interests nor mortgagors who had
transferred legal ownership in their land as security for credit with the
proviso that the conveyance should be void once their debt was paid in full
could vote under the original franchise legislation. Delays in conveyancing were considerable in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and so
was the interference with a purchaser's expected exercise of the franchise,
brought on by the complexities and uncertainties of the law of real
property; Fry attributes the growth of the doctrine of specific performance to the disarray of titles of land: '[Wlhere contract is separated from
conveyance by all the formalities and delay of an examination into title,
and the preparation of a formal deed, [specific performance] would be a
necessity to anything like a civilized system of law."54
Interference with acquisition of the right to vote was reduced considerably in 1696. In that year the franchise was extended to prospective
purchasers in actual physical possession of the land or in receipt of its
~ purchaser standing in the
rents and profits pending c ~ m p l e t i o n-' ~the
guise of a beneficiary in relation to the vendor as a trustee or quasitrustee.'s6 Thus, after 1696 political rights depended on the terms of the
contract of purchase and sale, and specifically on the private allocation of
physical possession or economic return prior to a transfer of legal
ownership: 'If they belonged to the purchaser under such circumstances
that he could compel a specific performance, the vendor was a trustee of
the legal estate for him, he took an equitable freehold and had a right to
vote."s7 Over time, the recognition of the purchaser's equitable interest in
the land and, more precisely, his right to specific performance became the
explicit criterion for the electoral franchise: '[Ilf a person has such an
equitable title as the Courts will recognize, he is entitled to vote. As where
there has been an agreement for sale and the vendee has taken possession
under the agreement, or has become otherwise entitled to a specific
performance of the c0ntract."3~
One might surmise, easily enough, that mortgagors would have been
similarly dissatisfied with electoral qualifications for different but equally
persuasive reasons. If a purchaser of land gave a mortgage as security for
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the price, he did not, through mere acquisition of equitable ownership,
acquire the vote; and if one already owned land, the mortgage became a
tool of disenfranchisement if insufficient land was retained to meet the
forty-shilling annual income qualification.'39 Finally, even if a mortgagor
retained sufficient land to vote, mortgage transactions resulted in a
dilution of narrowly circumscribed political authority - where only the
landowner could vote prior to the mortgage, both he and his creditor
would be entitled to the franchise once legal ownership was transferred.
In 1759 Lord Mansfield would openly acknowledge the transfer of the
franchise as a predominant characteristic of the transfer of legal title by
way of mortgage prior to i6g6.I4O
The political implications of what was rapidly evolving into a patently
commercial transaction were altered in 1696,with the enfranchisement of
all mortgagors in possession of the land or in receipt of the requisite yearly
value of forty shillings.'4' Again political identity was dependent upon
private, contractual allocation of rights to land, and it is not inconceivable
that the mortgagee's contractual right to dispossess the landowner, as a
private right of disenfranchisement, was modified by equitable doctrines
in response to political reality: 'In popular parlance, the possession of the
land without rack rent or receipt of rent is often made the test of
ownership. As regards mortgages this is more practical than appears at
first sight; for the mortgagee rarely takes possession save as a last resort,
and such possession is therefore usually followed by sale, foreclosure, or
the acquisition of a squatter's title. Likewise possession confers upon the
party the parliamentary franchise.'I4'
The intersection of the law of specific performance and the franchise,
undisguised in the case of purchases and mortgages of real property, is
revealed in a third context in the historical treatment in Equity of
transfers of copyhold land. A contract to sell freehold land, which in truth
was held only by copyhold, was not capable of specific performance.'43 A
purchaser would not have copyhold land forced on him even though it
has been said that the ancient requirement that the lord of the manor
consent to the transfer had become a mere formality by the end of the
seventeenth century. It is true, nonetheless, that later contracts in respect
of copyhold estates were ordered performed.'44 Earlier, however, when
copyholders were not enfranchised it had been held that an agreement to
transfer a copyhold estate would not be enforced,'45 and it has been said
that '[alt one time the Court hesitated to decree specific performance of
an agreement relating to copyhold lands, in respect of the rights of the
lord; but about 1680, the distinction was laughed out of c0urt."4~
Thus there can be no quarrel with the proposition that the courts, as
well as the community at large, were cognizant of the interdependence of
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the franchise and land ownership; and the practice of creating 'occasional
voters' - voters who acquired ownership of land for the sole purpose of
voting for a particular candidate - was held an offence at common law
early in the eighteenth century and possibly earlier.'47 In addition, the
practice of conveying land 'in order to multiply voices, or to split and
divide the interest in any houses or lands among several persons, to enable
them to vote at elections' .was decried in 1696 under section 7 of Lord
~ the contract to sell votes deemed 'void and of none
Somer's ~ c t ' 4and
effect.' This prohibition was later reinforced by the institution of a not
insubstantial fine in the case of contracts made in 'a fraudulent or collusive
manner, on purpose to qualify' the recipient to vote.'49 However, these
statutes, as well as the common law criminal offence, applied only to those
conveyances which were actually fraudulent,'5" and the practice soon
arose of splitting estates into numerous smaller units and of granting
various minor interests in the same land (eg, estates for life, annuities, and
rent charges), thereby creating a large number of voters whose political
behaviour could be influenced by the primary landowner. Even before
the Cromwellian revolution, the freehold franchise had been altered
drastically; men were voting in counties in respect of annuities, tenancies
for life, in tail or in fee, and rent charges, as trustees and mortgagees, and
in respect of the dowers of their wives.'5'
Thus the mere purchase of a house with five others, all of whom were to
gain votes, without a collateral contract establishing a candidate for whom
the votes were to be cast, was not illegal.15' A classic case is that of Hoyland v
Bremne~-,'~~
where a large number of properties were purchased by
members of a political organization from a vendor who knew nothing of
the purchasers' political intentions. The sales were affirmed without
question. In Alexander v Newman154 a purchase of property for value by
thirty-five purchasers from a vendor to whom the land was leased back
immediately after the sale was challenged under the legislation. The
vendor and purchasers held the same political views, and the admitted
and sole purpose of the sale was the transfer of political identity to the
purchasers. Nonetheless, the conveyances were not voided, the court
holding that the legislation applied only to those alleged conveyances
which did not transfer any interest in land at all, and which when made,
contained stipulations as to how the franchise was to be exercised. The law
reports are replete with similar cases.155SOlong as the consideration for
the purchase was paid, and no overt control over the exercise of the
franchise was retained by the vendor, the sales were not set aside. Where,
however, the purchases were infected with secret trusts - the conveyances
merely fictitious - the fraudulent sales were set aside as null
and void.'5
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By 1875, Lord Coleridge could say, in a case involving a transfer of land
to a trustee for the admitted purpose of enfranchising some thirty-four
beneficiaries: 'It may be that the framers of this deed contemplated a
fraud upon the election law. It may be that their object was to create votes.
~ 5Archibald
~
J, responding to the
They had a perfect right to do ~ 0 . And
claim that the manifest intention of a transaction was to manufacture
votes, said that the court would 'not look behind the legal construction of
the deed."5* SOwidespread was the practice that in Etherington v Wilson,'59
James LJ admitted: 'Of course it is familiar to us all that men constantly
acquire qualifications for voting in counties. A man buys a 40 s. freehold
for the sole purpose - the undisguised purpose - of giving himself a vote
in a county with which he has not and does not mean to have any
connection whatever.''& The political aspirations and motives of purchasers of land in boroughs were, it seems, even more unqualified: 'The
right to vote being attached to the ownership of certain tenements, it was
simply a matter of buying sufficient properties in a borough to be able to
control its ele~tion."~'
The Canadian judiciary took an equally sanguine view of these
practices, one case holding that under the Canadian constitutional form
of government, every citizen had the right to purchase such property 'as
would qualify him to vote in a parliamentary election in whatever district
he pleases."62 Again, however, the purchase of votes through fraudulent
sales of real property was di~allowed.'~S
This entire drama is made all the more meaningful when one realizes
that land represented not only the right to vote but also, when the
franchise was extended in the nineteenth century, the power to control
the exercise of one's tenants' franchise.164 The political influence which
could be purchased with land could hardly be reflected or assessed in
money terms:
[Slome interesting stories were told -of a landlord in mid-Cheshire whose tenants
supported a candidate during the canvass and then unaccountably voted against
him; of another whose tenants asked him if they were free to vote as they wished,
and on his agreeing that they were, they voted against his candidate; and the two
cases that caused the greatest stir - the case of the Marquis of Lothian and the case
of the hundred tenants evicted at Cardiganshire (immediately after an election)
and the fund of f4,ooo collected for them, mainly from the subscriptions of
fellow tenants ...
The case of the Marquis of Lothian concerned a substantial tenant who was
refused a renewal of a nineteen-year lease because he had voted against the
candidate favoured by the Marquis ... Lothian said there were 'many' reasons why
he had not renewed the lease, 'but I should consider myself acting unfairly if I did
not say out at once that among them was the vote he gave at election.'165
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Even freeholders, supposedly capable of exercising an independent mind
if they could hold themselves above the pressures of social hierarchy, were
amenable to economic rewards, and perhaps as tenants on other land
were subject to inescapable pressure at the hands of their landlords, who
might threaten them with evicti0n.1~~
This exercise of political influence through contract law, incomprehensible today, was ensured and reinforced through the practice of the open
ballot, which allowed the purchaser of land to monitor the efficacy of his
authority and thereby assess the 'return' on his investment. The institution of the secret ballot, although advocated for almost a century,'67 did
not take place until 1872,16' and the exercise of overt political influence
through widespread bribery at the hands of landowners did not disappear at least until then. It has been said, however, that one disconcerting
effect of the secret ballot was to allow voters to take bribes from both
candidates without fear of d i s c ~ v e r ~ . ' ~ g
Finally, plural voting - the exercise of the political franchise in as many
counties as one held land - was notorious.'7" While residence had been a
franchise requisite for several centuries, by the eighteenth century a man
could vote in each county in which he had purchased freehold land, and in
1774 the residency requirement was repealed.'7' Mill wrote, 'A person
may have a double vote by other means than that of tendering two votes at
the same hustings; he may have a vote in each of two different
constituencies: and ...this exceptional privilege at present belongs rather
to superiority of means than of intelligence."7' The custom of plural
voting was made possible by the practice of holding the polls open for
several days, or even weeks,'73and in Canada, electionsin 1867ran from 7
August until 2 0 September, and in 1872 from 2 0 July to 1 2 October.'74
During debates concerning Canadian electoral reform in 1885 some
members argued that plural voting discriminated against those land
owners who had bought scattered properties which were too distant to
allow travel from one constituency to another and worked against the
interest of other members who were obliged to cover the travelling
expenses of non-resident voters.'75 Although many abuses of the Canadian electoral process were eliminated in 1874,176 remnants of this
distinctly inegalitarian convention lingered until 1920.~77
The ultimate consequence of the political philosophy that land merited
representation in Parliament - 'the propertied basis of the franchise'17' was the general acceptance outside the structure of law of the view that the
vote itself was property, to be bought and sold in the same manner as any
Consequently, any person who desired the
other valuable posse~sion.'~g
exercise or use of this political property would have to contract for it,
either in money or through barter.''" Where landed interests were in
conflict, votes were traded at inflated prices; the only redeeming feature
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of such contractual freedom in circumstances of laissez-faire political
competition was that the voter, if his franchise was to be purchased, at
least had the choice of prospective buyers."' It is not at all inconceivable
that the price placed on land included this indeterminable, but nonetheless real, premium for the voting privileges expected by a purchaser.'89 In
the early eighteenth century, in the smaller constituencies, 'voting at
and in view
parliamentary elections was a regular means of li~elihood,"~3
of the openness of the practice, it is not at all unlikely that the future
stream of income from the franchise would constitute a not insubstantial
factor in the more traditional forms of economic return from land. Votes,
under this view, were marketable commodities with a fluctuating but
generally appreciating value, and the only means to acquire this good was
through the purchase of land.184 Traditional contract theory applied to
the political relationship of the parliamentarian and his constituents
reflects this view. Since the vote was a good which could be bought and
sold as land, the member, if he wanted the good to be used in a certain
manner, would have to compensate the owner: 'From the point of view of
the electorate ... the privilege of the franchise was conceived in terms of
personal advantage in the narrowest sense,'185 and of course those who
held land which entitled them to vote twice were doubly c~mpensated."~
The scheme was self-perpetuating. Those who enjoyed the franchise
through the purchase of land not only risked the loss of political wealth
upon the dilution of their voting monopoly, but also would suffer the
economic loss on the depreciation of the price paid for their votes (which
presumably would be reflected in a corresponding diminution in the
capital price of their land). As one commentator has observed somewhat
cynically, 'the only change effected by the Reform Act was that the price of
votes fell because the number willing to sell their votes had grown."87
The purchase and sale of votes, which today are distributed without
regard to income or wealth, were viewed without embarrassment in
earlier times. A treatise on election law published in 1880 advised
solicitors, when assessing the political character of a community, to count
stressing that the cost of the
'men who vote only for a c~nsideration,"~~
voter was to be noted as well and warning, 'If your candidate honestly
resolves not to secure these marketable votes, you must count them as
against YOU."^^ The practice was hardly a secret one: the candidates'
managers were instructed, when canvassing prospective voters, to tabulate those canvassed as: '1. Probable friendly; 2. Probable hostile;
3. Neutrals; and 4. For sale."gO
So far I have attempted to demonstrate that in England, as well as in
Canada, markets and thus contracts in land were in fact private allocative
devices in which the goods distributed included political identity and,
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later, political a ~ t h o r i t y . ' ~This
' in itself could explain the quite extraordinary contractual remedies created by the law to reflect those expectations. History demonstrates, however, that markets in land in fact
represented markets in much more. Not only did one acquire political
identity and influence on the purchase of land, but contracts for land were
made with the knowledge that the ultimate right to hold parliamentary
office was premised on land ownership. From 1 7 1 1 until late in the
nineteenth century parliamentary representatives from the counties and
boroughs were qualified only if they possessed land worth at least f 600
per year and $300 per year respectively.'g2 Thus the franchise and
political influence were joined by a third political expectation, the
privilege of sitting in Parliament, and in 1 7 9 4 Clark LJ described
landowners 'who alone had a right to be represented by Parliament, not
the rabble who have nothing but personal property."gs It is not, therefore,
surprising that the legislation enacted in 1 7 1 1 was described in its
preamble as 'securing the freedom of parliament.'lg4 And of course the
restriction of political power represented by ownership of land was
self-perpetuating. It existed, as we have seen, for over four centuries.
Land in the seventeenth century had become synonymous with freedom
and liberty, an unformulated assumption upon which a vast part of the
English law has been built: 'trade, law, and government itself were
visualized as ministering, in different degrees, to the sanctity of landed
property.'l95
Contract was the vehicle which society chose to allocate this political
good in the same way as it had chosen contract to allocate votes.
Nonetheless, Cannon notes that the requirement was evaded or 'often
met by land transfers within families' or with the aid of accommodating
lawyers or friends.@ It was not uncommon to discover conveyances
intended to qualify the transferee to sit in Parliament or hold some other
qualified elected office,lg7and intra-familial transfers of property, often
for a nominal consideration, were affirmed by the courts, notwithstanding that their sole intent was to enfranchise the transferor's son or to
qualify him to sit in Parliament.'@ Nor were contractual expectations
limited to parliamentary enfranchisement or qualification, as cases
respecting transfers of land to circumvent the gaming laws indicate so
clearly.'99 In Callaghan v Callaghan,'" however, the House of Lords
dismissed an appeal from a decision of Lord Plunket refusing specific
performance of an agreement to make a lease intended to qualify the
transferee for a seat in Parliament, on the ground that there was no
contractual intention to transfer an interest in land under the contract,
but only the most obvious intention to qualify the purported lessee.'"'
Nonetheless, if an interest in land was to be transferred the courts would

Heinonline - - 32 U. Toronto L.J. 51 1982

not hesitate to enforce contracts whose obvious intent was the purchase
of status and political influence. This private right when exercised openly
was protected, as one might imagine, by a property rule: an order for
performance of a contract to establish the plaintiff as a baronet for f 500
was awarded in the early seventeenth cent~ry,'"~
and Maitland notes that
'no great absurdity could have resulted from the doctrine that the right to
a summons [to Parliament] could be conveyed along with the lands.""3
Once we acknowledge that land rather than the individual was represented in Parliament, it becomes entirely clear that an offer of damages
as compensation for breach of an agreement to transfer land would,
during the eighteenth century, have been considered entirely disproportionate to the injury suffered and also an outright insult to the political
aspirations of the plaintiff. Although a decision to purchase land most
likely arose from a variety of motives, it may be said with some degree of
confidence that monetary profit was not an overriding consideration. T o
the political expectations detailed above (political identity, political
authority, and parliamentary qualification acquired on the sale),one may
add legal expectations. Through a bargained exchange of land for money
the purchaser gained entry to the narrow class of society eligible for jury
service. Ownership of land was for centuries2"4 a qualification for jury
service which, while it may or may not at one time have been a desired
public duty,1°5 resulted in an identity of membership between political
and legal communities. Men of property, that is land, were allegedly more
amenable to punishment: '[Tlhe reason why a juryman is to have a
freehold when he is sworn is that the law intends that he will more take
care to speak the truth than one who has none; and if he do not say the
truth he will be punished in attaint and his land wasted."~~
The exercise of political and legal authority vested in the English jury
was a social privilege, like so many other, which formed part of the
contractual expectations of a purchaser of land. This confluence of legal
institutions and land ownership was extended in 1732 to justices of the
peace, who were required to possess land of at least f loo per yearz0' - 'A
remarkable tribute to the ideal of landed property.'2o8 This legislation
was, in fact, merely a revision of fifteenth-century legislation which from
1440 onwards demanded that everyjustice of the peace derive at least 520
per year from land.'Og
Political identity through ownership of land and the franchise - and
later, political influence exercisable over one's tenants - and parliamentary, jural, and judicial qualifications were, however, only the most
tangible non-economic promissory expectations motivating the contract
to purchase land. Of far greater import was the acquisition of social status.
Wealth acquired through commerce or industry did not make the
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merchant or factory owner the equal of the landed gentleman - an
exalted status attainable only through the purchase of an estate - and it is
almost trite to say that the social status acquired with the acquisition of title
to land would have defied quantification. Purchases of land were, as we
have seen, often made in disregard of the financial consequences of the
investment,'1° and for the law to adjust the rights of the parties through a
pecuniary award would have been to act in total disregard of the
purchaser's social as well as his political and legal aspirations."' Ownership of land was a social privilege - land had not, at the time, entered the
stream of commerce as an economic commodity. Thus Weber writes that
'the social prestige of the manorial lords also motivates the nouveawc riches
to invest their acquired wealth not in a capitalistic venture, but in land, in
Members of the fledgling
order to rise to the nobility if it be p~ssible.'~"
middle class who had acquired their wealth in commerce, finance, and
industry bought land to attain social status 'for their children, if not for
themselves."'3 The price paid for land was not simply the product of the
economic wealth which it would produce for its new owner but represented the value which the purchaser, often new to wealth, would pay for
entry into the landed class. Objective assessment of this value in the form
of damages would have been a wholly unthinkable legal response, an
insult to both parties, and a terribly imprecise and expensive task once
undertaken. Social expectations and political aspirations in market
transactions would have resulted in intractable difficulties in assessing the
value of contractual performance, and one suspects as well that the
disappointment on contractual failure would not have been compensable
in money damages.
The new iniddle class had no shortage of wealth, while the customs and
social mores of the time insisted upon land ownership as the unique badge
of social acceptability: 'Traders have no bond of union, no habits of
intercourse; their wives, if they care for society, want to see not the wives
of other such men, but 'better people,' as they say - the wives of men
certainly with land, and, if Heaven help, with titles."'4 The base financial
success of the new industrialist and merchant were not the measure of
social worth. If he was to make his mark he would have to 'escape from the
source of his wealth, to acquire new interest, 'and he was more likely to
magnify than to belittle the virtues of the life into which he and his wife
yearned to be admitted, the life of wealth, of power and consideration on
the land."I5 It would be naive to presume that the licence to such social
intercourse had a price in money, and one can quite easily appreciate the
foundations of legal rules which would at once avoid valuation, affirm the
primacy of land in society, and restrict whatever opportunities might have
been available to transform land into an economic commodity.
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The result of all of this, as one modern writer has hypothesized''6
(unaware, it seems, of his historical accuracy), was the concentration of
political power in the landed classes. Entry into this exalted class could not
be obtained without land; members of the new commercial and industrial
classes sought to become 'squires by p ~ r c h a s e " ' and,
~
once established,
attempted to entrench their status, not only through the perpetuation of
legal rules which reflected political authority in economic power and
which, like the doctrine of primogeniture, kept both within narrow
onf fines''^ but also, by private arrangements, to ensure that the land
which constituted a 'unique' entry to social status and political authority
was retained in perpetuity by the landowner's family."g
The protection of contractual entitlements by property rules should
thus be perceived as a reflection of political and social values which for
centuries had identified the contract for the purchase and sale of land as
an allocative device in non-economic goods - political identity and
authority, legal identity, and social status. The special legal status of such
contracts - enforced by the state in a manner quite unlike exchanges of
commodities - recognized the non-economic expectations of the contracting parties. It seems to me, however, that the intersection of property
rights in contract with political, legal, and social status should be
considered as a more diffuse phenomenon. That is, the legal protection of
contractual rights in land by property rules not only served to protect the
expectations of purchasers; as a more general matter it reaffirmed the
primacy of land ownership in English society - a primacy undeniable in
terms of the cultural, political, and social perspectives of the time. The
moral authority of property (land) was not extended to financial wealth,
and indeed the law was structured to retain authority in those possessed of
land, not money. Protection of contractual rights in land through law
could engender social acceptability and consensus only if the political
authority and status which the land purchaser sought was respected in
legal rules defining remedies on breach. Property rules fulfilled these
intentions; liability rules would only have insulted them.
There is one further point which must be examined before we turn to
the analysis of liability rules in contracts for the purchase and sale of land.
My thesis so far has been that bargained exchanges of real property were
in reality political, legal, and social acts of extraordinary significance. That
is, the contractual expectations of purchasers of real property consisted,
in whole or in part, of political identity, political authority, a number of
legal privileges, and social status, which may or may not have been transferred together with a valuable economic commodity. One may ask,
therefore, whether an award of damages which would have enabled the
disappointed purchaser to contract for another piece of land - with
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roughly similar political, cultural, and social attributes - would have constituted adequate compensation. To a limited extent that point is well
taken. There are, however, several reaons for the view that such would
not have been the case.
First, while equivalent economic value might have been ascertainable
at a reasonable investment of legal resources, the assessment of
equivalent social, political, and cultural value would have raised far more
complex and unknowable considerations. It is certainly true that a sum of
money sufficient to permit an alternative purchase might have provided
the disappointed party with an equivalent piece of real property in
economic terms. It is not as clear that the alternative real estate would
have represented an equivalent 'value' in terms of social status, political
identity, and political authority. A second reason for the failure of the law
to develop liability rules in contract and thus to insist upon an alternative
purchase of property was that the market economy had not fully
enveloped the land distribution system; land was not freely available for
purchase and sale. The existing distribution of economic, social, and
political power leads one to conclude that only a very few would consider
selling their land except if they had no other choice - to do so would, as
one landowner feared, 'lower the position of my family.'"" The reasons
why land was not a freely traded commodity were the amount of settled
land, the moral costs of selling political authority and power, and the
uncertainties surrounding the existence of the seller's right to sell.'" The
disappointed purchaser's substitute contract would most likely have been
shadowed by the vagaries of third-party claims to the land, and, as we shall
see, the risk of loss due to a defective title was allocated by the law to the
purchaser. Third, the introduction of a damage rule representing the
purchaser's expectation interest would have meant that the state would be
called upon to state publicly the 'worth' of political rights and social status
associated with land ownership, and, as we shall see, if it is not altogether
unlikely that legal rules were developed so as to avoid valuation."*
Fourth, denial of expectation damages and the prohibition, through an
order for specific performance, of the right to breach contracts may have
reflected an intuitive understanding on the part of the judiciary that
allowing a contracting party to breach his contract and pay damages
might have encouraged trade in land. The distribution of land and
political power could hardly be described as equitable, and it may be that
the perpetuation of this inequality was furthered by legal structures proFinally, one
tecting contractual entitlements through property r~les.~'8
must note that, at least from 1696, a breach of a contract to sell land in
law disenfranchised the purchaser."4 The contractual entitlement to
vote, which had been transformed in 1696 from inchoate to actual, was
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liable to be destroyed in contractual breach. It takes little imagination to
consider what the social response to an attempted disenfranchisement
prior to completion would have been.
Thus the relationship of legal contract remedies to political and social
commodities consists of two interdependent concepts. The first, which I
have described in some detail, recognizes the protection of contractual
expectations of political, legal, and social status by property rules. The
second facet of the symbiotic relationship between culture and law was the
legal decision not to protect these same non-economic expectations by
liability rules. The duality of the thesis recognizes that contractual
remedies generally afford individuals the freedom to choose which of
damages or specific performance better maximizes their individual
satisfaction. In the case of exchanges of political, legal, and social status,
however, the state insisted that contractual expectations, if they were to be
recognized at all, were to be protected only by a property rule. It is
impossible to say with any degree of certainty why liability rules (damage
awards) did not develop to any substantial degree in respect of contracts
to sell land. Yet the matter deserves investigation. A decision to protect
contractual entitlements by property rules does not necessarily deny the
existence of liability rules under some circumstances for a breach of an
agreement to exchange political, legal, and social status for money; and
theories of individuality and wealth maximization would suggest that
both kinds of entitlement would have been recognized in law. The
evolution of the law in this context to deny damages reveals attitudes
which reinforce the view that political, social, and legal contractual
expectations provided the foundation for the development of property in
contract.
The legal rules denying recovery of damages in respect of contracts for
the purchase and sale of land are well known. Courts exercising equitable
jurisdiction to order performance of contractual obligations were not
granted express authority to award damages until 1858,''~ and since
disappointed purchasers would generally have sought equitable relief their primary interest being land rather than economic wealth in the guise
of money damages to which they may or may not have been entitled principles of damage remedies in respect of land contracts remained in
the most attenuated forms until the latter part of the nineteenth
~ e n t u r y . "Of
~ course a court could, in awarding specific performance of a
contract, concurrently order that the price be modified in an amount
equal to the reduced value of the property transferred,"' this compensation (even though it involved valuation of that part of the contract left
unperformed) being 'very different' from damages.228It is only fair to say
that money awards had been ordered, albeit infrequently, in Equity,''g
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but this was without statutory authority and notwithstanding Lord
Eldon's admonition that he was 'not ... aware that this Court would give
relief in the shape of damage^."^" Nonetheless, it has been argued that
where the failing was one of tenure, the vendor would not likely obtain
specific performance together with compensation. 'Differences of tenure
do not in general admit of ~aluation,"~'and because tenure was the
criterion upon which the franchise was founded, monetization of political
rights and social status in Equity would not generally have been the
practice.
The disinclination of Equity to assess the value of contractual expectations to land was adopted, as well, in the common law courts, which would
not, in the usual case, award damages (contrasted with an order for the
return of the purchaser's deposit and incidental expenses) on a basis
which would oblige the courts to embark on the treacherous task of
assessing the value of real estate. The leading case of the eighteenth
century, Flureau v Thornhill,'3' denied recovery for the loss of the 'fancied
goodness' of the purchaser's bargain, a limitation which was affirmed with
Earlier
unwavering consistency throughout the nineteenth ~entury.~33
cases, which are hardly well known, reveal very little of the forces
decided in 1604,
operating on the law at the time.'s4 Gray v Br~icoe,~35
involved an executed contract and a conveyance of land by the defendant
of which he said he was seized in fee simple. In fact, he held only by
copyhold. The somewhat cryptic report states that 'the jury shall give
damages, in their consciences, according to that rate, that the country
values fee-simple land, more than copyhold land.'@
The best-known example of the comon law rule forbidding recovery of
lost profits, fii-stenunciated in 1775in Flureau v Thornhill,'37 is the decision
to restrict contractual recovery
of the House of Lords in Bainv ~othergill'3~
in land contracts which failed because of a defect in title to return of the
purchaser's deposit with interest and incidental expenses.'39 Lost profits the value of the purchaser's bargain - were not recoverable. Traditional
explanations for the rule range from an implied contractual term denying
recovery of the purchaser's expectation interest in the light of the widely
known inaccuracies of the land registration system in force in England in
judicial legislation designed
the eighteenth and nineteenth centurie~;'4~
to increase the liquidity of realty;'4' and contractual liability premised on
fault rather than strict liability.'4' In addition, it has been argued - indeed
the point was made in Bain v Fothergill itself - that the expense and time
concomitant to assessment of real estate values justified a decision which
rendered the calculation of damages certain.'43 Related to this theory is
another which explains the rule in Bain v Fothergill as a judicial device
designed to limit the disconcerting practice ofjuries of awarding arbitrary
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and sometimes outrageous damage awards, exacerbated by the absence of
objective evidence of value.'44 Mayne offers a more enlightened view,
suggesting that the rule forbidding recovery of the appreciated value of
the land in the case of executed contracts ' is clearly the equitable rule,
where the improvements arise from causes of an entirely collateral
nature, such as the growth of a town, the formation of a railway, or the
like. The occupier has had all the benefits of this increased value, so long
as it lasted, without paying anything like it.'*45
It is true that doctrinal purity and administrative convenience must be
recognized as having played a role in the evolution of laws which denied
protection of contractual entitlements by liability rules. My point,
however, is that the societal decision to deny the right to recover damages
was based upon considerations identical to those which provided the
foundation for the recognition of property rights in contract. It may be
argued that motives very different from those expressed in the cases lay
behind the common law doctrine denying recovery of damages for breach
of contract to sell land. The combined forces of the rules mandating
performance of land contracts almost without exception and complementary rules denying compensation in damages defined land, and contracts
respecting land, very differently from other kinds of property and
contracts.
Specific performance as a means of withdrawing land from commerce,
or, in any event, of erecting barriers to its entry, may be perceived more
accurately as a component in a broader political constitution which
included a common law rule denying recovery of lost profits on breach of
a contract to buy land. Fuller and Perdue have detailed the significanceof
recovery for lost opportunities, or, to put it differently, of recovery of an
individual's expectation interest, as an incentive to the development of
market exchange transactions in western economies:
In seekingjustification for the rule granting the value of the expectancy there is no
need, however, to restrict ourselves by the assumption, hitherto made, that the
rule can only be intended to cure or prevent the losses caused by reliance ... It may
be said that there is not only a policy in favor of preventing and undoing the harms
resulting from reliance, but also a policy in favor of promoting and facilitating
reliance on business agreements. Agreements can accomplish little, either for
their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. When
business agreements are not only made but are also acted on, the division of labor
is facilitated, goods find their way to the places where they are most needed, and
economic activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would be threatened
by any rule which limited legal protection to the reliance interest. Such a rule
would in practice tend to discourage reliance. The difficulties in proving reliance
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and subjecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that the business man
knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the way ofjudicial relief would
hesitate to rely on a promise in any case where the legal sanction was of
significance to him. T o encourage reliance we must therefore dispense with its
proof. For this reason it has been found wise to make recovery on a promise
independent of reliance, both in the sense that in some cases the promise is
enforced though not relied on (as in the bilateral business agreement) and in the
sense that recovery is not limited to the detriment incurred in reliance.@

Generally, we have chosen to encourage commerce through legal
recognition of the purchaser's expected return on his investment - a legal
rule complemented as it must be (in terms of economic efficiency) by a
general rule denying specific performance. The operation of the two
rules allows a promisor to break his contract whenever it is advantageous
for him to do so while at the same time leaving the promisee no worse off,
in monetary terms, than he was prior to the breach.
Land, however, was not accorded such a liberal ideology. Specific
performance tied the hands of sellers of land who might otherwise have
breached their contracts if offered a higher price by one to whom the land
was more valuable.'47 In addition, the most potent form of incentive to
contract - legal protection of the contractor's expected economic profit was, in a very great number of cases, denied outright. The most obvious
and substantial risk in the market-place in land (ie, the risk of nonperformance due to a defect of title) was allocated by the state to the
purchaser. He might, of course, negotiate for a reallocation of that risk to
the seller, but the transfer would not come cheaply, and negotiations are
never costiess. Finally, the risk was absolute. Not only was the loss
non-compensable in damages, specific performance would not generally
be ordered if the seller did not have full ownership of the land.@ Without
this encouragement, markets in land in the hope of attaining financial
profit may not have developed as rapidly as they otherwise might have.
One cannot but question the foundation of contract when, for some two
hundred years during which specific performance was granted almost
without hesitation, one can uncover perhaps three or four cases in which
damages for breach were sought,'49 compared with dozens of reported
cases in contracts involving goods.'5" Perhaps a modern perspective
allows a more sensitive appreciation of the subtle impact of denying
recovery for lost profits: '[Rleal property is the only character of property
absolutely essential to human existence, and ...it is the policy of the law ...
not to encourage speculative or chance bargaining in it, but to adjust the
rights of the parties concerning its transfer, by placing them in the status
quo.'15' The status quo is precisely what contract and exchange relation-
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ships are not about, and in societies in which land was not so intensely
endowed with political and social personality, calls for the abolition of the
rule and for legal recognition of the expectation interest in contract came
q~ickly.'~'
It is a truism to say that the power to alienate is a central element in the
bundle of rights which constitute 'ownership' in land, and while society
acknowledged the right to transfer land through private bargains, barriers were erected through which contractual exchange could take place
only with substantial interference. It has been said, for example, that the
medieval distinction between real and personal property amounted
'roughly to this, that over the first, one had much less power of disposition
than over the second."53 Primogeniture,'5* the perpetuation of feudal
tenures until 1660,'~5and the pervasive resistance to land reform which
would have increased security of titles and eliminated the worst part of the
consumptive costs on land transfer's6 are only the most obvious devices
which limited economic intercourse in land. To these can be added
specific performance. Unlike the law applicable to all other contracts,
which simply meant that a party who intended to breach would have to
assess his prospective profits on breach against the damages payable to his
first contractor, the law of specific performance, through the creation of a
property right in the purchaser, forbad the sale of land at a better price to
an alternative purchaser who valued the property more highly, unless the
first purchaser were willing to sell his opportunity to engage in political
life and society. In addition, the purchaser of land could not generally
recover his expectation interest or profit on breach, and in an era when
ownership of land was notoriously obscure and inconclusive the risk of
non-compensable forgone opportunities arising on contractual failure
operated as a potent disincentive to contractual exchange. Finally, the
costs of professional assistance, registration fees, transaction taxes,
expenses of searching and confirming title, and the substantial delays
characteristic of land transfer in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
combined to create imposing obstacles to efficient market exchange. The
existence of these 'costs of sale,' added to the cost of the land itself, would
certainly have reduced the incidence of exchange transactions. As
transaction costs are added to the 'true market value' of the land, the
number of willing buyers diminishes, and the most probable transactions
(between buyers and sellers of land whose numbers are, by definition,
highest at the market price) are excluded.'57
The point here is quite simple. The rule denying compensation in
damages for a breach of contract to transfer land, if in reality a contract to
transfer political, legal, and social status, may have operated as a barrier to
the creation of markets in land - and may thus have protected and
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reinforced the existing distribution of those commodities. In addition,
rules denying compensation may have had a more subtle, but equally
significant, impact on the manner in which society and the law defined
land and thus exchanges of land.
I remarked earlier, too summarily perhaps, that liability rules in
contract presuppose that society is willing to engage in the public valuation of the object of private exchange relationships. When we enforce
contracts to transfer grain, or automobiles, or corporate shares, we do
not find it disturbing (if in fact the issue enters our conscious minds at all)
that a public, government agency (ie, a court, and in particular a judge
whose orders are enforced through executive action) will tell us what
these commodities are 'worth' in dollars and cents. This dispassionate
attitude to public valuation is not always so easily come by. Were ajudge to
enforce a contract to sell a kidney, or an arm, or a leg, some of us, at least,
would react with horror. While markets in many goods have been
permitted in western societies, markets in human body parts have not
gained considerable social acceptance. Although some might actually
insist that everything has a price,'58 and while economic analysis of
contract remedies has implicitly assumed monetization of all 10sses,~59that
assertion, even if true, does not necessarily mean that the state should
announce that fact, and indeed it does not deny that some want to believe
that certain things are (or perhaps ought to be) literally priceless. The
point is that the pricingof certain 'ethical phenomena"6"carries the risk of
degradation if in fact such monetization is possible at all, and at its most
simplistic level the costs of this monetization may be so great as to justify
the adoption of distribution and allocative mechanisms other than the
market. As we have seen, land transfer was a political and cultural
ceremony of some significance, and while society may have allowed
market exchanges in land to take place, the bargaining was not always an
amoral event. 'Is it going too far to suggest that while estates in land were
focused with a vital personal affinity between lord and vassal, to speak of a
land market [was] profane?''61
Thus we have seen that while contracts for the sale of land, which as a
matter of course carried the franchise and political authority, were
specifically enforced, the law denied legal recognition of contracts which
were openly bargains to distribute votes or to confer a knighthood. The
point here is that the law may have been unwilling to admit that social
goods were being traded like all other commodities. We put prices on
things we don't want to price, but we don't like doing it, admitting that we
do it, or especially having it called to our attention. We enforce contracts
knowing the buyer is buying the right to sit in Parliament, but if he says he
~ ' would be even
is doing that we call him 'venal' or ' m e r ~ e n a r ~ . "This
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more so if we as a society were asked to state publicly the worth of that
right. Essentially the same attitudes were revealed by one commentator
who wrote, at the turn of the century: 'There was a time, and that not
many years since, when a proposal to a landowner to discuss the merits of
what is called "Free Trade in Land" would have been regarded by him in
much the same light as a suggestion that he should put a price on his
personal raiment."63
The political and social goods associated with land ownership may have
evoked powerful moral notions as to the appropriate role of the state in
recognizing market transactions. At the same time, this almost religious
sanctity may have been raised as justification for the decidedly skewed
distribution of land in society. The inequalities of distribution were, as
Mill put it, justified by imbuing land with honorific qualities: 'Landed
property is felt even by those most tendacious of its rights, to be a very
different thing from other property; and where the bulk of the community have been disinherited of their share of it, and it has become the
exclusive attribute of a small minority, men have generally tried to
reconcile it, at least in theory, to their sense ofjustice, by endeavouring to
attach duties to it, and erecting it into a sort of magistry, either moral or
legal."64
Calabresi and Bobbit have denominated this market trait as the 'cost of
costing': '[M]oralisms and the affront to values ... of market determinations that say or imply that the value of life or some precious activity
integral to life is reducible to a money fig~re."~5
The 'right' to land created
through the adoption of property rules during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries emphasized the pricelessness of land through obviation of the odious task of public assessment of the value of so majestic
a good. Political authority, the right to vote, and social status (all
represented by promissory entitlements to land) were protected, to a very
large degree, by a property rule and not by a liability rule.'66 Not only did
society through specific performance acknowledge the primacy of land;
at the same time it retreated from calls to engage in the pricing or
monetization of social class or political power.
The conclusion one must draw after assessing the development of
property rules and liability rules in contracts for the transfer of land is that
the law not surprisingly reflected the very powerful political and social
mores of the times. The limitations on freedom to contract created and
preserved through the technical complexities of the land law were
complemented both by the denial of the freedom to breach through the
doctrine of specific performance and by the denial of compensation if
breach did occur. Land was not destined to become a commodity trading
freely at prices determined by multitudes of individual bargains. Rather,
as a proxy for political authority, it would be kept within narrow bounds,
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perpetuating a social hierarchy where 'the freeholder on the land, and the
freeman in the town were, each in his sphere, the accredited elements in
society, in comparison with which other men appeared, not as rival
classes, but as adjuncts, or excrescences, or even social dangers.'167
Economic individualism and the metamorphosis of the legal and
economic foundations of English society from status to contractz6*were
not to alter the status of landlord. Pollock, in his notes to Maine's treatise,
says '[Wlhat we call [a man's] status is his position as a lawful man, a voter,
and so f0rth,"~9 implicitly acknowledging that the transfer of freehold
land would have consisted of an exchange of money for political status.
And the metamorphosis of land from a symbol of political and social
status to an economic commodity would have meant the devolution of
political authority to all of those who could pay for it. The sale of land, if
assimilated to the sale of personality, would have become a commercial
event involving the exchange of wealth in money for wealth in land which would have meant the death of the sale and contract as a political
and social event. Specific performance and non-recovery of damages
were simply doctrinal manifestations of values which had evolved in a
society which first created a right to participate in government, then
defined it in terms of the ownership and possession of a real object in the
hands of a relatively narrow structure of society, and finally established
and preserved legal rules which at once proclaimed the ideal of repreLand, during the
sentative democracy and the inviolabilityof pr~perty.'~"
early history of England, does not easily fit within the paradigm of contract as linked to the ethics of free enterprise, small individualistic
entrepreneurs, and ~ a p i t a l i s m . ~T~o' the extent that free enterprise
capitalism existed at all, it did not apply to the ownership of rights enjoyed
by a narrow political Clite. The state had a direct and abiding interest in
the distribution of this political wealth among the populace, and if
freedom of contract would entail a reallocation of political authority, those
who controlled the machinery of government, includingjudicial government, would not be likely to encourage it.'7'
The absence, or at least the sublimation, of pecuniary motivations in
transactions which assumed the guise of contract but in substance were
consumated with radically different objectives nurtured the advancement
of non-pecuniary remedies. Personal expectations of political identity or
societal objectives respecting the allocation and transfer of land would
hardly have been well served had legal institutions limited redress to
money compensation. The observation that 'the factors that have made
compulsion of promisors attractive in a planned economy are plainly
absent in a free enterprise economy''73 takes on a special meaning in the
light of the role of land before the industrial revolution. Land had not yet
been incorporated into the market-place, and the 'privileged freeholder'
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who clung to his vote with extraordinary tenacity, secluding it from
copyholders and leaseholders, did so by keeping his freehold out of the
market. In the end, this tactic could not have met with success, and indeed
landowners were mortgaging and selling off their land throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order to raise capital. But they
did so only because they were left no alternative, and they did it with a full
knowledge that society would thereby be admitted to the franchise.'74
The status of land and, for our purposes, the status of contracts to
transfer land that is reflected in the evolution of property rules and the
complementary modification of liability rules denying recovery of expectation interests has surfaced in at least onejurisdiction, in the application
of criminal sanctions to interference with promissory entitlements. This
extension of protection beyond liability and property rules reflects a
philosophy of state compulsion not frequently found in the common law
The introduction of penal sanctions to enforce contracts or
of ~ontract.'7~
to deter purposeful contractual breach is most obvious in the context of
imprisonment for contempt, exercisable against a promisor whose
voluntary private obligation has been transmuted into law through the
issuance of an order for specific performance. His incentive to perform,
perhaps consisting of the fear of social reprobation, the loss of commercial reputation, or an order to pay damages, is joined by the prospect of
incarceration for contempt. Less common is the application of direct
criminal liability for breach of contract such as existed in respect of land
contracts even in ~ a n a d a . ' ~ ~
Generally, the law has not coerced men to keep their promises, except
in so far as recovery for lost profits is perceived as a penalty designed to
encourage reliance on contract.*77 It is just possible that the direct
to
imposition of criminal sanctions for breach of consensual 0bli~ations~7~
transfer land and the more common indirect invocation of penal
sanctions through the threat of contempt in the case of an order of specific
performance evince a sensitivity not only to the expectations of purchasers of land apart from their purely financial motives but also to the social
philosophy that land was not an economic commodity liable to be debased
by market bargaining and distributed according to taste among the
common populace. Rather, as we have seen, land was retained as a symbol
of social class - its ownership a measure of political authority - and thus its
distribution among the citizenry was to be closely monitored.'79

In view of the overt political and social nature of land ownership, it is not
at all surprising that the contracts to exchange land dramatized the
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creation of property rules to protect contractual entitlements. Enfranchisement on the acquisition of title could be made the object of a
compensatory damage award only in a most superficial manner, with
substantial risks of error, and only after a significant expenditure of
judicial resources. The 'fancied goodness' of one's bargain on the
purchase of real estate not only consisted of the obvious economic worth
of the land (even if one could assess and account for the present value of
future electoral payments) but included as well the enormous political
power represented by the vote itself - in some cases the licence to sit in
Parliament - and the incalculable value of political authority which the
landowner could exercise over his tenants. At a time when the common
law was moving towards objective valuation of compensation in cases of
contract damages,280the inescapable subjectivity and affront to social
values represented by an attempt to value political rights and social
privilege inevitably foreclosed the application of liability rules to contract
entitlements in respect of land. While there is little doubt that other
attributes of such contracts distinguished them from exchange transactions to which liability rules were traditionally applied,28' the social status
and the value of political authority which surrounded the acquisition of
land in England before the nineteenth century certainly played a role in
the creation of law.
But all of this is history. Ownership of land no longer constitutes a legal
prerequisite to vote, to sit in Parliament, or to act as a juror.28a
Landowners no longer control the exercise of their tenants' franchise, nor
do tenants charge for their support. Egalitarianism, at least in the context
of electoral democracy, is relatively well established in our political
culture. And while class still pervades social intercourse, land ownership is
hardly a unique badge of social acceptability.
Where, one might ask, do we go from here? If, in reality, political, legal,
and social status are more evenly shared in Canada than was the case in
England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (or perhaps
ought to be more evenly shared), what can one say about the law? The
answer has two parts. The first is that the legal rules relating to contracts
for the transfer of land may not be as absolute as once believed. Property
rules may be applied in a discretionary manner, and liability rules may be
recognized without fear of encouraging commerce or of degrading
political and social class. The second part of the answer is that the legal
rules defining rather different contracts which may now be associated
with political and social identity may be evolving in a manner which
reflects that underlying cultural reality. 1have described the weakening of
the traditional property rules protecting contractual entitlements to
land2'3 and the complementary modification of the liability rules which
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historically denied protection to those contractual entitlements. What I
would like to do now is to explore the implications of this thesis in respect
of contracts involving the exchange of labour for money.
It may be argued that the evolution of political, social, and cultural
mores that has provided the foundation for the tentative, though dilatory,
metamorphosis of contractual entitlements in respect of land may at the
same time provide some insight into the legal definition of labour
entitlements. Legal principles respecting promissory entitlements under
individual and collective contracts of employment over the past century
have reflected a persistent progression from liability rules to property
rules, and courts no longer order the specific performance of contracts
respecting land in every ~ a s e . ~This
~ 4 redefinition of the nature of
contractual entitlements to which the law applies property rules is hardly
startling, and the institution of labour which most often surfaces when
contract expectations are specificially enforced in a modern context has,
to a large extent, joined land as a source of political and social authority.
The boundaries of political and social power are now exceedingly diffuse.
The distribution of political and social power is no longer as narrow as it
once was, and the boundaries of property rules in contract cannot but
reflect that dis~i~ation.'~5
Historically, contracts of employment were not afforded the status of
property, the common law rule stating emphatically that 'if a contract is
terminated there are ordinarily no questions affecting status or involving
property rights.'lS6 The ostensible foundations for the rule - a supposed
fear of coerced employment and an understandable reluctance to oblige
individuals to work in a close personal relationship with one another - are
well
One cannot, however, ignore the reality of protecting
employment contracts by liability rules. As soon as society allows an
individual to interfere with another's contract entitlements and simply
obligates the contract-breacher to pay damages to compensate the other
for his economic loss,'88 we sanction industrial decisions of the employer
made solely in his interest. That is, where we decide not to protect a
contractual entitlement to employment by a property rule, all the gains
generated by the employer's breach are retained by the employer. At the
same time we ignore the non-economic attributes of the contract of
employment which, depending on one's philosophy, are non-compensable in money damages, ought not to be compensable in damages, or are
compensable only after extensive judicial assessment of intangible loss
and the concomitant risk of over-compensation or under-compensation.
It is not at all surprising that liability rules in the case of contracts of
employment have undergone substantial modification in response to the
transformation in the nature of the employment relationship and in the
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expectations and attitudes of members of society towards employment. A
person's job is no longer simply a means of acquiring short-term financial
gain. It often represents security in the form of pension and seniority
rights, status in the form of community respect and recognition, a sense of
camaraderie with one's fellow employees, political influence through
union membership, a foundation for marital and familial stability,
security in an increasingly transient work force, a position of authority in a
union hierarchy, and much more. What we have seen in response to these
non-economic attributes of contracts is a judicial acceptance of the
philosophy that losses suffered on breach of an individual contract of
employment are of more than a narrow financial import to an employee.
The resulting modification of the rules defining labour entitlements has
had two branches. The first has been the recognition of subjective,
non-economic expectations in the application of liability rules. The
second has been the protection of labour entitlements by property rules.
The older cases almost unanimously rejected claims for non-economic
loss on breach of contracts of employment,'89 and those which did
acknowledge this facet of contract allowed recovery for other than lost
wages only in cases of theatrical or journalistic endeavours,'gO on the
theory that a term of the contract of employment, express or implied,
was the opportunity of enhancing the employee's reputation.'gl The
intransigent attitudes expressed at the turn of the twentieth century in
Addk v Gramophone Company Ltd.,'g2 which it has been said by one judge
have in recent times been adopted with reluctance.
'can work inj~stice,'~93
In Cox v Philips Industries Ltd.*94 Lawson,J awarded 2500 to the plaintiff,
representing the 'vexation, distress and general disappointment and
f r ~ s t r a t i o n ' consequent
'~~
upon the loss of employment. In another case,
the 'loss of social prestige' incurred by union members who had been
wrongfully expelled from their union was held compensable in contract,
notwithstanding the absence of any demonstrable pecuniary ~ o s s . ' ~ ~
Moreover, the extension of the interests protected by liability rules in
the case of contracts of employment has been complemented by modifications of the principles of specific performance. While it is too early to say
whether or not an individual can be considered to enjoy the 'ownership of
his job,' an increasingly sensitivejudiciary and legislature are responding
to the realities of social and economic life in the twentieth century. No
longer can we accept the absolute authority of the law of master and
servant reflected in judicial attitudes of the nineteenth century: 'A servant
is a person subject to the command of his master as to the manner in which
he shall do his work."g7 Although there may still be legitimate fears of
economic duress in cases of employers seeking to enforce labour
contracts,'g8 rules prohibiting the specific enforcements of labour con-
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tracts are no longer absolute. The personal element of contract and the
archaic status relationship of master-servant have in a very great number
of cases become a fiction. In addition, the creation of the limited
corporation and the reallocation of bargaining power through the
legitimation of collective labour action suggest that historic fears of
villeinage are no longer incontrovertible, if in fact such fears ever existed.
Traditional contract theory hasjustified the application of liability rules
to labour entitlements on the theory that the establishment of property
rules - that is, specific performance of labour contracts - would have
transformed agreements to serve into private enslavement at the behest
of the employer. Thus the employer's entitlement could not be protected
by a property rule, and theories of mutuality299were invoked tojustify the
converse - neither could the employee's entitlement be protected by a
property rule. The thesis which I have developed in relation to land - that
property rules were designed as a constraint on market exchanges and as
a societal response to non-economic attributes of certain exchange
relationships - suggests that rather different motives may explain the
creation of labour entitlements which at the hands of the employee were
protected only by a liability rule, while at the hands of the employer they
were protected not by a private property rule (specific performance) but
rather by a public property rule - the criminal law.
As we have been told so often, employees as well as employers were free
to break their promises subject only to liability in damages. If the
employee was offered better wages, or if the employer could take
advantage of less expensive labour, each was free to act as he wanted.
This liberal ideology was, however, more apparent than real. Evidence
suggests that, in reality, employers could very often 'specifically enforce'
contracts of employment under the criminal law, while employees did not
enjoy a complementary property right. Legal coercion can operate either
through the vehicle of specific performance or, more directly, through
the application of criminal sanctions for breach of contractual obligations.
While specific performance was denied on the grounds that the law would
not compel personal servitude, the criminal law for centuries described a
breach of a contract of employment as a crime.
From 1663 onwards, justices of the peace were granted jurisdiction to
resolve employment disputes (to use a modern phrase) in certain cases,
mostly involving payment of wages.3"" Any person trained in any of a wide
variety of specific crafts was compellable to work in that craft except if the
person was possessed of hnds, tenements, or for a term of any lfe or lives of
clear yearly value of forty shillings (thus exempting land owners from the
application of the statute!), and servants who departed from their
master's service ('who promise or covenant to serve and do not serve
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according to the tenor of the same')sol were subject to be committed 'to
ward, there to remain without bail or mainprise' until they would agree to
return and serve their master according to law.so2In addition, servants
who left the jurisdiction where they were employed were subject to
recapture and imprisonment until they found another 'well and honestly
to serve their masters ... according to the order of the law.'sOsDissatisfaction with the act led to its replacement in 1747 by more extensive
regulatory legislati0n.9~4Any employee within statutorily prescribed
classes who was found guilty of any misdemeanour, miscarriage, or ill behaviour in his or her service or employment was subject 'to commitment
to the house of correction, to remain and be corrected [whipped]so5and
held to hard labour for a reasonable time, not exceeding one calendar
month.'so6 In 1766, further legislation was enacted in response to the
disturbing practice of apprentices who, after considerable training at
substantial cost to their masters, left for better wages.s07 After 1766 such
behaviour in breach of contract was punishable by up to three months'
imprisonment.so8 In addition, section 4 of the act applied to servants and
employees 'who contract with persons for certain terms, [and] leave their
respective services before the terms of their contracts are fulfilled, to the
great disappointment and loss of the persons with whom they so contract.'
The remedy for breach of contract under that section was imprisonment
for up to three months and not less than one month.s09 There can be no
doubt that this legislative framework, which remained in force for the
greater part of the nineteenth century,s1° imposed criminal liability for
breach of an employment contract by an employee. Mens rea was a
necessary ingredient of the offence,sl' and, as we have seen, the penalties
for breach of contract were severe.
Thus we can see that employers did not need to seek the assistance of
the state in the guise of enforcing entitlements by property rules. Far
more expeditious and effective redress was available through the coercive
medium of the criminal law. The liberal rhetoric of the Equityjudges was,
it seems, a facade, a distortion of real societal values which compelled the
performance of personal service contracts through corporal punishment
and incarceration. The remote possibility of imprisonment for contempt
of court in the case of a refusal to obey an order for specific performance
would evoke little fear in a servant liable, in summary proceedings, to
imprisonment or physical brutality.
In any event, labour relations have now moved to a point very distant
from the quasi-servitude characteristic of the eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century employment relationship. The modern example of
contractual breach in the sphere of employment relations consists of an
arbitrary dismissal of an employee contrary to the terms of a collective
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agreement prohibiting discharge except for 'just cause.' When an
employee is discharged in violation of the terms of a collective agreement,
his only 'right' to continued employment is a contractual right either
under an individual contract of employment or, more commonly,
through the medium of a collective agreement of which the individual
employee is a beneficiary. Traditional contract theory tells us that the
employee's entitlement under his contract consists only of a right in
damages. Modern labour policy is another matter entirely. A breach by an
employer where the collective agreement prohibits discharge except for
just cause is remedied in arbitration proceedings not simply by an order
for payment of money damages but in addition through a mandatory
order that the employee be rehired: 'Although an order of reinstatement
and the substitution of a lesser penalty generally involve a form of
mandatory order that was not recognized at common law, the authority of
an arbitrator to reinstate an employee who was unjustly discharged has
never been questi0ned.'3'~
The same philosophy has been reflected in court decisions through
relaxation of the principles which historically denied the rights of
employees to the specific enforcement of individual contracts of employment. Individual contract entitlements have been protected by property
rules when the terms of a collective agreement provide expressly for
continuation of the employment relationship, and injunctive relief
restraining an employee from engaging in his occupation has been
ordered by the court, at least for a temporary period.3'3 As long ago as
1944, the province of Saskatchewan enacted The Trade Union Act,S14
which authorized an administrative tribunal, inter alia, to order an
employer to reinstate an employee discharged in violation of the
provisions of the act. The contrast between this view of labour contracts
and traditional judicial conservatism was explained by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Labour Relatim Board (Saskatchan) v
John East Iron Works:
The jurisdiction of the Board under s.g(e) is not invoked by the employee for the
enforcement of his contractual rights: those, whatever they may be, he can assert
elsewhere. But his reinstatement, which the terms of his contract of employment
might not by themselvesjustify, is the means by which labour practices regarded as
unfair are frustrated and the policy of collective bargaining as a road to industrial
peace is secured. It is in the light of this new conception of industrial relations that
the question to be determined by the Board must be viewed, and, even if the issue
so raised can be regarded as a justifiable one, it finds no analogy in those issues
which were familiar to the Courts of 1867.3'5

In more recent times, the Canada Labour code316has established a right,
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albeit in limited circumstances, to reinstatement of employment when an
employee has been unjustly dismissed.
Collective rights enjoyed by the trade union and individual employees
and the complementary contractual right of the employer to collective
labour, established under collective agreements, are also protected by
property rules. A lockout occurring while a collective agreement is extant
is remedied not by damages but rather by injunctive relief.3'7 Similarly, an
illegal strike will be enjoined, a distinction being drawn between the
institution of forced labour and the enforcement of modern collective
agreements.S1B The reasons for the transformation of the contractual
entitlement are obvious. Obedience to the provisions of the collective
agreement is often crucial to economic stability, the collective employment relationship involving thousands of employees in industries interference with whose operations would inevitably cripple vast sectors of a
sensitively balanced and interdependent economy. Industrial peace, not
industrial strife compensated by damage payments, has become the
judicial and legislative goal. Expectations under collective labour contracts, from the perspective of both the employee and the employer, have
replaced entitlements created by the seventeenth-century contract for the
sale of land as deserving of protection by property rules. The collective
agreement, however, has an economic impact which reinforces the social
and political influence which it now reflects. In fact, the economic
consequences of a major industrial dispute may be so terribly devastating
to individual employees and employers, as well as to the economy of the
nation, that the time-honoured but abstruse phrase that 'damages are an
inadequate remedy' once again becomes meaningful.
The concept of 'ownership of jobs,' which simply reflects the enforcement of promissory entitlements through property rules, is now a
common social expectation:
With respect to the protection of the employee's interest in hisjob, we are dealing
with an inference from facts rather than with ajudicially named property interest.
The legal recognition of collective bargaining as a 'right'with workers maintaining
their employee status during strikes or other labor disputes, and with enforceable
claims on employment if illegally discharged, with back pay for the period of
illegal withholding of employment - all this amounts to property, however
unwilling the courts may be to offend traditional sentiment by use of the term.3'9

Perhaps the form of property in employment which readers will
recognize most immediately is that defined by membership rights granted
by self-governing professional licensing institutions. Membership in the
medical, legal, and academic professions, or indeed in any other private
organization which exercises a monopoly or near-monopoly over a
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unique and essential service and which restricts entry through any of a
variety of standards, is an 'immensely valuable right,'sZ0representing a
legal licence to perform certain activities which others are excluded from
performing.g2' The 'right' to join a profession or to continue one's
and has
membership if one has fulfilled the professional req~irements3'~
not breached the rules established by the guild is protected by a property
rule. Thurman Arnold once described himself as owning only 'rank and
privilege in an organizational hierarchy,'s23 and many of us today could
say little more than that. Charles Reich echoed these sentiments three
decades later, when he spoke of wealth deriving from professional or
occupational employment.3'4 Reich called attention to the failure of
society to afford substantive and procedural protection to these new
forms of property, a failure remedied today in some jurisdictions by
judicial creativity, legislative initiatives, and executive programs.3'5 The
most dramatic example of this metamorphosis in contract entitlements in
respect of labour contracts is the institutionalization of specific performance of employment contracts in England. There, legislation has emphasized reinstatement and re-engagement of employees, which became
primary remedies in cases of individual loss of employment under the
Employment Protection Act, 1975326and have been continued in more
recent times under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act,
1978.3'~Yet the legislation,which in a euphemistic trick has avoided using
the term 'specific performance' to describe its remedial process, does not
sanction disobedience through the invocation ofjudicial or administrative
contempt. Instead it authorizes economic sancti0ns3'~- the assessment of
substantial sums above the amount considered appropriate according to
compensatory standards.3'9
This tentative advance in the law, in respect of both individual and
collective contract entitlements, merely reflects another stage in a long
history of social innovation designed to promote the creation and
redistribution of property and, with it, the transfer of social and political
power. Legislation which first relaxed and then erased franchise qualifications premised on land ownership was interwoven with and dependent
upon the introduction of reform legislation designed to simplify the
archaic, irrational, and wholly dysfunctional land law, which, in governing the ownership and sale of land, had effectively precluded access to it.
Simplification of substantive real property law3s0 and the introduction of
legislation which insisted upon public registration to protect property
rights33' intended to reduce the fetters on land as a factor in commerce
were but an adjunct of political reform. The revolution in democratic
politics and land ownership went hand in hand, and efforts to subvert
reform were directed at both. Dicey, reflecting on the conflict in
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philosophies of democratic socialism and radicalism in the nineteenth
century in their efforts to 'make land easily saleable'33' when confronted
both by the political conservatism of the landowners and by the land laws
which had withdrawn land from the mainstream of commerce,333 argued
that the latter merely reinforced the former, representing the ideas and
meeting the desires of the landed classes.334
The weakenings of the rigid, historical limitations on property rules
cannot be denied. Land no longer represents the most powerful or the
sole form of wealth; nor does it now stand as a symbol of absolute political
power or otherwise unattainable social privilege. The creation and
redistribution of new and traditional forms of wealth have dramatically
altered the assumptions upon which property rules were first developed
to protect only a narrowly defined class of contract entitlements. The
application of property rules to promissory entitlements is not a static
construct but, like contract law itself, reflects and shapes social and
cultural norms. Contract does not, whether or not we are comfortable
with its dynamic nature, exhibit well-settled principles335 but rather
involves an ongoing interaction with other social institutions, responding
to change which may have been born outside the legal system but which, at
the same time, has been sculpted by the law.3s6 The evolving economic,
political, social, and cultural attributes of land and labour and the
corresponding modifications of the rules protecting contractual entitlements are indeed reform movements.
The progression of society from status to contract reflects a restructuring of individual relationships away from immutable, hierarchical allocations of authority, grounded not only in family but more directly in the
'tenurial relation of man to man,' in 'estates and tenure of land.'337 Social
relationships today are not static, involving as they do an ongoing struggle
to achieve some semblance of balance between institutions, as well as
individuals, insisting on respect for divergent or antipodal interests. To
the extent that society allows the creation and definition of relationships
through private expressions of free will either by individuals acting alone
or by collective institutions of labour, capital, and consumer interests,
contract cannot remain burdened under eighteenth-century ideals of
status in land. Our conception of property over the centuries has exhibited only one constant, and that constant is that the meaning of
property will always change. There is nothing either in history or in
reason to support a thesis which would exempt property rights in contract
from this evolutionary process, and it thus becomes imperative that the
law, if it is founded in social consensus, must respond to the values and
forces which have shaped contractual expectations and private obligations in our society.

Heinonline - - 32 U. Toronto L.J. 73 1982

74

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
NOTES

I
2

3

4
5

6
7

Guttsman The British Political Elite (1963) I 27
See Waddams The Law of Contract (1977)42 1; Treitel The Law of Contract (5th ed 1976)
I . Anson's Law of Contract (24th ed 1975) 1; Atiyah An Introduction to the Law of Contract
(2nd ed 1971) I ; Swan and Reiter Contracts Cases, Notes and Materials (1978) xxxi.
Libling, The concept of property: Property in intangibles (1978) 94 Law Q. Rev. 103,
104. Leff describes this interaction of supply and demand - the sale - as having been
'ostentatiously neglected by almost all scholars in almost all pertinent disciplines, thus
denying all of us the aestheticjoy of what is really a very pretty story.' Leff Swindlingand
Selling (1976) 6. It is my hope to flesh out the picture which lawyers and legal scholars
have traditionally drawn of the sale of land.
Ely in 2 Property and Contract (1g I g) 56 I , who makes this point in arguing that contracts
(defined as agreements enforceable by public authority) are property, fails to
distinguish among the alternative modes of legal enforcement available in our society.
See Farnsworth, Legal remedies for breach of contract (1970) 70 Col. L.R. I 145.1 147;
Simon and Novak, Limiting the buyer's market damages to lost profit: A challenge to
the enforceability of market contracts (1979) 92 Ham. L.R. 1395, 1398-402. Holmes
The Common Law (1881) 299-301.
See Atiyah, Contracts, promises and the law of obligations (1978)94 Law Q. Rev. 193,
2p6; Barton, The economic basis of damages for breach of contract (1972) i J. of Legal
StUdk 277.
This analysis begins with the obvious point that property is most often defined and
assessed according to the degree of protection which society affords it, not merely
against an individual (ie, one's promisor), but against the world at large. See Atiyah The
Safe of Goods (5th ed 1975) 141; Scanlon, Liberty, contract and contribution, in
Dworkin, Bermant, and Brown (eds) Markets and Morals (1977). Thus the bipolar
paradigm used to describe contractual relationships, in so far as one is engaging in an
examination of contract as property, is not entirely accurate. If one decides to protect
contract entitlements by specific performance, one is obligated to decide a collateral
matter, that is, how to allocate, adjust, and resolve conflicting claims to contractual
performance between the original promisee and a second or even a third or fourth
promisee who has contracted with the same party as did the first, either with knowledge
or in ignorance of the prior agreement. Allocation of loss between two 'innocent'
parties has long been characterized by irreconcilable and intractable normative
difficulties. One response has been the promulgation of registration regimes,
notoriously complex and expensive, designed to resolve, avoid, or at least ameliorate
conflicting claims arising on the protection of contract entitlements by property rules.
Another, it might be argued, has been the evolution of legal rules permitting
compensation in the form of damages rather than specific performance - a
demonstrably effective technique of avoiding third-party disputes.
For the most pan, this essay will focus on bilateral entitlements - a choice between
performatory and substitutionary obligations only in so far as the interests of the
immediate contracting parties are at issue. The global notion of property can, it seems,
be put at least temporarily to one side. It is open to enforce contract entitlements by
property rules, but for other reasons including reliance on ostensible ownership,
possessory rights, or commercial efficacy - to allow others to interfere with the
resulting bilateral property rights unless the possessor of those rights has done
something more than merely contract in private. Thus, in the case of sales, the passing
of 'property,' which historically has been tied to specific relief, has had only a minor role
to play in determining property rights as against the world; 'if we look at the other
effects of the transfer of property as between seller and buyer in the common law
systems, we shall see that they are for the most part, if not entirely, illusory.' Lawson,
The passing of property and risk in sale of goods -A comparative study (1949)65 Law
Q.Reu. 352.354. Callman, He who reaps where he has not sown: Unjust enrichment in
the law of unfair competition (1942) 55 Ham. L.R. 595,597. A nice example of this
point is the recent case of Gyger v L'Amvee (1977) 3 B.C.L.R. 384.

-
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Specific performance is certainly of great import to members of the public who cannot but be concerned as to the identity of the person who has the legal right to transfer
an interest in the property. An analysis of specific performance, however, may focus on
mere relatimu1 property rights, leaving exclusive property rights arising out of
performatory obligations, which cast a far broader shadow, to another time.
8 Traditional Anglo-Canadian judicial reasoning in cases in which promissory expectations have been raised to the status of property offer little insight as to the forces
operating to justify a decision in favour of performatory obligations. For example,
Martland J in Canadian Long Island Petroleum Ltd. et al. v Ztving Industries (Irving Wire
Products Divicion Ltd. et al. (1975) 50 D.L.R. (3d) 265.277, openly rationalized holding a
contractual right of pre-emption as an interest in land (as a subspecies of option) on the
'underlying theory ... that the option to purchase land does create an equitable interest
because it is specifically enforceable.' Ibid, at 277. See also Frobicher Ltd. v Canudian
Pipelines Ltd. et al. (1958) 2 1 D.L.R. (2d) 449 (s.c.c.).Morris and Leach The RuLAgaimt
Perpetuities (2nd ed 1962) 219, 220. Jackson Principles of Prqpetty Law (1967) 301,302,
399. Precisely the opposite result obtains in Australia, where a right of pre-emption has
been held to constitute a mere contractual interest. MuRoy v WiLton (1947) 47 S.R.
(N.s.w.)3 15,325. Harpum, Rights of pre-emption: Ugly ducklings into swans (1978)37
Camb. LJ. 2 13; Scott, Options of purchase (1918)38 Can. Law T i m s 242. One discovers
on reading the cases that the issue as to whether an option creates an interest in land is
apt to be determined according to its consequences. If the outcome is the invalidation
of the option-holder's rights (for example, under the rule against perpetuities), one is
Likely to find decisions describing the right as purely contractual - thus not constituting
an interest in land. Where, however, an interest in land is a pre-requisite to certain
rights (eg, where the land has been sold to a third party, and the validity of the holder's
registration is challenged) a proprietary interest will miraculously appear. La Forest
has made the point that protecting property rights effects fungibiity, but concludes
that the interest of the optionee, if recognized as a property interest, will bring the
registration acts into play, leading to a dearer determination of priorities. He thus
overlooks the point that priority conflicts might be avoided entirely simply by defining
the optionee's interest as a claim in damages. La Forest, Real property - options rights of pre-emption - equitable interest in land - personal contractual obligation rule against perpetuities (1960) 38 Can. Bar Rev. 595. Similarly, in Warnington v M i l k
rig751 2 W.L.R. 654, where the English Court of Appeal refused specific performance
of an agreement for a sublease, Stamp LJ noted that the 'equitable interests which the
intended lessee has under an agreement for a lease do not exist in v m , but arise
because the intended lessee has an equitable right to specific performance.' Ibid, at
661. MegarryJ has adopted the same restricted analysis, suggesting that 'the existence
of an equitable interest in the purchaser as soon as the contract is signed depends'upon
the contract being specifically enforceable.' Megany, Note (1960) 76 Law (2. Rev. zoo,
202; Mapp, Torrens' elusive title (1978) I A h . L.R. (Book Series) 162.
Yet others have argued precisely the converse - that specific performance is available
because the daimant has acquired an equitable interest in the property. Heathcote v The
North StaffmdchireRailway Company (1850) 2 M. & G. I lo, I 12. The courts consistently fail
to explore beyond that point, justifying the creation of property rights in contract on
the availability of specific performance, and the availability of specific performance on
the existence of property rights, leaving the law no wiser than it was before. Brandeis J ,
in Zn&nutimul News Seruices v Associated Press (1918)248 U.S. 2 15, admitted the obvious
in recognizing the shallowness of the traditional view for what it is. If we are to
understand why property rules are only sometimes applied to protect contractual
entitlements, we must, at the outset, jettison the tautological reliance on the right to
specific performance as the prerequisite to the creation of property rights and the
existence of property rights as a pre-condition to an order of performance of a
promissory obligation: 'The doctrines relating to specific performance do not, I think,
afford a test or measure of the rights created. There are cases where the rights of the
parties may be worked out by specific performance though no specific lien is created.
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More frequently, a specific lien is created though no case of specific performance is
contemplated.' Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App.Cas. 523, 548.
g The classic argument put forward for limiting curial jurisdiction to order specific
performance is 'respect for individual freedom,' the right to freedom of contract
reflected in the concomitant freedom to breach. Keeton and Sheridan, Equity (2nd ed
1976) 360. O'Neill, Specific performance of a contract for purchase and sale of land
(147%)
2 1 Chitty's L.I. 104. The view that specific performance constitutes a direct
infringement df pefsonar liberty is reflected in derisions establishing the power to
order ~erformanceof contractual oblieations in the aiudiciarv rather than in administrative agencies in some circumstances. See Reference re Constitutional Questions Act
(Alberta) (1978) 7 R.P.R. 104.
T h e time-honoured phrase 'The law of England will not permit any man to enslave
himself by contract' (Somersett's case, 2 0 St. Tr. 1; Stocker v Brockkbank (1851) 42 E.R.
257) and the historical and somewhat archaic doctrine forbidding the ordering of
performance of contracts of personal service need no elaboration here. See Marsh,
Specific performance of contracts for continuous personal relations (1894) 14 Can. Law
Times 1; Emerald Resources Ltd. v Sterling Oil Properties Management Ltd. (1969) 3 D.L.R.
(3d) 630,647, affirmed 15 D.L.R. (3d) 256n; Garnett v Amtrong(lg78) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 7 17
(N.B.s.c.A.D.); Rushton v McPherson [1939] 4 D.L.R. 78111, 14 M.P.R. 235; McWhirter v
Governors of the University of Alberta (1978) 80 D.L.R. ( ~ d609.
)
There can be little doubt that the protection of a contractual obligation by a property
rule impacts more intrusively on the liberty of one who interferes with it than does
protection by a liability rule. Where the value of the promised performance is, to the
plaintiff, identical to the value of the damage award, the only consequence of an order
for specific performance will be to deprive the defendant of a choice between
alternative courses of behaviour. If ordered to perform, he can comply, ignore the
judicial direction and thus risk incarceration, or bargain with the claimant under the
handicap of a judicial order in the other's favour. Where a contract entitlement is
protected only be a liability rule, the defendant can choose to perform, either by
locating a new contractor or by performing himself; he may renegotiate the contract,
or, as is more common, he can compensate the plaintiff through a transfer of money
raised in a manner which generates the least cost to him. Simpson A Histoty ofthe Common Law of Contract (1975) 597. In Bromage v Genning (1616) I Rolle 368 an action had
been commenced to compel the defendant to execute a lease. A prohibition against the
action was sought, and Lord Coke said that 'this would subvert the intention of the
covenantor when he intends it to be at his election either to lose the damages or to make
the lease, and they wish to compel him to make the lease against his will; and so it is if a
man binds himself in an obligation to enfeoff another, he cannot be compelled to make
the feoffment.'
l o An order for performance of even a simple contract of sale may catalyse substantial,
time-consuming, and intractable disputes involving the manner and time of delivery,
the quality of the property transferred, claims of third parties, misunderstandings as to
allocation of responsibility for obligations which continue after delivery, and the like.
In the regular course of events, these expected nonconformities with contractually
assumed obligations are often resolved informally through private negotiation - by
promises to cure, modification and renegotiation of future sale contracts, or price
adjustments. An order for performance, unlike a damage award, which in terms is as
simple an obligation as one might conceive, obliges the court to take upon itself the
myriad risks attendant upon contract. If the plaintiff is, or ought to be, indifferent as to
a compensatory or performatory award, the choice is obvious.
Difficulties of supervision with respect to the exactitude of the ordered performance,
administrative costs imposed by a judicial supervisory role, and the lack of expertise in
the judiciary have been proffered, over time, as explanations for refusals to order
performance. See generally Dominion Coal Co. Ltd. v Dominion Iron &fSteelCo. Lld. [ igog]
A.C. 893; PowellDUffvyn Steam Coal Co. v Taff Vale Railway (1894) LR g Ch. App. 331;
Ryan v Mutual Tontine Ltd. [ ~ g o gA.C.
] 293; Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. v Westminster
-2
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Chambers Association [18g3] 1 Ch. 116 (c.A.)(promise to provide a porter held not specifically enforceable). A common example of the attitude of the courts towards
specific performance is presented by the case of construction contracts - which are not
generally specifically enforced on the ground that the judicial branch of government
has neither the resources nor the expertise to engage in extended and exacting
supervision of private obligations. Yet again the rule is not absolute. Tanenbaum v W.J.
Bell Papm Co. [1g56]O.R. 278; Gross v Wright [1923] S.C.R. 2 14,2 19. Williston suggests
that traditional judicial conservatism is due to 'the difficulty of enforcing a decree
without an expenditure of effort disproportionate to the value of the result.' 5 Willuton
on Contracts (1937) 3976-7.
It is clear that the mere presence of uncertainty or ambiguity in the order or the
requirement of judicial supervision will not be dispositive. Thus a vendor has been
ordered to make an application to a land planning authority for a subdivision approval
in Dynamic TransportLtd, v O.K.DetailingLtd. (1978)85 D.L.R. (3d) 19;Hoggv Wilkaetal.
(1974) 51 D.L.R. (3d) 51 1; Sleiner et al. v E.H.D. Investments Ltd. (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d)
499 leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused 14 December 1977). A
contrary view was expressed in E.J.H.Holdings Ltd. v Bougieet m. (1977)3 Alta. L.R. 244.
Similarly a company has been ordered to apply for permission to deal on the London
Stock Exchange. Nmlhtrn Counties Securities Ltd. v Jackson &? Steep& Ltd. [I9741 2 All E.R.
625.
It is easy enough to see that the social obligation arising on contract has been defined in
a manner which limits the intrusive nature of the judicial role. While we might have
chosen to establish a legal obligation to perform a specific task, we have created a more
generalized obligation to transfer wealth in the form of money, allowing each
individual to retain the freedom to act as he wants, subject only to this economic
restraint. The similarity between this perception of individual contract obligation
fulfilled through a transfer of money and a more generalized social obligation again
met through a transfer of money rather than services or performance is remarkable:
'One reason why taxation seems generally thought to be a more acceptable form of
required contribution than, say, a system of required tasks or a requirement of
payments in kind is that it leaves citizens with greater latitude in declding how to
arrange their lives while still meeting their social obligations.' Scanlon, Liberty,contract
and contribution, supra note 7. Nozick, however, has denied the distinction: 'Taxation
of earnings from labor is on par with forced labor.' Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia
(1974) 169. See generally Cooley A Treatise on the Law of T a M t i a (2nd ed 1886) 13-15,
McCulloch describes 'labour taxes, or contributions of personal services for the
execution of public works,' as 'among the very worst species of taxes.' McCulloch A
Treatise on the Princi'p&s and Practical Iquence of Tawtion and the Funding System (3rd ed
1863) 44-50 in Scottish Economics Classics Ed (O'Brien, ed, 1975).
Some writen who have thought about why we enforce some promises through specific
performance and leave others to damage awards have analysed decisions as to the
grant or denial of specific enforcement in terms of the dangers inherent in assessing
value in the absence of objective, accessible market price information. Kronman,
Specific performance (1978) 45 U . Chi. L.R. 351,352,353. Trietal, Specific performance in the sale of goods,' [1g66]J. of Bus. Law 2 I 1, 2 16.
Property rules have been chosen as the preferred mode of protecting certain classes
of contractual entitlements, not on the basis of any intrinsic quality or value of the
performance, but on the notorious risks of over-compensation or under-compensation
attendant upon subjective assessment of value. As long ago as 1824 specific performance of a contract for the sale of a debt upon which dividends were to be paid was
ordered on the ground that damages could not 'accurately represent the value of the
future dividends; and to compel this purchaser to take such damages would be to
compel him to sell those dividends at a conjectural price.' Adderley v Diron (1824) 1 Sim
& St. 607, 612; 57 E.R. 239. In essence, we recognize that to limit the protection of a
promissory entitlement to liability rules is to force its 'sale' at an objectively and
collectively determined price. If the price to be charged cannot be determined with any
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degree of precision or without a substantial expenditure of judicial resources, we are
apt to protect the entitlement by a property rule. For example, in Tanenbaum v W.J. Bell
PapmCo. Ltd., supra note lo, at 3 0 9 ~ 10,
3 the assessment of the present value of the cost
of road-repair over ten years was said to be 'quite impossible to do with any degree of
accuracy' in the light of the uncertainty as to the frequency and kind of use and the cost
of money in the future. Accordingly, the contract for the construction of the road was
ordered performed.
Similar difficulties of assessment have generated corresponding judicial responses
in a range of substantive areas of law. The well-known practice of enjoining an
infringement of trade mark rights has been defended on the ground that 'the common
law remedy in such situations, involving guesses as to loss of profits, is hopelessly
inadequate.' Robinette, Protection of property interests in equity (1932) lo Can. Bar
Rev. 172,177.
Stoliar
on the same lines. that the right
., has argued.
"
,
" of a ~urchaserwho is offered a
late delivery to reject the goods for breach of condition in the absence of proof of loss
is a response to uncertainties in damage assessment. Delay, of itself, may not result in a
directly calculable economic loss, and, even where it does, its assessment raises
intractable problems. T h e response - allowing the buyer to repudiate even in the
absence of demonstrable loss - is simply a means of allocating the risk of uncertainty in
damage assessment to the party in breach. See Thomas Borihwick (Ghgow), Ltd. v Bunge
E3 Co., Ltd. [1969] U. R. 17,28;Bowes v Shand(1877), 2 App. Cas. 455; Atiyah Thesaleof
Goods (4th ed 1974) 60; AVO"W Co. v Comptoir Wegimont [1g21] 3 K.B. 435. Stoljar,
Untimely performance in the law of contract (1955) 71 Law Q. Rev. 527,528. The result
is to place the entire risk of market fluctuation on the seller if he breaches his delivery
obligation by even a day. Bowes v Shand, ibid, per Mellish LJ at I 16; Reuterv Sah (1879) 4
C.B.D. 239, 257.
The same complexities inherent in demonstrating value in the absence of market
price information and the dangers of over-compensation or under-compensation
often underlie the recognition of liquidated damages clauses in building and
construction contracts. Such provisions are especially important in the case of
unprovable anticipated losses, where the adoption of stipulated compensation allows
the parties to 'insure' their losses by agreeing on a set price for the entitlement, and to
reduce the process costs incurred in determining the value of the expected performance. Stoljar, ibid, at 528; Goetz and Scott, Liquidated damages, penalties and thejust
compensation principle: Some notes on an enforcement model and a theory of efficient
breach (1977) 77 Col. L.R. 554. Section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code
acknowledges that the reasonableness of a liquidated damages clause stands to be
determined, in part, on the 'difficulties of proof of loss.'
The archtypical case of non-market valuation is presented by land, which, because
each parcel of realty is 'unique,' cannot, in theory, have a true market value. It may, of
course, be virtually indistinguishable from neighbouring lands, and the sale of similar,
albeit non-identical, lands may provide information as to the value of the promised
performance; but again the costs and uncertainty of assessment are notorious. Hoggv
Wilkin (1975) 51 D.L.R. (3d) 41 I (noting speculative nature of damage award and risks of
over-compensation o r under-compensation in cases of contracts for the sale of land). A
typical case is Harris et a1.v Darh'ngta Properties Ltd. (1978) 6 B.C.L.R. 88, where evidence
led by the plaintiff established the value of the land at $5 I ,450, expert evidence led by
the defendant established the value at $8o,ooo, and the defendant himself testified that
the land was worth $61,500. T h e decision - placing a value of $65,000 on the land was an uneasy compromise.
In Hechter and Reymaft v Thurston [ig78] I W.W.R. 695 Nitikman J considered the
evidence of a qualified appraiser as to the value of real property, the absence of sales of
comparable property, deficiencies in accessability, and the irrelevance of sales of
property of different areas and characteristics and admitted that the evidence of value
in assessing damages for breach of contract was 'not very dependable.' See also E.J.H.
Hokfings Ltd. v Bovgie et al. (1977) 3 Alta. L.R. (2d) 244.
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The absence of a market in land is arguably of far less significance today than in the
eighteenth century, when the rules protecting promissory entitlements were developed. See Reiter and Sharpe, Wroth v Tyler: Must equity remedy contract damages? (1979)
3 Can. Bw. L.J. 146, 151. As one text puts it, 'How much sense the "uniqueness of
Blackacre" idea ever made is questionable. It makes no sense at all when translated into
the brave, new world of Levittown in which land seems to have become fungible as
wheat or corn or oil.' Kessler and Gilmore Contracts, Cares and Materialr.(nnd ed 1974)
994.
13 Several writers have suggested that specific performance ought to be the preferred
remedy in contract law - or at the very least should be granted more readily than it is
today. They argue, quite persuasively, that the judicial order (or, more precisely, the
perceived likelihood of the order) creates an environment in which the party who
chooses to break his contractual obligation must transfer some, not all, of the wealth
generated by the breach to his contracting partner. He will not transfer all of his
new-found wealth, since he would be left in no better a position than he would have
been in had he not decided to breach. Rather, he will transfer some of this benefit to the
plaintiff, thus leaving himself better off than if he had fulfilled his contract, and leaving
the innocent plaintiff with a portion of the wealth as well. One difficulty with this thesis
is the probability of negotiation taking place. While the perceived likelihood of an
order for performance will provide the potential defendant with an incentive to
negotiate which would not exist if damages were to be awarded on breach, there is no
obvious corresponding incentive to negotiate from the point of view of the innocent
party. He will, if he so desires, enjoy the entire benefit of the original contract, and may
enjoy the increased wealth now enjoyed by the contract breaker, without having to
transfer any portion of the latter wealth.
It is true, nonetheless, that the non-breaching party may be willing to negotiate an
exchange of his property (ie, his potential right of specific performance) in return for
money, thus establishing in monetary terms the subjective value of the contract to him.
The negotiation may come about in view of the ever-present uncertainty flowing from
evidentiary requirements, potential appeals, the exercise ofjudicial discretion, and the
risk of intervening legislation or administrative regulation affecting the transaction.
Moreover, the delay inherent in ajudicially ordered transfer of property may provide a
powerful incentive to negotiate an exchange of the right to specific performance in
return for an immediate transfer of wealth. This is not, of course, to ignore the
non-compensable legal litigation costs and the similarly non-compensable personal
litigation costs including stress, foregone opportunities, fear of retribution, and the
like, which may also lead to negotiation.
The distributive consequences of property rules have been the subject of judicial
comment which emphasizes the process of contractual renegotiation between two
parties where one, but not the other, is subject to a judicial order to perform the
contract - a law, so to speak, 'passed' with only the defendant in mind. Advocates of
specific performance have denied the coerciveness of this enforcement mechanism,
arguing that it simply obliges the parties to negotiate a price for the right to breach - a
thesis which may or may not be supported by the common experience that the issuance
of an injunction or an order of specific performance typically settles the issues in
dispute. Lord Denning has suggested that settlement is reached in gg cases out of loo
where preliminary injunctions are issued. Fellowes v Fisher [1975] 2 All E.R 829,836. See
Prescott, Note (1975) 91 Law 4. Rev. 168. The opportunity to renegotiate assumes,
however, that a fair bargaining process will exist, and as long ago as 1863 in Isenbwg v
E a t India Howe Estate Co. (1863) 3 De G.J. a s. 263 Lord Westbury pointed out the
dangers inherent in an order for specific performance, fearing that the defendants
would 'be made subject to any extortionate demand' (ibid) which the plaintiff might
impose. More recently, Graham J insisted that if an injunction were to be employed in
order to compel a market exchange, the claimants 'must not be treated as if they were in
the extremely powerful bargaining position which an interlocutory injunction would
have given them.' Bracewell v Appleby [ig75] 1 Ch. 408,419. The individual nature of
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the mandatory judicial order may have a compelling psychological impact which is
absent in the vague, generalized notion of legal duty which most often reinforces
contractual performance. As Chayes notes, an injunction may constitute a far more
severe restraint on behaviour than the risk of future liability in money damages.
Chayes, The role of the judge in public law litigation (1976) 89 Ham. L.R. 1281. One
purpose of liability rules, and the consequent objective assessment of damages, may be
to ensure that the price paid by the defendant is not distorted by the shadow of a
judicially imposed duty to perform on pain of imprisonment for contempt.
On balance, while it may be valid to argue for a distributive element in an order for
specific performance, experience suggests that performatory obligations 'may prevent
a negotiated solution rather than bringing it about.' Pearce The Valuation of Social Cost
(1978) 13; Posner Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed 1977) 97.
14 Calabresi and Melamed, Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of
the cathedral (1072)
. ., , 86" Ham. L.R. 1080. See also Hale. Coercion and distribution in a
supposedly non-coercive state (1923) 38 PoLSc. Q. 470.
15 Calabresi and Melamed, supra
- note 14, at 1106, 1107
16 Kronman, supra note 1 2
17 Bentham Thory of Legislation, Principles of the Civil Code 137 (Hildreth, ed, 1840) i 37
18 Philbrick, Changing conceptions of property in law (1938) 86 U.Pa. L.R. 691,694
19 Kronman, supra note 12, at 353
20 Horwitz has described the antiquated and generally disparaged theory that contracts
were, in essence, transfers of title. Honviu, The historical foundations of modern
contract law (1974) 87 Ham. L.R. g17,gro-3.
21 Maitland insists that '[oln the whole ... specific performance applies to agreements for
the sale or the lease of lands as a matter of course.' Maitland Equity (1910) 240. In
Kloepfer Wholesah Hardware and Automotive Company Ltd. v Roy [1g52] 2 S.C.R. 465.472
the Supreme Court of Canada said that 'generally speaking, specific performance
applies to agreements for the sale of land as a matter of course.' In recent years we have
witnessed a departure from the strictness of the rule, especially where the motives for
the purchase of land are speculative. Chalh v Fairuiew Construction Ltd.(1978) 33 A.P.R.
13; [1g77] 3 R.P.R. 117. One commentator over a half-century ago proposed that sales
of land not be specifically enforced when the contract is of a speculative nature. Heap,
A draft of a proposed code on the subject of the sale of lands (1922)42 Can. Law T i w
257. In Prittie v Laughton (1902) 1 0 . w . ~185specific performance of a land contract was
refused on the grounds of the purchaser's speculative intentions. American courts
have for a number of years been willing to assess the motives of the purchaser in
determining whether specific performance of a contract to sell land should be enforced.
Where the motives are speculative, damages will be the likely remedy. See Bird and
Fanning, Specific performance of contracts to convey real estate (1935) 23 Ky. LJ. 380.
See Watkins v Paul 95 Idaho 499.51 1 P. 2d 781 (1973); Suchan v Rutherford go Idaho
288,295,296; 410 P. 2d 434,443 (1966); Paddock v Davenport 108 N.C. 710; 1 2 S.E. 464
(1890). Recent decisions in Canada contain references to a similar philosophy. See
306793 Ontario Ltd. in T w t v Rims (1979) 25 O.R.(zd) 79 per MacKinnon A.C.J.O. at 81;
Heron Bay Investmats Ltd. v Peel Elder Developmmtr Ltd. (1976) 2 C.P.C. 338, 339. See
generally Brenner, Specific performance of contracts for the sale of land purchased for
resale or investment (1978) 24 McCiU LJ. 513.
22 The first suspicion that the development of property rules to protect promissory
entitlements does not rest entirely on the intricacies and risks inherent in assessing
damages is the well-established, indeed ancient, practice of awarding 'compensation'
when specific performance is ordered, and where the transferor cannot convey all that
he promised. See Wood v Gn;ffith(18 18) I Swan. 43; 36 E.R. 29 1 (purchaser successful in
compelling vendor to convey limited interest, with compensation adjusted in accordance with the diminution in the value of the interest transferred); Mortlock v B u l k
(1804) l o Ves. 292; 32 E.R. 857 (purchaser granted specific performance with abatement of purchase price); Bowes v V a u (1918), 43 O.L.R. 521 (area of land smaller than
that contracted for, specific performance with compensation ordered); Mason v
d
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Freeman [ig58] S.C.R. 483 (refusal to bar dower by vendor's wife, specific performance
with compensation respecting the diminished value of the land ordered). See Harpum,
Specific performance with compensation as a purchaser's remedy - A study in contract and equity [ig81] Camb. LJ. 47.
T h e risks of error resulting in over-compensation or under-compensation, and the
intricacies of assessment in cases of partial contractual performance are as prevalent as
in the case of valuing the entire property, but this, as Fry notes, has not interfered with
the development of liability rules to augment property rules; the law did not hesitate to
value land where performance was demanded: 'Where the difference in value of the
interest contracted for and the interest that can actually be conveyed is incapable of
computation, the Court will not enforce specific performance. But having regard to
some of the decided cases already referred to, it is conceived that the Court will seldom
now consider a difficulty of this kind insuperable ... The objection that the compensation is
unarcertuinable it, as h been already in substance obserued, one which the Court is unwilling to
entertain' (emphasis added). Fry Specific Performance (2nd ed 1881) 539,540.
Although one might concede that the complexities and likelihood of error in
ascertaining the value of land in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (when no
market existed in which the prices of land bought and sold might have served as an
accurate proxy for value) may have provided a powerful incentive for a remedial tool
which would avoid the costs generated by non-market valuation, it would seem that
other forces were at play in shaping and colouring the evolution of the law. As Maitland
put it, 'even if land can be said to have a market value, still a man may well have
consented to pay more ... to him the land may have a fancy value.' Maitland Equity (2nd
ed 1936) 238. This attitude was typical of judicial discourse of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. In Adder* v Dkon (1824) 1 Sim. & St. 607, Sir John Leach vc
commented that 'damages at law ... may not be a complete remedy to the purchaser, to
whom the land may have a peculiar and special value' (ibid, at 610); and in 1746 Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke observed that specific performance of land contracts would be
decreed as a matter of course, a purchaser agreeing to buy 'on a particular liking to the
land.' Buton v Litter and Cooper (1746). 3 Atk. 383,384. Even earlier, in 1719, land was
pictured as a 'matter of moment and use,' Cud v Rutter (1719) P. Wms. 570; 24 E.R. 52 1.
Remarks by councel at 571; being 'more commodious, pleasant or convenient than
another parcel of land' (ibid). Fry, while admitting the difficulties inherent in assessing
value in the absence of market information, argued that 'one landed estate, though of
precisely t h e same market value as another, may be vastly different in every
circumstance that makes it an object of desire.' Fry Spenfic Pnformance (2nd ed 1881)
Para 43.
23 The centrality of land contracts to English law and legal institutions is most evident in
the direct disobedience of the Court of Equity in enforcing parol contracts in the face of
legislation enacted in 1677 imposing formalities on the legal recognition (in any form)
of promissory entitlements in respect of land. The Statute of Frauds (1677) 29 Car. 2, s.
4 required that every 'Contract o r Sale of Land, Tenements or Hereditaments, or any
Interest in o r concerning them' must be evidenced in writing. Holdsworth has
exhaustively detailed the history of the statute. Holdsworth, 6 History of English Law
(1924) 379-97. The courts devised means to avoid the statute within seven years of its
enactment. Bzltcher v Stapelq, (1685) 1 Vern. 363. See Law Reform Commission of
British Columbia Report on the Statute of Fraudc (L.R.c. 33, 1977); Spry Equitable Remedies
(1971) 233; Pollock, Princi'pb of C a t r c t r 521 (13th ed., 1950).
24 Judicial attitudes in the case of credit transactions in which the debtor's land was
pledged as collateral stood in stark contrast to the rigour of enforcement, at common
law, of more common contractual obligations. T h e intrusion of equitable doctrines to
allow the landowner further time to meet his debt obligation so as not to forfeit his land
has beenjustified by onejudge in almost religious terms - a product of 'the piety or love
of fees of those who administer equity.' Salt v Marquess of Northampton [ i 8921 A.C. 1, ig.
Although security agreements in which personal property was impressed with debt
obligations have, in some cases, been assimilated to the position of mortgages of realty,
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Maitland could still say, as recently as 1910, that 'mortgages of such things ... have
nothing to do with the doctrines of equity,' Maitland, supra note 22, at 193, 194.
Ashburner makes the same point. Ashburner Pnncipb ofEquity (1902) 257,261. Rules
protecting entitlements in the case of mortgages have little in common with the
property rules applied to protect promissory entitlements in the case of purchases. In
contracts of purchase, the law specifically compels a transfer of land, protecting the
purchaser's entitlement through the invocation of a property rule. In the case of a
contract to transfer land on default of a debt obligation, however, the entitlement of the
'purchaser' (ie, the prospective transferee-mortgagee) is protected merely by a liability
rule. In most cases, the law modifies his consensual rights, giving the debtor further
time to pay. At best, he receives only his damages - the law insisting that the land be
sold, with the surplus generated by the sale to be returned to the owner. Thus the
contractual entitlement of the mortgagee can be destroyed by the mortgagor on
payment of compensation for the mortgagee's losses.
Infra, at notes 300-1 1
Maitland Constitutional Histoy (1908) 538. Watkins writes that 'from [the feudal] system
are derived our laws relative to property.' Watkins The Law of Tenures (1824) xxv, xxvi.
Mcllwain, in The Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932) 177, 182, 355, details a
similar confusion of public and private authority.
What I mean by 'economic foundation' is simply that the individuals who are involved
in the exchange process must perceive, or be prepared to perceive, the commodities
that are being traded as being reducible to monetary equivalents. The wheat, or
machinery, or shares represent a certain sum of money which has only temporarily
assumed the guise of a tangible object. The 'economic foundation' of the contract
reflects the financial motivations and expectations of the parties engaged in the trade.
'Social needs are the essential life that give vitality to all legal institutes.' Philbrick, supra
note 18, at 694. See also Reich, The new property (1964) 73 Yak LJ. 733. Watkins,
writing of the feudal system observed that 'to it must we have recourse, in order to
account for the origin and utility of many [laws] which might otherwise appear useless
or unjust; and to it must we continually recur, to explain and illustrate what might
otherwise seem dictated only by caprice.' Watkins, supra note 26, at xxvi.
Adams Garrow's Law of Real Property (5th ed 1961) 2. Cheshire writes that 'land
constituted the sole form of wealth.' Cheshire on M o h Real Property (1925)4. Topham
comments that 'land was by far the most important form of wealth.' Topham's Real
Property (5th ed 1961) 2.
Williams The Law of Real Property (1845) 1.5 (emphasis added). See also, Pollock The
Land Laws (1883) 53. In 1836 the value of fixed property in England was calculated to
be f 3,327 million, out of an aggregate national capital of f4,305.5 million. Manufacturing and commercial capital, exclusive of ships, was said to represent only 5 per cent of
the English national wealth. List The National System of Political Economy (1909) 192, 193.
Brodrick has described the appreciation in land values during the nineteenth century.
Brodrick English Land and English Lnndlurdc ( I88 I) 84-8.
Cheshire, supra note 29, at 6
Stamp The Land ofBritain (1946) 241
Dicey, The paradox of the land law (1905) Law Q. Rev. 22 I , 226
(1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 158
5 Curbin on Contractr (1964) 53 1
Mayne Treatise on Damages (5th ed 1894) 2 12-14
Hmfurd v Waight 1 Kirby 3 (Conn. 1786)
See Stone The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642 (1972) 73,77.
Haskins, Extending the grasp of the dead hand: Reflections on the origin of the rule
against perpetuities (1978) 126 U.Pa. L.R. 1g,24. Of course land did have value as a
source of economic wealth through agriculture, urbanization, and pressures of
population, and many have detailed the increased profitableness and resulting
demand for land in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. As Tawney
wrote: 'During the decade between 1540 and 1550 there was a furor of land
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speculation. T o the Abbey lands, which came into the market after 1536, were added
those of the guilds and chantries in 1547. It is quite clear that some of the grantees of
estates did not acquire them with the intention of retaining them, but simply "bought
for the rise."' Tawney The Agrarinn P r o b h in the Sirteenth Century (1912) 35,381. 2
Cunningham The Growth of English Industry and Commerce (6th ed 1925) 105.
40 Dickinson Liberty and Property. Political Ideology in Eighteenth Century Britain (1977) 51
4 i i Mill Principles of Political Economy (5th London ed 1893)294. Guttsman concludes that
the landed estate considered as a financial investment was, even through the
nineteenth century, inferior to industrial or commercial property. Guttsman, supra
note 1, at 127.
42 The Australian experience was similar - land quickly became a marketable commodity,
and land ownership was far more diverse than in England. Whalen, Immediate success
of registration of title to land in Australia and early failures in England (1967) 2
N.Z.U.L.R. 416, 423-24. Morden reveals a decidedly realistic attitude to the dramatic
differences between England in the eighteenth century and Canada at the turn of the
twentieth, suggesting that 'the obvious fact that land was plentiful' in Canada explains
the departure in philosophy of Canadian expropriation legislation from its English
predecessors. Morden, The new expropriation legislation: Powers and procedures in
The Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures, Recent Devehpientr in Real Estate
Law (1975) 225, 238-41. Land in England no longer exhibits the price stability it once
did. Drewett, Land values and the suburban land market in 2 Hall (ed) The Confainmat
of Urban Land (1973) 220-2. The Law Commission in England reacted to rapid
increases in land values by proposing substantive reforms in the law of contract to
protect the interests of prospective purchasers of land. See Law Commission Transfer of
Land 'Subject to Contract' Agreements 1-3 (Working Paper No. 5 1,1973)-The commission
retreated from its proposals in its report on the same topic. Law Commission TraNfmof
Land. Report on ' S e e c t to Contract' Agreements (Law Comm. No. 65,1975). See generally
Hall (ed) Land Values (1965).
43 Sqmrourv Delancy (1824) 3 Conv. 445, reversing (1822)6 Johns Ch. 222. See also Gates,
The homestead law in an incongruous land system (1936) 41 Am. Hist. Rev. 655.
Hibbard has described rampant land speculation in America as characteristic of the
colonial and confederation periods. Hibbard A History of the Public LandPolicies (1924)
ch 12.
44 Pilcher v Livingston 4 Johnson's Rep. 1
45 M c K i n m v Burrows (1834) 3 Q.B. (o.s.) 590; Kilborn v Workman (1862) g Ch 255. See
Risk, The last golden age: Property and the allocation of losses in Ontario in the
nineteenth century (1977) 27 U.T.L.J. 199, 210.
46 Moore Social Origins of Dictatorship andDemocracy (1966)8-13,25-g; Gash Politics in the
Age ofpeel (1953) 177-181; Hobsbaum Zndushy and Empire 97 (1968).
47 See McCloskey, The enclosure of open fields: Preface to a study of its impact on the
efficiency of English agriculture in the eighteenth century (1g72), 32J . ofEcon. Hist. 15.
48 Ibid, at 23. See also Davies, The small landowner 1780-1832, in the light of the land tax
assessments (1927-8) 1 Econ. Hist. Rev. 87; Habakkuk, English land ownership,
1680-1740 (1939-40) 10 E c m Hut Rev. 1; Beckett, English land ownership in the later
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: The debate and the problems (1977) 30 Econ.
Hist. Rev. (2d series) 567,570.
49 Cockburn Lqe ofLurd Jejfrey (1857) 185
50 See Hanbury Essays in Equity (1933) 39
51 Burgess v Whe& (1759) i Eden. 177, 225; 28 E.R. 652. The connection of land
ownership and the right to vote is not, of course, the entire answer. For example it may
not explain awards of specific performance (or rather the legal ancestors of specific
performance) prior to 1430. See Fry, supra note 22, at para 19; 1 Spence Equitable
Juricpdence (1846)644,645; Newland A treatise on Contracts (1808) 88,89. Simpson has
collected a number of cases of specific performance of contracts to convey land in the
mid-fifteenth century. Simpson, supra note g, at 595.
Nor can the vote explain the specificenforcement of contracts for the sale of personal
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property o r of land situated outside of England. See Fry, supra note 22, at paras 14,23;
Davis v Park (1860) L.R. 8 Ch 862; T o l k v Cartmet (1705) 2 Vern. 494; Penn v Lord
Baltimore (1750) i Ves. Sen. 444. In addition, contracts relating to interests in land
which did not carry the vote were specifically enforced. Hinton v Hinton (1855) 2 Ves.
Sen. 631,638 (contract to convey copyhold enforced).
A partial explanation for the discontinuity between the class of contracts for which
specific performance would lie and the narrower class which would involve a transfer
of the franchise may be found in the judicial response to the Statute of Frauds (29 Car.
11,c. 3) in 1677 which proscribed the enforcement of parol contracts for the sale of land,
including in the definition of land much more than freehold. Scriven Copyhold (2nd ed
1823) 262. The doctrine of part performance quickly arose as an equitable device
which enabled Chancery to order the specific enforcement of parol contracts
notwithstanding their unenforceability of law. The doctrine was applied, however,
only to those contracts for which a Court of Equity would entertain or, in the view of
some, grant a suit for specific performance. McManus v Cook (1887)35 Ch. D. 68 1,697
(doctrine of part performance applies to contracts in respect of which a court would
entertain a suit for specific performance) Rink v March [igzi] 1 W.W.R. gig (part
performance applies to contracts of which specific performance would be ordered ). See
also Sarbit v Hanson and Booth Fisheries Can. Co. [ig50] 4 D.L.R. 34, reversed on other
grounds, [ig52] 2 D.L.R. 108; L a u q v Purse11 (1888) 39 Ch. D. 508,518.
This doctrine created a powerful incentive to expand the equitable jurisdiction to
award specific performance of a broad range of contracts notwithstanding that political
rights were not necessarily at issue. Some authorities take a narrower position - that the
doctrine of part performance applies only to contracts 'concerning land' or 'relating to
land,'but this view has been widely criticized. Britain v Rossiter(i87g) 1 1 Q.B.C. i 23, 129,
131, criticized in Williams The Stat& of Frauds (1932) 239; Maddison v Alderson (1887) 1
Mac. & G. 572; 41 E.R. 1387; Fry states that the doctrine applies to 'all cases in which a
Court of Equity would entertain a suit if the alleged contract had been in writing.' Fry
Spec@ Petformance (6th ed 192 1) 283. Spry concurs in this opinion, citing numerous
Australian authorities to that effect. Spry, supra note 23, at 237, 238.
Defoe The Original Power of the Collective Body of the People of England, Examined and
Assert~d(1702) 18
There is some debate as to whether the pre-1430 franchise extended to freemen or to
freeholders. See Hodgins The Canoda Franchise Act (1886) 14. Chalmers and Asquith, as
well as Medley, argue that only freeholders elected members of Parliament prior to
1430. Chalmers and Asquith Outlines of Constitutional Law (3rd ed 1925) 334. Medley
English Constitutional Histoy (4th ed 1907) 195, 196. Professor Hearn discusses the
possibility that only tenants in chief of the Crown voted prior to 1430. Hearn The
Government of England (1886) 534-7. In 1405 by 7 Henry IV,c 15 the franchise was
expressly vested in all freeholders.
8 Henry VI,c 7. The residency qualification was made explicit in 1432 by lo Henry VI,c
7. Little attention was paid to the latter statute, and it was formally repealed by 14 Geo.
111,c 68.
Prior to 1430, parliamentary elections had been subject to serious disruption by the
local populace. Love11 English CorrttitutMnal and Legal Histoy (1962) 199,200. Reiss The
Histoy of the English Electoral Law in the Middle Ages trans1 K.L. Wood-Legh (1973) 57-9
8 Henry VI,c 7
Plucknett TasweU-Lungmead's CunstitutioMl Histoy (loth ed 1946) 225; Wilkinson
Constitutional Hisloty of England in the Ffteenth Century (1963) 289
1 Blackstone Commentaties on theLaws ofEngland (18th ed 1829) i 73. Bishop Fleetwood
in 'Chronicon Pretiosum' argued that the franchise requirement was equivalent to
twelve pounds in the reign of Queen Anne. Cited in Leader The Franchise, A Manual of
Registration and Election Law and Practice (1879) 54, and in Blackstone, ibid, at 173.
Medley, supra note 53, at 196
In 1886 Hearn estimated the qualification as an eighteen-pound freehold. Hearn,
supra note 53, at 538,539. 'The qualification thus prescribed was at the time (1430) a
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high limit.' Courtney The Wwking Constitution of the United Kingdom (1901) 59. Bailey
estimates that a 40-shilling freehold would be worth several hundred dollars in the
middleof the twentieth century. Bailey BritishParliamentary Democracy (1958) 61 at note
4. Gneist in 1889 suggested that the qualification would have to be raised to loo to 800
shillings to take account of the change in the value of money. Gneist A Histo7 ofthe
English Parliament (3rd ed I 889) 39 1.
61 See Bishop Fleetwood Chronicon Pretiosum 174, cited in Blackstone, supra note 58, at
173. Wilkinson estimated that the electorate represented in the Commons numbered
some 10,000. Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 292.
62 The overt political ramifications of this legislation cannot be denied. The feudal service
obligations of tenure holders to their landlords which, on the surface, had gradually
disappeared during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had, in truth, been
transformed into political servitudes - the exercise of political authority by the
landowners over their tenants.
T h e major forms of feudal tenure were military tenure or knightservice, providing
the landowner with a standing army, either directly or through scutage payments;
socage tenure, providing agriculturai production; frankalmoign tenure, ensuring
religious salvation; and serjeanty tenure, providing personal servants for the landowner. See Powell Real Property (1977) 41-70; Pollock, supra note 30; Holdsworth An
HistwiEalZntroduction to theLandLaw (1927) 2 1-9; Baker An Introduction to English Legal
History (2nd ed 1979) 193-201. Tenurial holding of land was abolished gradually
during the middle ages. T h e most important legislation affecting the institution of
feudal tenure was the statute Quia Emptwes 18 Edw. I , c 1) in 1290; and an 'Act taking
away the Court of Wards and Liveries and Tenures in Capite and by Knight Service
and Purveyance and for settling a Revenue upon his Majesty in lieu thereof (12 Car. 11,
c 24) in 1660 transformed knightservice and socage tenure into free and common
socage. See 1 Washburn The American Law of Real Property (1860) 29-54; Williams,
supra note 30, at 86-91.
De Tocqueville's laudatory praise of English democracy - that feudalism did not
result in the establishment of a caste system in England - is accurate only in the most
narrow of perspectives. The obligation of service owed to the lord of the manor was
replaced by the more insidious obligation of political fielty. T h e military authority of
the feudal lord had evolved into political influence exercised through the ownership of
property, and, until the nineteenth century, property meant land. De Tocqueville
L'Ancien Regime (1856) 178. Robertson Ekctwal Justice (1931) 18, 20; Cannon
Parliamentary Reform 1640-1832 (1973) 1-5.
63 Gwyer Anson's Law and Custom ofthe Constituth (5th ed I 92 2) I 1 1- 15; Medley, supra
note 53, at 201, 205; Cannon, supra note 62
64 Pollard The Evolutwn of Parliament (1926) 156; Maitland The Constitutiml History of
Enghnd (1913) 3569 357
65 The result of periodic House of Commons decisions on disputed elections in the
boroughs 'over the years was substantially to reduce the size of the borough electorate.'
Cannon, supra note 62, at 34; Keir The Constitutional History ofModrm Britain Since 1485
(8th ed 1966) 46.
66 Lovell English Constitutional and Legal History (1962) 199,250. T h e debate as to the size
of the electorate is hardly satisfying. Dalrymple states that the electorate in some
particular counties numbered at least 30,000. Dalrymple An Essay Towards a General
Histoly of Feudal Property in Great Britain (4th ed 1759) 274. Polland estimates that 3000
voters were present at the county election in Norfolk in 1586. Pollard, supra note 64, at
163.
67 Lovell, ibid. Marriot estimates the electorate at 160,000. 1 Marriot The Mechanism of the
M o h State (1927) 477. Cannon, supra note 62, at 290-2.
68 Cannon, supra note 62, at 41,42, states:
'In 1715 the total population of England and Wales was some 54 million: by 1?go it
had risen to 84 million, and by 1831 it stood at nearly 14 million.- that is, it had
increased by 155%. Plumb's estimate of the English electorate at the end of Anne's
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reign was approximately 250,000. The House of Commons, 1715-54 suggests a slightly
higher figure of 261,000, of whom 160,000 were county voters. The subsequent
volume of The House of Commons puts the county vote in 1754 at about 177,000, with
105,000in the boroughs, making a grand total of some 282,000. Although percentages
may suggest a false precision, the electorate seems to have increased in that period by
some 8% against a population increase of some 18%.
'To assess the electorate in the years immediately preceding 1832 is far from easy,
since there were several counties where there were no contests or only token ones, and
the evidence for many boroughs is similarly fragmentary. There seems little doubt
however that the increase in the county electorate was modest ...
'From the figures I have compiled, I would put the increase in the county electorate
between 1754 and 1831 at not much higher than 6%. During the same period, the
English borough electorate seems to have increased by some 50%. My estimate for the
total English electorate in the years immediately before 1832 is some 344,000,
representing an overall increase on 1754 of something like 20%. Since during the same
period the total population more than doubled; we may say with reasonable confidence
that there was a sharp decline in the proportion of people who had even a formal share
in the political life of the nation.'
Stout British Government (1953) 202
Lovell estimates an electorate, in 1760, of some 85,000 in the boroughs, of which some
15,000 elected over half the borough members. Lovell, supra note 66, at 429.
Robertson writes that by the mid-Georgian era, the boroughs 'had generally become
the mere vestiges of villages ... mere private possessions, politically speaking, of rich
landowners.' Robertson, supra note 62, at 25. 'Only the merest fraction' of the
population possessed the vote. Pollard, supra note 20, at 338. It has been calculated
elsewhere that at the end of the eighteenth century, 1 1,075voters elected 257 members
of Parliament, and that this narrow electorate was itself controlled by less than zoo
more influential landowners. Dickinson, supra note 40, at 238. Even where the
borough franchise appeared generous, it was often in reality strictly circumscribed;
Gatton, which enfranchised all freeholders and 'scot the lot' inhabitants, consisted of an
electorate of seven; Tavistock only ten. Marriot, supra note 67, at 476. Walcott has
estimated that in 1701 over 40 per cent of the boroughs consisted of electorates of less
than loo voters, another 25 per cent had less than 500, and only 1 2 per cent had more
than 1000. Walcott English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century (1956) 23. An admittedly
idiosyncratic sample of various boroughs during the eighteenth century reveals an
electorate of loo in Tregony in 1696; 250 in Abingdon in 1699and again in 1796; over
iooo in Colchester in 17i 1; 450 in Carlisle in 1712; 37 in Bury St Edmonds in 1718-24;
and loo or fewer in several boroughs, including Appleby and Great Bedwyn.
Nottingham's electorate in 1753 was over 2000. Williams The Eighteenth Century
Constitution 1688-1815 (1960) 152-70.
Phillips and Jackson Constitutional and Administrative Law (6th ed 1978) 187
McKenzie British Political Parties (2nd ed 1963) 2,4
Wright The Law Relating to Laded Estates (1897) 135, 136
Pollack, supra note 30, at 49
Powell, supra note 62 at 60. Coke wrote in 1584 that the '[glreat part of the land within
the realm is in grant by copy.' Heydun's Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep., at note 86.
1 Rogers Histg, of Agriculture and P k e s in England (1866) 693. See Sir Colin Thornton
Kenisley, Tradition and change in property ownership, in Denman (ed) Contemporary
Problems of Land O w ~ e n h i p(1962). Tuberville argues that no more than 7000 persons
owned 80 per cent of the land in England as late as 1876. Tuberville The House of Lo&
in the Age of R 4 m 1784-1837 (1958) 407-10. See also Scmtton Land in Fetters (1886)
144-5:
Brodnck, supra note 30, at 166. Brickdale, writing in 1914, could say that 'the soil of
our country ...will remain for ever what it is at present - chiefly an exclusive luxury of
the very rich, and seldom, if ever, enjoyed by any beyond the limited circle of the
comparatively well-to-do.' Brickdale Methods of Land Transfer (1914) 207.
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The influence exercised by those who held the political franchise was exacerbated by
the archaic distribution of parliamentary seats prior to the nineteenth century. For
example, London, with an immense population numbering in the hundreds of
thousands, returned four members to the House of Commons in 1801, while 2 1
Cornish boroughs, each with a population of under zoo, returned 42 members.
Lovell, supra note 66, at 427. Other boroughs, such as Gratton, returned two members
out of an electorate of six. Ibid, at 419. TWO
boroughs, Old Sarum and Dunwich, no
longer existed, the former being deserted and the latter having fallen into the sea. Yet
both returned members to Parliament, chosen by owners of the land where the
boroughs formerly existed as thriving communities. Stout, supra note 69, at 203. The
burgage boroughs, in which the franchise was allocated to the owners of specific pieces
of property, were often 'pocket boroughs,' literally in the pocket of a family or patron
who controlled all or nearly all of the enfranchised property. Lovell, supra 66, at 428,
429. Cannon, supra note 62.
The result of four centuries of propertied voting rights was a form of representational democracy which vested absolute political control in a narrow oligarchy of
landowners. One historian has detailed the history of political democracy in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in graphic terms, describing the House of
Commons of over 500 parliamentarians of whom 326 were returned by 182
individuals. Robertson, supra note 62, at 34-8. Although mathematical accuracy is an
unattainable object, similar figures are given by others. See 2 Gneist The Histmy of the
English Constitution (2nd ed 1889)447.
In 1816, Oldfield calculated that 87 peers controlled the return of 218 English
parliamentarians and that 57 peers were responsible for the return of 82 Scottish and
Irish members. 6 Oldfield The Representative Histoty of Great Britain and Ireland (1816)
295-9. The influence of commoners was equally pervasive. In 1780,6000 men were
said to have returned a clear majority of the members of Parliament. Marriot, supra
note 67, at 477. Todd cites evidence prepared in 1865 which compared voting rights
based on population (4 votes to the upper class, 32 to the middle, and 64 to the working
classes) to the allocation of voting rights based on land ownership (83 to the upper
classes, 13to the middle, and 4 to the working classes). 1 Todd Parliamentaty Government
in England (1887) 26.
Under article 18 of the Instrument of Government, The Government of the Commonwealth of
England, Scotland and Ireland, and t& Dominions k e u d o belonging, 16 December 1653,
the qualification for the county franchise was extended to those who possessed or
owned real or personal property of a value o f f roo. The borough franchise was left to
custom. See Gardner, Constitutional documents of the puritan Revolution, in Medley,
supra note 53, at 31 1. Gough has described the conflict between the radical and
conservative factions of the Levellers. The latter regarded 'the safeguarding of
property as one of the primary objects of government, and ... insisted on the historic
principle that the franchise should be extended to property owners.' Gough Fundamental LOW in English Constitutional Histmy (196 I ) 1 I 3, I 14. MacPherson has described the
numerous franchise proposals considered by participants in the seventeenth-century
revolutionary movements. MacPherson The Political Theory of Possm've Individualism
(1962) 107-59. See also Cannon, supra note 62, at 1-23.
Reform of the franchise was abandoned upon the restoration of the monarchy in
1660. Keir, supra note 65, at 231.
2 W i IV,c 45
For example, the franchise was extended to non-occupying freeholders of an annual
value of ten pounds; to holders of land by copyhold or any other tenure for life or lives,
or any longer estate, of the same annual value; to leaseholders for any term originally of
greater than sixty years with an annual value of ten pounds, or of a term of twenty years
with an annual value of fifty pounds; and to persons occupying as tenants-at-will who
were liable for rent of at least fifty pounds. Ibid, ss 18-20.
Keir, supra note 65, at 40 I
Butt The Power of Parliament ( I968) 59. Lovell, supra note 66, at 47 1. Turberville relates
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that some Members of Parliament objected to the enfranchisement of fifty-pound
tenants-at-will because it would favour the landlords. Turberville, supra note 76, at
268,407.
83 See I May The Constitutional Histoly of England (1911) 302-8. In the appendix to Cox
and Grady Registration and Elections, Parliamentary and Municipal (1880), twenty-four
statutes ranging from the House Occupiers' Disqualification Removal Act, 4 I Vict., c 3,
to the Property Qualification Abolition Act, 21 & 2 2 Vict., c 26, are set out in full. The
Representation of the People Act, 1gi8,7 & 8 Geo. v, c 65, repealed over one hundred
earlier statutes.
84 30 & 3 I Vict., c 1 0 2
8; 48 &
Vict., c 3
86 See Laski, The personnel of the English cabinet 1801-1924 (1928) 2 2 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
18, ig. Lovell, supra note 66, at 472-7. Jennings The British Constitution (1942) 5. Even
Bagehot, who favoured restricting the electorate, complained in 1888 '[tlhat Parliament leans too much to the opinions of the landed interest.' Bagehot The English
Constitution (5th ed 1888) 163. Turberville, supra note 76, at 407. Butt, supra note 82, at
40. Marriot, supra note 67, at 482,483. Guttsman has collected detailed statistical data
describing the continued influence of the landed interests during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Guttsman, supra note 1, at 75-108. One should note, however,
that such influence was not limited to land owners; it extended as well, to the church.
See Somenille and Ross Irish Memoirs (1925) 28.
87 Todd, supra note 77, at 12-26; Turberville, supra note 76, at 407; 2 Taylor The Origin
and Growth of the English Constitution (1904) 530; Gneist, supra note 77, at 455-75
88 Representation of the People Act, 1918, 7 & 8 Geo. v, c 64; Representation of the
People Act, 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. v, c i z
89 31 Geo. III, c 3 1. By contrast, land as a political commodity, withdrawn from the regular
channels of commerce, did not prevail in the American colonies. Although the United
States began with the same traditions, democratic ideals combined with an abundance
of land quickly produced reform. See Konig, Community, custom and the common
law: Social change and the development of land law in seventeenth-century Massachusetts (1974) 18 Am. J. Legal Hut 137. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Mayer and
Lerner eds, 1966) 696. T h e original colonies began with English electoral traditions,
but possibly by the end of the eighteenth century, and certainly by the middle of the
nineteenth, property qualifications were abandoned in most states. Dieu In Defence of
Property (1963) 146,147. Nonetheless, even in America, vast tracts of land were held by
the very wealthy, and it has been argued that in 1787 'property qualifications left
perhaps ... a third of the white, male population disenfranchised.' Parenti Democracy
for the Few (1977) 50-1. Taft has suggested that of a population of 4,000,000 in
the 13 colonies, only 150,ooo were qualified to vote. Taft Popular Governmat (1913)
'3.
No explicit constitutional protection of a universal right of suffrage exists in the
United States, and the courts have consistently refused to invoke the constitutional
guarantee of a republican form of government as the foundation of a constitutional
protection of the right to vote. Pope v Williams 193 U.S. 62 1 (1904); Luther v B w h 48
U.S. (7 How.) I (1849); Baker v Cam 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Voting rights have been
protected under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Harper
v Virginia Board of Elections 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v Union FreeSchoolDistrict No. 15
395 U.S. 621 (1969)), and the First Amendment 'political expression' doctrine has also
been referred to in support of the franchise. Kusper v Pontikes 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
Nonetheless, vivid examples of property qualifications, indeed of land ownership, as
a prerequisite to the franchise in elections for certain limited purposes have recently
been sustained by the Supreme Court. See Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Lake Basin Water
Stmage Co. 410 u.S. 719 (1973). Compare Hill v Stone 95 S.Ct. 1637 (1975) (p~operty
qualification held invalid in the case of a general obligation bond election).
go 31 Geo 11, c 31, ss 20,24
91 Ibid
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92 In Upper Canada persons who had sworn allegiance to a foreign state, whose deeds had
not been registered within three months of an election, or who had not been in
possession of land or in receipt of its income for twelve months prior to an election were
disqualified.40 Geo. 111,c 3; 4 Geo. c 3. A university franchise was established in 1820by
60 Geo. 111,c 2, s 4; I Geo. IV,c 2.
In Lower Canada, persons who were not in receipt of income from land for six
months prior to the election, fraudulent grantees, and persons guilty of perjury were
disenfranchised. 2 Geo. IV,c 4; 5 Geo. IV,c 33.
93 3 & 4 Vict., c 35, s 27
94 I 2 Vict., c 12
95 16 Vict., c 153; 18 Vict., c 7; 18 Vict., c 87
96 C . S . C . 2 2 Vict., c 6, s 4
97 See Beck The Government of Nova Scotia (1957) 257, 258.
98 S.N.B. 18 Vict., c 37
gg Section 41 of the British North America Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c 3, provided for the
continuation of provincial franchise qualificationsuntil federal legislation was enacted.
The provincial franchise prerequisites were hardly enlightened. See Kennedy The
Constitution of C a d (1922) 391; Beck, supra note 97; Schindeler, Responsible
Government in Onturio (1969) 93,94; Donnelly The Govament of Manitoba (1963)72.73;
I Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (2nd ed 1927) 392-5.
loo Ward The Canudian House of Commons,Representation (1950) 2 1 2 ; Brady Democrq in the
Dominions (1958) 68
101 Ward, ibid, at 2 13
102 Dawson The Government of C a d (5th ed 1970) 321; Kennedy The Constitution of
Canada 1534-1937 (2nd ed 1938) 387; Keith, supra note 99, at 393
103 48 & 49 Via., c 40; see Mallory The Structure of Canadian Government ( I 97 I) I 8 I . Prior to
1885 the federal parliament had enacted a number of temporary election acts, all of
which had retained the provincial franchise: 34 Vict., c 20; 35 Vict., c 13; 36 Vict., c 27;
37 Vict., c g. The Electoral Franchise Act of 1885 repealed the previous acts and, with
the exceptions of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, instituted uniform
property qualifications throughout the country.
104 In these provinces, more liberal vested rights of franchise existing as of 20 July 1885
were retained.
105 See Electoral Franchise Act, 48 & 49 Vict., c 40, s 2.
106 Ermatinger CaMdian Franchise and Election Laws (1886) 6-9. Other significant
franchise qualifications of an extremely complicated system of electoral prerequisites
included: attainment of the age of majority; British citizenship; and either ownership
of real property worth $200 in any town or $300 in a city or tenancy rights at a monthly
rental of at least f 2, a quarterly rental of at least $6, a half-yearly rental of at least $12,
or an annual rental of at least $20. Other franchise qualifications included occupancy of
real property; residence and income from trade, office, calling, or profession; and
family relationship. Similar franchise requirements were imposed in the counties.
Electoral Franchise Act, 48 & 49 Vict., c 40, ss 3,4.
107 Legislative authority over 'Property and Civil Rights in the Provinces' is vested in the
provincial governments under s 92 (13) of the British North America Act, 1867,3o &
31 Vict., c 3.
108 Re North Perth Hessin v Lloyd (1891) 2 I O.R. 538,541,542. But see Re Simmons and Dalton
(1886) 12 O.R. 505,517 (suggesting that the right to vote was a mere civil right within
provincial jurisdiction and beyond federal legislative competence).
log 61 Vict., c 14
110 7 & 8 G e 0 . v , c 3 4 ; 7 & 8 G e 0 . v , c 3 9 .
I I 1 Dominion Elections Act l o & I I Geo. c46, s 29. The right tovote is now dependent upon
citizenship. Canada Elections Act s.c. 1970, c 14 (1st Supp.); as amended by S.C.
1973-4, c 51; 1974-5-6, c 66; S.C. 1977-8, c 3. Vestiges of the property qualification
remained until 1948 in respect of the disenfranchisement of residents of charitable
institutions in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. See Ward, supra note 100,at
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233-7. Mill had argued, decades earlier, for the disenfranchisement of those'in receipt
of parish relief.' Mill Considmations on Representative Govmment (McCallum, ed, 1946)
213-15.
Property qualifications for membership in the House of Commons, originally
entrusted to the provinces, had been abolished in 1874 by 37 Vict., c g, s 20.
I i 2 Pollard, supra note 64, at 156. McKinley The Suffsage Franchise in the Thirteen English
Colonies in America (1905) 8,g. But see 4 Co. Inst. at 4,5; Nairn v St. And~ewsUniversity
[igog] A.C. 147 (women disentitled to vote at common law). 12 Halsbury Encyclopedia of
the Laws of England (1910) 140; Brown v Ingram 7 Sess. Ca. (3rd Ser.) 281 (Scotland).
One advocate of reform suggested in 1797 that 'it has never been in the
contemplation of the most absurd theorists to extend the elective Franchise to the other
sex.' 33 FOXParliamentaly Histoty cols 726, 727, cited in Bailey, supra note 60, at 66.
i 13 Cathannev Susvq, cited in Olivev Zngram(i73g) 7 Mod. 263,264; Coatesv Lisle 14Jac. 1,
cited in Olive v Ingram; Holt v Lyle (1606). 4 Jac. 1, cited in Olive v Ingram, at 267,271
114 Cleverdon The Woman Suffsge Movement in Canada (2nd ed 1974) 214,215
115 Phiiips and Jackson Constitutiunul and Administrative Law (6th ed 1978) 187
116 Anclay v Lewis (1855) 17 C.B. 316,328
i 17 Elliot A Practical Treatice on the Qualifications and Registration of Parliamentuv Electors
(1839) 14
118 1 Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (18th ed 1829) 173, at note 62
i i g 20 Geo. 111, c 17, s 12
1 2 0 See Chorlton v Lings (1868) L.R. 4 C.P. 374; i H.& C. (women not entitled to vote in
boroughs); Churlton v Kessler (1868) L.R. 4 C.P. 397; 1 H.& C. 42 (women not entitled to
vote in counties); Rogers Elections, Registration and Election Agency (13th ed 1880) 180.
The Reform Act, 1 8 3 2 , Wm.
~
c 45 referred to 'male persons,' and the Representation
of the People Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c 102, used the word 'man.' It should be noted,
however, that women did not, merely through ownership of land, acquire the privilege
of sitting in Parliament. Maitland, supra note 64, at 364.
121 Pollard, supra note 64, at 165
122 Holmes, supra note 5, at 384. Cf Lovell, supra note 66, at 426. Austin has said that land
'is erected into a legal or fictitious person' Austin Jurirpndence (3rd ed 1872) 847.
id (1885) 1 Law Rev. 25,27
123 Anson, The franchise b
124 (1855) 17 C.B. 316
125 Ibid, at 325
126 Cough, supra note 78, at 178. Gough in another context refers to the Statutes of Uses
(1536),De Donis Conditiunulibus and Quia Emptores as striking 'close to the heart of what
... one might have thought would have been inviolable - the individual's rights of
property, and even that most "real" of all kinds of property, property in land.' Ibid, at
25.
127 'It is the beliefs which are so much a matter of course that they are rather tacitly
presupposed than formally expressed and argued for, the ways of thinking which seem
so natural and inevitable that they are not scrutinized with the eye of logical
self-consciousness, that often are most decisive of the character of a philosopher's
doctrine, and still oftener of the dominant intellectual tendencies of an age.' Lovejoy
The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the Histny of an Idea (2nd ed 1964)
128 (1704) 1 Sak. ig; 1 E.R. 41 7. Holt CJ dissented in the case, the majority holding that the
common law judges had no authority where matters of Parliament were at issue. See
Sugden The Law of Property as Administered by the House of Lords (1840) 18
129 Ashby v White, ibid, at 20
130 Ibid. S.A. de Smith describes the right to vote as 'in the nature of a proprietary right.'
De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (3rd ed 1977) 238
131 14 St. Trials 695,792
132 Mayne, supra note 36, at 1, 2; Williams Principles of the Law of Real Property (14th ed
1882)7; Kersley G o h e ' s Modem Law of PmmlProperty (9th ed 1949)2. 'In early law,
property was deemed "real" if the courts would restore to a dispossessed owner the
thing itself, the "res," and not merely give compensation for the loss.' Megarry and
Wade The Law of Real Property (4th ed 1975) lo.
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133 Heuston Essays in Constitutional Law (196 I ) 8 1
134 Fry, supra note 51, at 16. 'The proof of title often takes a considerable time.' Wright,
supra note 73, at 2.
135 7 & 8 Will. 111,c 25, s 7; 2 & 3 Will. IV,c 45, s 23. Underhill Thelaw ofMortgages (6th ed
1910) 451, 451. See Wallis v Birh (1870) 5 L.R.C.P. 2 2 2 (curate of parish as holder of
equitable interest in freehold of church entitled to vote). Bnxter v Newmn (1845) 14
L.J.C.P. 193, 197 (person seized in equity to have the same right to vote as if he had the
seizen in law).
136 ShowvFosler(i872)~.~.
5 H.L. 321; LysaghtvEdwards(1876)I Ch. D. qgg; Painev M u l h
(1801) 6 Ves. 349; 33 E.R. 1088.
137 Leader, supra note 58, at lo. Once the contract is entered into, the vendor is said to be a
mere trustee for the new 'owner,' and if he relinquishes possession he loses the right to
vote. McPherson ElectiunLaw of C a d (1905)97. Anelay v L& (1855) 17 C.B.3 16; 139
E.R. 1094 (purchaser of land not in actual possession prior to conveyance not entitled to
vote); Murray v T h o n i b ( I 846) 2 C.B. 2 I 7; I 35 E.R. 927 (grantee of rent charge entitled
to vote only if in actual receipt of rent); R. v Cawthone [1g30] 3 W.W.R. 373; [ig31] i
D.L.R. 317 (tenants who are not 'purchasers' not entitled to vote); Peny v Morlq, (1911)
16 W.L.R. 691; 16 B.C.R. 91 (holder of an unregistered agreement for purchase of land
not entitled to vote).
Long after 1696, legislation was enacted which required six months' actual possession or receipt of rents toqualify freeholders to vote (I Will. IV,c45, s 23); and still later,
an act was passed which abolished the right of trustees to vote whether in actual
possession or not (6 Vict., c 18, s 14).
138 Ermatinger, supra note 106, at lo; Rogers Laws and Practice of Elections, Election
Committees and Registration (9th ed 1859) 33. Others have suggested that a purchaser
could not vote unless the purchase money was paid. Elliot, supra note I 17, at 61-4.
139 'The question of the eligibility of the mortgagor in possession was much discussed in
the latter half of the eighteenth century, and seems to have been definitely settled after
the Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire cases, 1785, which decided, 'that the interest
upon a mortgage, the mortgagor still being in possession, is a charge upon the estate
within the meaning of the Statute (8 Hen. VI,7)'; and that if it was such as to reduce the
value of the estate to less than 40s per annum, 'it does not invalidate the vote.' In the
same year there was a case of by no means so decided an authority but shortly
afterwards a statute was passed confirming the former decisions.' Turner, The Equity of
Redemption, Cambridge Studies in English Legal Histoty (193I) 184.
140 Burgw v Wka& (1759) 1 Eden. 177; 28 E.R. 652. The same benefits were extended to
mortgagors who, from the sixteenth century, had been granted equitable relief on
default - a right in equity which by the latter half of the seventeenth century had been
described as 'an equitable right inherent in the land ...of such consideration in the eye
of the law, that the law takes notice of it and makes it assignable and devisable.' See
Anon, (1557-1601) Gary 1, 2; Bacon v Bacon (1639) Toth. 133; 21 E.R.146. Simpson
cites Bodenham v Halle (1456) Seldon Society, vol lo, at 137 as the earliest known case of
equitable relief afforded to mortgagors. Simpson Anlntroduction to the History of theland
Law (1961) 224,227. In Coote A Treatise on thelaw ofMortgages (4th ed 1880) 15 relief in
equity is traced to Langfwd v Barnurd (1594) Toth. 134.
The quotation is from Pawlett v Att.-Gen. (1657) Hardres 465, 469; 145 E.R. 550;
Thornborough v Baker (1675) i Ch. Ca. 284. In 1738, Lord Hardwicke claimed that 'An
equity of redemption has always been considered as an estate in the land ...the person,
therefore, entitled to the equity of redemption is considered as the owner of the land,
and a mortgage in fee is considered as personal assets.' Cacborne v Scarfe (1738) I Atk.
603,605; 26 E.R. 377.
141 7 & 8 Will. 111, c 25. Turner, supra note 139, at 103, 185
142 Turner, supra note 139, at 155. By 1867 Cockburn cj in R v Baker could say that 'the
commissioners are not bound to enquire whether the legal estate is in him. They find
him in possession of the estate, and he "hath or holdeth the estate and thereby
satisfieth the terms of the Statute of Henry VI.' R. v Baker (1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 62 I .
The protection of social status, class, and political identity may provide an explana-
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tion for the 'anomalous' anti-forfeiture doctrine affording relief from consensual obligations. See Michelman, A comment on some uses and abuses of economics in law
(1979) 46 U . Chi. L.R. 307, 312. Duncan Kennedy has written an invaluable essay in
which he has commented on the role of mercy in legal doctrine: Form and substance in
private law adjudication (1976) 76 Ham. L.R. 1685.
143 Sugden Vendors and Purchasers ( I ith ed 1846) 343; Scriven, supra note 51, at 617;
Twining v Monice 2 Bro. Ch. Rep. 330; Sir Hany Hide v Philifs Prec. Cha. 575
144 See Hinton v Hinton (1855) 2 Ves. Sen. 631,638; 28 E.R. 406.
145 Murgrave v Dashwood (1688) 2 Vern. 63; 23 E.R. 650. See Holdsworth, supra note 62, at
16-18,42-5.
146 I Spence EquztabL Jurisdiction (1882) 646; Anon, 2 Freem. I 23; 2 2 E.R. 1 loo.
One explanation for the specific enforcement of a class of contracts which was
significantly broader than the class which involved a transfer of the franchise was the
influence of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 11, c 3) which from 1677 onwards proscribed
the enforcement of par01 contracts for the sale of land. Copyhold land came within the
purview of the statute. Scriven, supra note 51, at 262. Courts of Equity soon created
techniques which enabled them to recognize contracts which the statute deemed
unenforceable at law, the most famous of which is the doctrine of part performance.
This equitable doctrine could be applied, however, only in respect of those contracts of
which a Court of Equity would entertain, or in the opinion of some, grant a suit for
specific performance. The Statute of Frauds thus created an ovemding incentive to
expand equitable jurisdiction to award performance of a wide range of contracts
relating to land, notwithstanding that political rights were not necessarily at issue. R i d
v March [ig21] 1 W.W.R. g i g (doctrine of part performance applies to contracts in
respect of which a court would mder specific performance). See also Sarbit v Hansun and
Booth Fishrries Can. Co. [1g50] 4 D.L.R. 34; reversed on other grounds [ig52] 2 D.L.R.
108; Lavety v Purse11 (1888) 39 Ch. D. 508.518.
In McManw v Cook (1887) 35 Ch. D. 681,697. it was held that the doctrine of part
performance applies to contracts in respect of which a court would entertain a suit for
specific performance. Some authorities take a narrower position - that the doctrine
applies only to contracts 'concerning land' or 'relating to land,' but this view has not
been accepted. See B h i n v Rossiter (1879) I 1 Q.B.D. 123, 129, 131, criticized in
Williams The Statute of Frauds (1932) 239; Maddison v Aluhsun (1887) I Mac. & G. 572;
41 E.R. 1387. Fry, supra note 51, at 283, states that the doctrine applies 'to all cases in
which a Court of Equity would entertain a suit if the alleged contract had been in
writing.' Spry concurs in this opinion, citing numerous Australian authorities to that
effect. Spry, supra note 23, at 237, 238.
147 See Weymouth, 3 June 1714; Middlesex, Peck. 23 cited in Rogers TheLuw ofElections
(13th ed 1880) 203.
148 7 & 8 Will 111, c 25, s 7, properly cited as 'An Act for the further regulating Elections
of Members to serve in Parliament, and for the preventing of irregular proceedings
of Sheriffs and other officers in the electing and returning of such Members.' The act
was later amended by 6 Geo. 11, c 23, and by 53 Geo. 111, c 49 (extending the act to devisees).
149 Ibid
150 See Rogers, supra note 147, at 204.
151 Robertson, supra note 62, at 22; 1 Pomt History of the U n r e j m d House of Commmrc:
Parliamentary Representation before 1832 (1903) 22, The practice was apparently
condemned, but for centuries the dilatory process of electoral reform was directed at
even more disturbing forms of political influence. Dickinson, supra note 40, at I 14.
152 Marshall v Bourn (1845) 7 Man. & G 188; 14 L.J.C.P. 129
153 (1846) 2 C.B. 84; 15 L.J.C.P. 133; B k k v A k d (1846) 2 C.B. 156; 15 L.J.C.P. 145; Beswick
v Ashworfh (1846) 2 C.B. 152; 15 L.J.C.P. 145; Rawlins v Bremner (1846) 2 C.B. 166; 15
L.J.C.P. 145
154 (1846) 2 C.B. 122; 15 L.J.C.P. 134
155 See R t k j v Crmlqr (1846) 2 C.B. 146; 15 L.J.C.P. 144; Thmntkj v Asfiland (1846) 2 C.B.
160; 15 L.J.C.P. 145.
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156 Lewin The Law of T m t s (7th ed 1879) 95; Anson, supra note 123; Platamone v Staple
(1815) G. Coop. 250; 35 E.R. 548 (conveyance of rent charge to qualify transferee for
seat in Parliament injoined); Birch v Blagrave (1755) Amb. 264; 27 E.R. 176 (conveyance
to daughter in order to disqualify father from holding office of sheriff of London set
aside).
157 Ashworthv Hopper(1875) I C.P.D. 178,179. In Drewev Hanson (1802)6 Ves. Jun. 675; 31
E.R. I 253 Lord Eldon referred to a case of Shirley v Davis where a purchaser was compelled to take property which was supposed to be in Essex but in fact was situated in
Kent, notwithstanding that 'the purchaser was told he- would be made a Churchwarden of Greenwich, and though his object was to be a freeholder of Essex.' Claims of
vendors seeking specific performance of land contracts have been viewed harshly
where inadequacies of title have been at issue, perhaps on the ground that
if the purchaser's motive is political identity, a forced sale of a non-enfranchised estate
even with compensation is entirely inappropriate. Hmley v Grant (1806) 13 Ves. Jun.
73;
.- 33
-- E.R. 222.
158 Ashworth v Hopper, ibid, at 183. However, ColeridgeJ remarked that the landowner had
not succeeded in retainine the leeal rieht to forfeit the title of the trust beneficiaries if
they sold contrary to his iktruczons. 'ibid, at 189.
159 (1875) 1 Ch. D. 160 (c.A.)
160 Ibid, at 166
161 Plucknett English Constitutional History ( I ith ed 1960) 562. Williams argues that one
need only have had to buy up a majority of the burgage tenements to attain absolute
political control of a particular borough. Williams, supra note 70, at 153. Gwyer, supra
note 63, at 107. 'A seat was as much a marketable commodity in the eighteenth century
as an advowson in the nineteenth ... the value of a seat was estimated at over f7,ooo.'
Mamot, supra note 67, at 478. May describes the right of property in enfranchised
property, capable of sale and transfer as not being different from any other property. 1
May Constitutional Hutmy of Britain 337 (1889).
It is not at all startling to discover in the years after initial attempts at electoral reform
that the incidence of tenancies-at-will rose substantially;for the grant of tenancies for a
fired term did not allow the landlord to exercise political control over his tenants, while
the transfer of an indeterminate leasehold interest enfranchised the lessee while
ensuring electoral influence in the hands of the landowner, who could simultaneously
dispossess and disenfranchise his tenant if his vote was not cast as directed. Brodrick,
supra note 30, at 201, 202.
162 Herberi v Saint Michel(lglo) 18 Rev. de Jur. 2a8
163 Lnnglois v Baby (1863) l o Gr. 358; (1864), I I Gr. 2 I ; Emes v Barber (1869) 15 Gr. 679
164 Namier estimated that not more &an one out of twenty voters was free of the influence
of the landed gentry in the exercise of his vote. Namier The Structure of Politics at tk
Accession of George III (2nd ed 1957) 166.
165 QLeary Elimination of C m p t Practices m British Elections 1868-~grr(1962) 62. One
example is given of 37 tenants of the Duke of Newcastle who, in 1831, were quickly
evicted when they voted against his wishes, and one suspects that their future electoral
behaviour would not be as autonomous. Turberville, supra note 76, at 250. In the same
year the Marquis of Exeter, after evicting those tenants who voted contrary to his
dictates, threatened to evict even those who did obey his commands unless they evicted
their subtenants. Ibid. In 1860 the landlord of the Cavray Estate in Cardiganshire
wrote to his tenants as follows: 'I feel myself morally bound to set befqre you two alternatives and you are at liberty t~ choose for yourself, namely, to attend our Church
services with your family and thus support its principles, or otherwise (if your conscious
will not allow you to comply with my request) you must quit the farm you hold from
me.' Cited in Denman Studies in LandEconomy, The Place of Prop* (1978)55. One result
of tbe Reform Act in 1832 was to perpetuate the economic and political servitudes
inherent in a society which tied the franchise to property ownership:
'The Act of Henry VI which created the 40s. county franchise introduced a new
motive for letting farms on lease which has not received sufficient attention. It was held
,
that a lease for life constituted a freehold, which, if above the value of ~ o s . camed
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with it a vote for the county. As English tenants have always been wont to follow the
politics of their landlords, the multiplication of such freeholds became a ready source
of political influence ...
' ... a new and powerful motive for refusing leases was created by the Reform Act of
1832. Under the so-called 'Chandos clause,' or section 20, of that Act, every tenant of a
farm, paying a rent o f f go or upwards, for the first time acquired the county franchise.
Thenceforward the political influence of landlords was multiplied by the votes of their
farm tenants, and, in order to maintain that influence, it was thought necessary to keep
farm-tenants in a state of dependence by letting farms only from year to year.'
Brodrick, supra note 30, at 201, 205.
Even before the 1832 enfranchisement of the easily manipulated tenants, the county
electorate was controlled by landed interests:
'The two seats in each county were usually in the hands of the great landed families,
aristocratic or otherwise. The vulgar arts of bribery founded in the boroughs were
inappropriate among the gentlemen who dominated the affairs of the countryside.
"Influence," of course, there was, but it was the social and economic influence of landed
magnates over their relations, their servants, their tenants, their shopkeepers; of
patrons living over their incumbents; of Lord Lieutenants over the J.P.'s; of aristocrats
and gentry over their social inferiors.' Williams, supra note 70, at 153. This authority
has been described as a kind of 'feudal sway' in Oldfield, supra note 77, at 285.
Walcott, supra note 70, at lo; Cannon, supra note 62, at 246, 247
See Wigmore The Australian Ballot System (2nd ed 1889) 10-14; Plucknett, supra note
161, at 573
Ballot Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict., c 33
Hanham Elections and Party Management (1959) 267. See Dickinson, supra note 40, at
289.
See Morris Parliamentary Franchise Reform in England from 1885 to 1918(1927) ch 2, 9.
Abolition of plural voting was a fundamental tenet of the Chartist platform during the
nineteenth century. Hovell The ChartistMovement (1918) 161; Ross Elections and Electors,
Studies in Democratic Representation (1955) 38.
See 1 Henry v, c I ; lo Henry VI,c 2; 14 Geo. 111, c 58.
Mill, supra note 111, at 2 ig. Although Mill favoured the abolition of plural voting in
respect of land ownership, he did so only in so far as it would be replaced by plural
rights founded upon intelligence and education. Ibid, at 217-20. One R. Burnett,
writing to his principal, the Duke of Newcastle, in I 733, explained that he had met with
thirty or forty freeholders 'who are most of them Duble votes.' Williams, supra note 70,
at 149.
Lovell, supra note 66, at 426. 'A county election might be continued from day to day as
long as voters came to the poll for as many as eleven days.' Courtney The Working
Constitution of the United Kingdom (1901)62. Stout, supra note 69, at 206. 'The poll was
liable to be kept open for forty days.' May, supra note 161, at 350.
Dawson, supra note 102, at 324
Ward, supra note loo, at 220,221
By s.c. 37 Vict., c g, ss 92-100
See House of Commons Debates 13 April 1920, 1158-9; 10-11 Geo. v, c 46, s 57.
Dawson, supra note 102, at 324.
Lovell, supra note 66, at 427
See May, supra note 161, at 333. 'A vote was a possession too valuable to be parted with
except for a high consideration.' Marriot, supra note 67, at 477. ROSSdescribes
numerous cases of direct bribery in the form of payments to individual electors. Ross
supra note 170, at 209.
One example is given of a payment of 29 shillings to each of 250 electors, and in
another case, payment in hogs and tin. Williams, supra note 70, at 155-6. In I 701 the
32 voters of Norfolk each received fifty guineas. Walcott, supra note 70, at 16.
Williams, supra note 70, at 153
One might speculate as to the price paid by the friends of the Earl of Shaftsbury for
wasteland, consisting of nothing but weeds and rubbish, to which the valuable right of
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suffrage appertained - the land was worth nothing but for the voting privileges
attached to it. Oldfield, supra note 77, at 54.
183 Walcott, supra note 70, at 2 I
184 Cannon describes the constant appreciation in election expenses reflected in the
inflated price paid by contestants in open boroughs for the saleable votes of the
constitutents: 'Whereas Thomas Webb, a candidate for Wooton Bassett in 1690, was
reported to have purchased votes at 32/6d a head, sixty-four years later John Probyn
and Thomas Estcourt Cresswell were charged thirty guineas apiece in the same
borough.' Cannon, supra note 62, at 35.
185 O'Leary, supra note 165, at 62
186 Williams, supra note 70, at 155
187 Hanham, supra note 169, at 166
188 Cox and Grady Regirtration and Elections, Parliamentuq and Municipal (1880) cxvii
189 Ibid
190 Ibid. Liberal agents kept records showing the sums paid out in bribery. Hanham, supra
note 169, at 266. Attempts to discourage bribery were almost futile. Taylor, supra note
87, at 532. May, supra note 161,at 334. Theoffering of payment for votes was said tobe
an offence at common law. Taylor, ibid, at 469; May, ibid, at 329. Stephen, however,
states somewhat equivocally that bribery is said to have been an offence at common law,
citing no authority in support of that view. 3 Stephen A Histoy of the Criminal Law of
England (1883) 252.
In any event legislation was enacted as early as 1695 disallowing elections in cases
of bribery (7 Will. 111,c4). This was followed by more detailed legislation in 1729(2 Geo.
11,c 24), and again in 1809 (49 Geo. III,c I 18).
191 Hirsh in Social Limits to Growth (1976) develops the concept of 'positional' goods, which
are described as goods which signify distinctions among individuals on the basis of
social status rather than simple economic wealth. This phenomenon, which describes
very nicely the place of votes and contract in law, has been described as 'the importance
of the symbolic attributes of goods, and the ways in which rank and status are attached
to them ... When relative position is at stake, then the society will and must create new
scarcities - that is, new symbolc of success to be striven for - at every turn. It matters little
what is chosen to signify status differences.' Leiss The Limits to Saticfaction:An essay on the
problem of nee& and commodities (British edition 1976) xvi.
Rawls has developed a rather different theory, but one which also acknowledges the
distinctive nature of certain kinds of goods: 'Those aspects of the social system that
define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship ... The basic liberties of citizens are,
vaguely speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office).'
Rawls A Themy of Justice ( I97 I ) 6 I . Rawls argues that the basis for self-respect (status) is
not simply one's relative wealth in income, but the publicly affirmed equal distribution
of these basic rights - including the right to participate in political life. Ibid, at 544,545.
192 g Anne, c 5. See Gneist The Histmy of the English Constitution (1891) 658; Taylor The
Origin and G~owthof the English Constitution (1898) 532, 533. In 1838, long after the
doctrine of specific performance had become fixed, the property qualification was
reformed to allow candidates to make up their stake in real or personal property. I & 2
Vict., c 48. It was not until 1858that the legal property qualification was abolished in its
entirety by 2 I & 2 2 Vict., c 26.
193 Cited in Guttsman, supra note I , at 68. Parliamentary attendance, even by the late
fifteenth century, was no longer an obligatory burden but had become 'an honour to be
welcomed, a privilege to be sought.' Ross, supra note 170, at 207. See also Wilkinson,
supra note 57, at 291.
194 Lovell, supra note 66, at 426
195 Ogg England in the Reigns of James 11and William III(lg55) 58
196 Cannon, supra, note 62, at 36
197 In Curtis v Peny (1802) 6 Ves. Jun. 739, 747; 31 E.R. 1285, Eldon LC openly admitted
that a suit to reconvey land given by the plaintiff to his son 'to enable him to sit in
Parliament ...was very properly dismissed.' But see Platumone v Staple (1815)G. Coop.
250; 35 E.R. 548 (conveyance of rent charge to qualify transferee as a Member of
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Parliament set aside); cf ChildeTs v Childmc (1875) 3 Kay &John 310; 69 E.R. I 126
(conveyance of goo acres of land in order to qualify son as bailiff held enforceable).
198 Newton v Overseers of Crowlq, (1846) 2 C.B. 207 (grant to son-in-law for a nominal
consideration held a valid transfer of the vote in the absence of fraud); Newton v
Harpeaves (1846) 2 C.B. 163; 15 L.J.C.P. 154 (transfer without consideration of land to
enfranchise two sons held enforceable): May v May (1863) 33 Beav. 81; 55 E.R. 297
(conveyance of property in order to enfranchise son held enforceable); Groves v Groves
(1828) 3 Y . & J. 163; 148 E.R. I 136 (conveyance to one brother in trust for another in
order to enfranchise the latter held enforceable). But see Brackmbuly v Brackenhly
(1820) 2 Jac. & W. 391; 37 E.R. 677.
199 Rob& v Rob& (1818) Dan. 153; 159E.R. 862 (conveyance toqualify purchaser to hunt
under the Game Act, 22 & 23 Car. 11, c 25, s 3 held enforceable); Cecil v Butcher (182 I ) 2
Jac. & W. 565; 37 E.R. 744 (claim to equitable relief on conveyance to qualify vendor's
son to hunt on the Eccleshall estate where deed had been lost, refused). Lord Mansfield
noted that the qualification was vested in property, and since a trustee was only a
nominal owner, the beneficiary under a trust of land would enjoy the privilege of the
hunt. Wetherell v Hall Cald. 230.
2 0 0 (1841) 8 C1. & Fin. 374.
201 Sugden A Treatise on the Law of Property (1849) 72.
202 Russell v Reed (1629) Toth. 164; 2 I E.R. 156. But see Freeman v Blagrave Bacon's Cases at
1I , cited in Potter Histm-icalIntroduction to English Law (1932) 5 13, where an agreement
to confer a knighthood was refused as 'venal and mercenary.'
203 Maitland, supra note 64, at 82
204 The real property qualification appears to have originated at common law, and in 1415
a freehold ownership in an amount of at least forty shillings was fixed by statute. See
Thompson and Merriam Conduct of Jurieslruluding Grand Juries (1882) 20; 4 Blackstone
Commentaries 302; 3 Bac. Abr. 751-2; 2 Hawk. P.c., 12; 2 Henry v, c 3; Thomas' Case
(1794) 1 Dyer 99; 73 E.R. 2 18.T h e value of the freehold as well as the nature of the
required ownership interest varied considerably over time and also from one kind of
jury to another. See Samaha Law and Order in Historical Perspective (1974) 48-50; Hay
(ed) Albion's Fatal Tree: Property and Authority and Criminal Law (1977) 30, 31. See also
Forsyth, A Histmy ofTrial by July (1878) 143 -5; Moore TheJuly (1973) 68.
It was not until 1825 that property qualifications were made uniform. TheJuries Act,
1825 (6 Geo. IV,c 50) repealed some 85 statutes and instituted landholding, albeit not
landholding as restricted as the franchise qualification at the time, as a prerequisite to
jury service. The 1825 property qualifications remained in force until this decade, and
notwithstanding that the absolute number of qualified jurors increased through
devaluation of money and periodic revaluation of assessments, as recently as 1956 it
was estimated that only one and a half million persons in England could serve asjurors.
See Cornish The July (1968) 28, 29. Devlin Trio1 by July (1956) 2 1 t 2 2 . Jackson, in an
admittedly narrow sampling, found that of 5000 parliamentary electors in a ward in
Cambridge before the second world war, only 187 persons qualied for jury service.
Jackson The Machinety ofJustice in England (7th ed 1977)487; Baldwin and McConville
July TThh (1979) 88- 105.
Jurors, drawn for the most p a n from the same landed classes as the politically
enfranchised, were hardly sympathetic to calls for electoral reform, and in the trial of
Daniel Holt in 1793 convicted the accused for publishing calls for expansion of the
franchise and for democratization of the electoral process ( 2 2 St. Tr. I 189).
205 See Samaha, supra note 204, at 48-50.
206 Thayer A P~eliminalyTreatise on E&e
at the Common Law ( I 898) I 5 I at note 3. Devlin,
supra note 204, at 17.
207 5 Geo. rr, c 18
208 Cannon, supra note 62, at 36
209 18 Henry vr, c I I . See Samaha, supra note 204, at 67-94. Taylor, supra note 192, at
532.
2 l o Supra note 39
2 I I Indeed, the purchaser's promissory entitlement was often protected only by property
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rule. Until very recently 'expectation' damages could not, for the most part, be
recovered for breach of a contract to sell land. See infra, at notes 225-66.
3 Weber Economy and Society (1968) I 108
Lovell, supra note 66, at 426. '[Mlany men, not freeholders, made large fortunes which
they usually applied to the purchase of freehold estates.' Ogg, supra note 195, at 57.
See Bagehot, supra note 86, at 164
Turberville, supra note 76, at 427, citing 2 Early Victorian England (ed Young 1934)at
486
Tobin, On limiting the domain of inequality (1970) 13J. of Law and Econ. 263, 269.
Okun, Equulity and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff(1975).
Simpson, supra note 140, at 195. Ownership of land, which was equivalent to political
authority, protected the continued control of political decision-making by the landed
aristocracy from the claims of mere wealth acquired through finance or trade.
Pollard, supra note 64, at 156, 164. These habits did not die a quick death. Disraeli,
before he became prime minister, was loaned money for the purpose of acquiring
Hughenden, for '[a] landless Conservative leader was a contradiction in terms;
Disraeli, if he was to fill the position, must possess real estate'. Turberville, supra note
76, at 420.
See Veal1 The Pqpvlar Movement f w Law R . f m 1640-1660 (1970) 270 et seq.
Simpson, supra note 140. at 195, 219. Haskins, supra note 39.
Scmtton, supra note 76
See infra, at note 240
See infra, at notes 225-66.
Ibid
Supra note 135
Chancery Amendment Act, 1 8 5 8 , I~& 2 2 Vict., c 27, s 2: 'In all cases in which the court
of Chancery hasjurisdiction to entertain an application ... for the specific performance
of any covenant, contract, or agreement, it shall be lawful for the same court, if it shall
think fit, to award damages to the party injured, either in addition toor in substitution
for such ... specific performance, and such damages may be assessed in such manner as
the court shall direct.' The act was repealed by the Statute Law Revision and Civil
Procedure Act, 188I , 44 & 45 Vict., c 59, and by the Statute Law Revision and Civil
Procedure Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c 49 s 3, but the jurisdiction to award damages
remains pursuant to savings provisions included in those acts through the combined
effect of s 5 of the 1883act, the Statute Law Revision Act, 1898,61 & 62 Vict., c 22, and
the Supreme Court of Judicature Consolidation Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. v, c 49, s 18.
See Sayers v Collyer (1884) 28 Ch. D 10%;Lee& Industrial Co-operatiueSociety Ltd. v Shuk
[1g24] A.C. 851 (H.L.) Stevenson D.C.J. in error in E.J.H. Holdings Ltd. v Bougk et w.
(1977) 3 Alta. L.R. (2d) 244. Jolowicz has pointed out that thejurisdiction created by the
1858 legislation may have been accidentally repealed in 1974 on the enactment of the
Statute Law Repeals Act, 1974, 2 2 & 23 Eliz. 2, c 22. Jolowicz, Damages in Equity - a
study of Lord Cairns' act [1g75] Camb. L.J. 224, 228.
Similar legislation exists in Canada. See Queen's Bench Act, R.S.S. 1965, c 73, s 45,
para g; Judicature Act, R.s.O. 1970, c 228, s 2 I ; The Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1973,cJ-2
as explained in Bsidges Brothm Ltd. v Fwest Protection Ltd. (1977)72 D.L.R. (3d)335. The
Chancery Amendment Act, 1858, is in force in British Columbia by virtue of the Law
and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c 224, s 2; see Rombough et al. v Crestbrook Timber Ltd.
(1966) 55 W.W.R. 577 (B.c.c.A.).
See I Bonbright The Valuation of Property (1937) 328, 329. While innumerable cases
dealing with recovery of damages in sales of goods transactions may be cited as
authority for the kinds of loss for which compensation will be granted and for the
boundaries of recovery in terms of causation and remoteness, most texts on real
property cite Diamond v Campbell-Jones [1g61] Ch. 2 2 as authority for the most
fundamental of principles of contract recovery. See Ogus The Law of Damages (1973); Di
Castri The Law of Vendor and Purchaser (2nd ed I 976); McGregor McGregw on Damages
(14th ed 1980).
See Fry, supra note 51, at 600; Toddv Gee (1810) 17 Ves. 273,278; Blorev Sutton (1817),
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3 Mer. 237. 247-8; Jenkins v Parkinson (1833) 2 My. & K. 5, 11-12; Nelson v Bridges
( I 839) 2 Beav. 239. These and a number of additional cases on point are collected and
very thoroughly analysed in Harpum, supra note 22, at 67-73.
228 In Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contractc (3rd ed 1926) go3 we find the somewhat
paradoxical statement that while 'the amount of compensation may be ascertained
upon somewhat the same basis as that upon which damages would be assessed for the
same loss ... the motives and principles upon which compensation is allowed are wholly
different.' But see Mayne, supra note 36, at 204, who argues that 'the compensation was
really damages.' As one recent commentator put it, 'The exact relationship between the
two remedies is not easy to deduce from the reported cases.' Harpum, supra note 22, at
67.
229 Jurisdiction to award damages in Equity was exercised only rarely, and while of
historical interest, it had very little, if anything at all, to do with the enforcement of
contractual obligations. See City of London v Nash ( I 747) 3 Atk. 5 12; 26 E.R. 1095; Phelps
v Prothero (1855) 7 De G.M. & G. 722,734; 44 E.R. 280,285. Fry, supra note 51, at 600;
Story Equity Julirpidence (14th ed 1918) 473-4. Simpson points out that an award of
damages would have violated the maxim that equity only acted when the legal remedy
was inadequate, but claims that 'there seems to have been no reluctance to make an
order for payment of money.' Simpson, supra note 9, at 596. Holdsworth writes, 'It was
not until the eighteenth century that it was settled equity would grant only specific
performance if damages were not an adequate remedy.' I Holdsworth A Histoty of
English Law (7th ed 1956) 457.
There existed as well inherent equitablejurisdiction to order an accounting of profits
irrespective of the loss incurred by the plaintiff. See P a r k v McKenna (1874) L.R. 10
Ch. 96, I 24.
230 Todd v Gee (1810) 17 Ves. 273, 278; 34 E.R. 106, 107; Kendell v Bechett (1830) 2 Russ. &
M. 88; 39 E.R. 327 (refusal of claim for return of deposit on contract to sell shares)
231 Clerk and Humphry Sales of Land (1885) 358. It is said, in 2 White and Tudor Leading
Cases in Equity (9th ed 1928) 453, that defects in tenure which 'extend to the nature of
the property itself cannot be compensated in damages. See also Fry SpecijicPerfmnce
supra note 22, at 527,528; Hick v Phillips (1721) Prec. Ch. 575; 24 E.R. 258; Fordyceetal.
v Ford (1794) 4 Bro. C.C. 494; 29 E.R. 1007; Drewe v Cwp (1804) g Ves. Jun. 368; 32 E.R.
644; In Re Ridgeway and Smith's Contract [ I ~ O I2 ]Ch. 98,108. But see Price v Macaulq
(1852) 2 De G.M. & G. 339; 42 E.R. 903.
232 (1776) 2 B1.W. 1078; 96 E.R. 635
233 See Washington, Damages in contract at common law 11 (1932) 48 Law 4.Rev. go, 94,
95. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report On theRule in Bain v. Fothergill
(L.R.c. 28, 1976). Poumett v Fuller (1856) 17 C.B. 660 (damages not recoverable where
vendor contracts under mistaken belief that his interest in the property was sufficient);
Rowe v School Board for London (I 877) 36 Ch. D. 6 I g (damages not recoverable in case of
breach of contract to transfer easement); Sihes v Wild (i861), I B . & s. 593; (1863), 4 B. &
s. 42 I.
In 1826 in Hopkins v Grarebrook (1826), 6 B . & C. 31, it was held that full contractual
damages would be recoverable in a case where the vendor knew of the defect at the time
of contracting. This exception to the rule was overruled some fifty years later in Bain v
Fothcrgill (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 158, at 207: 'Upon a review of all the decisions on the
subject, I think that the case of HopRins v Grazebrook ought not any longer to be
regarded as an authority ... the rule as to the limits within which damage may be
recovered upon the breach of a contract for the sale of a real estate must be taken to be
without exception. If a pmon enters into a contractfor & sale of a real estate knowing that he
has no title to it, nor any means of acquiring it, the purchaser cannot recover damages beyond the
expenses he has incurred by an action for the breach of the contract' (emphasis added).
Although Horwitz has argued that the expectation interest in contracts was not
recognized in any context prior to the nineteenth century, this thesis is not supported
by the evidence. Simpson, T h e Honvitz thesis and the history of contracts (1979) 46 U.
Chi. L.R. 533; Horwitz supra note 20, at 937.

Heinonline - - 32 U. Toronto L.J. 98 1982

CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STATUS

99

234 In an early claim for mesne profits, brought in 1770 in connection with an action for
ejectment by a plaintiff seeking compensation for the loss sustained on his dispossession from his land, Gould J said '[Tlhe plaintiff in this case is not confined to the very
mesne profits only, but he may recover for his trouble, &c. I have known four times the
value of the mesne profits given by a jury in this son of action of trespass; if it were not
to be so sometimes, compleatjustice could not be done to the party injured.' Goodtitle v
Tombs (1770) 3 Wils K.B. I 18; 95 E.R. 965. In a later case, Buller J said, of a claim for
mesne profits, 'The damages here are as uncertain as in an action of assault. 'Goodtitle v
North et. al. (1781) 2 Dougl. 584; gg E.R. 368. 369.
235 (1604) Noy. 142; 74 E.R. 1104. See also Brig's Case (1624) Palm 364; 81 E.R. 1125('Un
action sur le case pur losse de benefit de son bargaine').
236 Ibid. The reference to 'country' most likely refers to the county in which the franchise
was most closely associated with the ownership of freehold land. Ogg, supra note 195,
at 122.
237 Supra note 232
238 Bain and Paterson v Fothergill and H a n k ( I874) L.R. 7 H.L. I 58
239 Seepournett v Fuller (1856) 17 C.B. 660; Keen v Mear [lgzo] 2 Ch. 574. The status of the
restriction on contractual recovery in Canada has been thrown into considerable doubt
by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in A.V.G. Management Science
Lfd. v Barnell Developmmts Ltd. et al. [1g7g] 2 S.C.R. 43, which, although decided with
reference to the Torren's system, or rather the quasi-Torren's system, in British
Columbia, is of general applicability. In that case Laskin cj, speaking for the court,
noted recent British Columbia legislation which abrogates the rule and commented
disparagingly on its applicability generally in Canada.
The Province of British Columbia in s 33 of the Property Law Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c
340, has abrogated the rule and allows recovery for a purchaser's loss of bargain. It
should be noted, however, that the legislation says nothing of recovery of consequential
damages. The report of the British Columbia Law Reform Commission upon which
the section was based clearly contemplates recovery of incidental and consequential
damages as well as lost profits. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, supra
note 233, at 19, 20.
240 Bain v Fothergill, supra note 238, at 174, 2 I I ; Locke v Fun8 (1866) L.R. I C.P. 441,453;
Barnes v Cadogan Developments Ltd. [1g30] 1 Ch. 479,488; J.W. Cafe's Ltd. v Brownslow
T m t [1g50] I All E.R. 894,896; Day v Singleton [18gg] 2 Ch. 320.329; Phillips v L a d i n
[1g4g] 1 All E.R. 770. This analysis is, however, suspect, as it would be easy enough to
require. proof of actual intention. See Law Reform Commission of British Columbia,
supra note 233, at 13; Ogus, supra note 226, at 303.
241 S k v Wild, supra note 233
242 Bain v FothergiU, supra note 238, at 173; Maitland v Maahms (1915)8 W.W.R. 274; Di
Castri, supra note 226, at 748
243 Bain v Fothergdl, ibid, at 202
244 McCormick Handbook on the Law of Damages (1935) 563, 684 argues that Flureau v
Thornhill, supra note 232, was 'one of the first instances of assumption by the judge of
control over the damages in contract cases.'See also Horwiu, supra note 20, at 925-6.
245 Mayne A Treatise on the Law of Damages (1856) 106. Mill has made a similar point in a
broader context: 'The ordinary progress of society, which increases in wealth, is at all
times to augment the incomes of landlords - to give them a greater amount and a
greater proportion of the wealth of the community, independently of any trouble or
outlay incurred by themselves. They grow richer as it were in their sleep, without
working, risking or economising.' Mill Princi$b of Political Economy book 5, c 2, para 5.
See also George Progress and Poverty (fiftieth anniv. ed 1929). 358-67.
246 Fuller and Perdue, The reliance interest in contract damages (1936) 46 Yale LJ. I, 61,
62
247 It is true, as discussed earlier, that the vendor could purchase the first buyer's rights
from him, thus sharing the wealth represented by the higher price paid by the second
offeror. This, however, does not answer the point that the incentive to breach and thus
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to transfer land to its (objectively) more valued use would be quantitatively reduced by
the redistribution of wealth. In addition, the 'negotiated breach' argument, if it can be
put that way, must taken into account that, at least in respect of land, the prospective
purchaser's expectation of success would have been a virtual certainty. Moreover,
negotiations in this two-party paradigm are apt to be extremely protracted and
expensive. See Trebilcock, An economic approach to the doctrine of unconscionability,
in Swan and Reiter, Studies in Contrnct Law (1980), at 396.
See Harnett v YeiMing (1805) 2 Sch. & Lef. 549. The example given by Sir John Romilly
M R in Earl of Durham v Legard (1865) 34 Beav. 61 I of a man selling his property as a
freeholder when in fact he held only by copyhold is a classic illustration of the
intersection of the rules relating to specific performance and franchise.
In Bain v Fothergill, supra note 238, at 172, the House of Lords could not trace the rule
to any case before 1776.
See Nomood v Read ( 1 ~ 5 8Plowd.
)
180. See Honvitz, supra note 231, at 919-23.
Crmhaw v Williams 231 S.W. 45; 191 Ky. 559 ( ~ g z l )at, 48
See Slotk v Lockhart ( 1863) 1J.R. (s.c.) 1 (New Zealand); O'Neil v Drinhh (1908) 8 W.W.R.
937 (Canada); West v Read (1913) 13 S.R. (N.s.w.) 575 (Australia). In the United States
the majority of state courts adopted traditional contract damage rules. See McCormick,
supra note 244, at 680-3; Corbin Corbin on Contracts (1st ed 1950) 1098; 3 Sedgewick on
Damuges (9th ed 1913) 1012, 1016.
Ogg, supra note 195, at 70
'Landowners ... favoured primogeniture since it helped to concentrate ownership.'
Veall, supra note 218, at 60. Simpson has written that the propertied classes 'realized
that primogeniture was the very basis of their whole way of life.' Simpson, supra note
140. at 253.
Tenures Abolition Act, 1660, 1 2 Car. 11, c 24
Whalan, Immediate success of registration of title to land in Australia and early failures
in England (1966-7) 2 N.Z.U.L.R. 416,419. Dicey has argued that disappointment of
land reformers during the nineteenth century was caused in part by the reactionism of
the legal profession: 'legal experts, and certainly English conveyancers,are in no hurry
to revolutionize a system which enlists their sympathies and promotes their interests.'
Dicey, supra note 33, at 223. See also Simpson, supra note 140. at 253.
See Merryman, The inter vivos transfer of land (1978) 26 (supplement) J. of Znt. W
Comp. Law g l , at 97-100.
'There is certain to be some price at which the plaintiff would surrender his right to
specific performance.' Reiter and Sharpe, supra note 12 at 151.
Kronman, supra note 12, at 358-60. A similar view has been expressed in respect of
other legal phenomena. See Calabresi T h Costs of Accidents (1970); Veljanovski, The
economic approach to law: A critical introduction (1980) 7 Brit.J. of Law andsociety 158,
171; Weinrib, Utilitarianism, economics, and legal theory (1980) 30 U.T.L.J. 307,
312-15.
At the very least, the price which things'have' will obviously depend upon the way in
which we ask the question. Kelman, Consumption theory, production theory, and
ideology in the Coase theorem (1979) 52 S. Cal. L.R. 669; Kennedy, Cost-benefit
analysis of entitlement problems: A critique (1981) 33 Stan. L.R. 387,401-7. Kennedy
has noted the 'non market behaviour' of some classes of persons when faced with the
opportunity to sell certain 'goods' with obvious moral, religious, or political attributes:
'Take the issue of the manufacture of napalm by Dow Chemical during the war in
Vietnam. The private manufacturing sector could never possibly have bought out the
antiwar opposition to that allocation of resources - indeed it is doubtful that it could
have bought out one single serious antiwar activist.' Ibid, at 420.
See Weinrib, supra note 259, at 315.
Denman Origins of Ownership (1958) 144, 145
Freemn v Blagrave, Bacon's Cases at 1I cited in Potter, supra note 202
Fortescue-Brickdale Methooh of Land TraNfer (1914) 207, described land transfer
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reform as the foundation of social egalitarianism. See also Russet, Inequality and
instability: The relation of land tenure to politics, in Dahl Readings in Modem Political
Analysis (1968) 151-62.
i Mill Principles of Political Economy (5th London ed 1893) 296. One of the duties to
which Mill refers is, of course, the franchise, and it was this concept of public duty or
trust which was propounded as justification for the open ballot. Only through public
exercise of the trust could society assess whether a citizen was fulfilling his public
obligation.
Calabresi and Bobbit TragiG Choices (1978) 32. See also Singer, Freedoms and utilities in
the distribution of health care, in Dworkin, Bermant, and Brown (eds), supra note 7,
with respect to the market distribution of health services.
The Law Reform Commission of Australia in Human Tissue Transplants (Report No.
7,1977) recommended that the sale of human tissue be forbidden by law, resting their
judgment in part on the grounds that 'traffic in "human spare parts" is objectionablein
itself, and that payment will encourage blackmail, coercion, or duress.' Ibid, at 86.
While the courts may have withdrawn from attempts to monetize the value of political
identity not merely in response to intractable complexities of assessment, but also
because of the affront to social values which such pricing would have entailed, we
should note that the withdrawal was not absolute. In the famous case of Ashby v White et
al, discussed at note 128, the plaintiff, in an action decided ultimately in the House of
Lords, recovered ten pounds as damages (in tort) when his vote was maliciously refused
by a returning officer.
Ogg, supra note 195, at 56, 57. 'NO revolution in the distribution of political power
would come about without a redistribution of real property.' Turberville, supra note
76, at 407.
Maine Ancient Law (loth ed 1912)
Ibid, at 185
The absence of explicit constitutional limitations in England and Canada restricting the
right of the state to take property was not as remarkable as one might suspect. The
protection of property through legal limitations on governmental power was instead
carried out through the exercise of political authority by powerful property owners
elected by less powerful property owners. The narrow franchise was openlyjustified on
the ground that only through government by property owners could the institution of
private property be preserved. The function of government as the guardian of private
property was established not by constitutional guarantees but by the restriction of
political authority in landowners. See Fellman, Property in colonial political theory
(1942), 16 Temp. L.Q. 388, at 399, 400. See also Hadley U&-Currentc in American
Politicc (1915) 48: 'The first cause for this persistence of property right is to be found in
the land policy of the United States .. The immigrant who settled in the western states
was offered two things: the vote, and the chance of becoming a landowner ...'The
opportunity to own farms in freehold made ambitious settlers conservative. Men with a
hundred and sixty acres of land were not likely to pass laws which would interfere with
the rights of property, and particularly of landed property. The prospect of becoming
landowners had the same sort of steadying effect upon men who framed the
constitutions of new states in 1820 or 1830 that the fact of already being landowners
had upon the men who framed the Federal Constitution forty years earlier.'
Kessler, Contracts of adhesion - Some thoughts about freedom of contract (1943) 43
Col. L.R. 629,640
In societies which operate without a market, in which the dominant motive or purpose
for an exchange transaction is not merely the realization of profit but 'the main goal is
to satisfy social needs even if the profit motive is also incidentally present,'damages will
not be the preferred remedy. Treitel, Remedies for breach of contract (courses of
action open to a party aggrieved), in 7 Zntmtional Encyclopedia of Comparative Law c 16,
179 (1976). Gsovski in 1 Soviet Civil Law (1948) 438, 439 has described the Soviet
concept of specific performance as follows: '[Sloviet jurists unanimously insist that
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soviet law is governed by the principle of specific performance [which] corresponds to
the purposes which the obligation serves under the soviet law ... Since the socialist
national economy demands that the flow of goods run along the channels established
by the plant, the general rule is that the debtor is not relieved from specific
performance by paying damages in money ...Specificperformance of such obligations
is at the same time the fulfilment of the national economic plan.'
Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 1216
See Gneist, supra note 60, at 391
One notable example which Holmes immortalized in The Common Law is the imposition
of criminal sanctions in cases of breaches of contracts for the carriage of passengers,
which was advocated in Macauley's draft of the Indian Penal Code. The explanation of
the recommendation was that the palanquin-bearers of India were too destitute even
'to pay damages, and yet had to be trusted to carry unprotected women and children
through wild and desolate tracts, where their desertion would have placed those under
their charge in great danger.' Holmes, Supra note 5, at 40,41. Stephen, Supra note
190, at 300-2. See also Ahmed Anquilla Bin Hadje Mohumed Sallah Anquilla v Estate and
Trust Agencies (1927), Ltd. [1g38]AX. 624,635 (the breaking of an enforceable contract
is an unlawful act).
In addition, while specific performance of employment contracts would not be
ordered at law, employers did not need private relief to assist them in enforcing their
employees' obligations. Until the Master and Servant Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c 141,
and the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, 38 & 38 Vict., c 13, breach of an
employment contract by an employee was a criminal offence under the Master and
Servant Act, 1824,4 Geo. IV c 34. In essence, what we have is specific performance at
the hands of only one of the parties to the contract.
One possible explanation for criminal laws which generally did not touch upon
interference with contractual rights but demonstrated a remarkable concern with and
sensitivity to propeny, was the identity of the architects of the criminal law. Moral and
social insult was far more likely to be focused on interference with wealth in the form of
property than with wealth in the form of bargains. Dickinson, supra note 40, at 162.
Hay, supra note 204, at 17-63.
One's perception of the nature of land and the nature of land transfer must take
account of penal legislation first enacted in Canada during the nineteenth century
designed to reinforce the 'sanctity of contract': 'Everyone who, knowing of an
unregistered prior sale or of an existing unregistered grant, mortgage, hypothec,
privilege or encumbrance of or upon real property, fraudulently sells the property or
any part thereof is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two
years.' The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970,c C-34,s 345. This section of the Criminal Code
originated in Quebec, and its application was limited to that province until 1892.
Section 8 of An Act to amend and explain the Ordinance concerning the registration of
Hypothecs in Lower Canada, 16 Vict., c 208, was enacted on 14June I 853. The section
first appeared in its modern form as s 114 of An Act respecting the Registration of
Titles to or Charges Upon Real Estate, - the Law of Hypothecs, - the Dower and
Property of Married Women, - and the Conveyance of Socage Lands, c.s.L.c., 1860, c
37. The preamble to the act stated its purpose as the prevention of losses from secret
conveyances of real estate and the elimination of uncertainty and insecurity of title in
Lower Canada. The legislation was incorporated into The Larceny Act, R.S.C. 1867, c
164, ss gr, 93.94, and subsequently into the first Criminal Code, i8gz,55 & 56 Vict., c
299 ss 372.373.
Althourrh the section (even though it was c o u ~ l e dto a 'reverse onus' ~rovisionin
respect 07 proof of ownership) aipears not t i have been widely enjbrced, rare
convictions and prosecutions have been recorded. See R. v McDeuitt (1906) 17 C.C.C.
331; R. v Foreman (1955). 111 C.C.C. 297; R. v Lawerue (1g50), g C.R. 5.
Perhaps the legislation and the absence of any convictions outside Quebec can be
explained by the civilian doctrines of sale and propeny which are markedly different
from those of common law. In R. v Lawrence, supra, Barlay J suggests (at I 2) that 'the
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document was not a mere promise to buy within a specified date, the l o day period
refers not to the sale but to the signing of the deed which will evidence the sale. The
signing of the deed was not to create the contract but was to evidence thecontract of sale
already completed between the parties. The sale ittelf conveyed the property to the
purchaser but for the purposes of registration a ....deed had to be executed.' Marler
states 'By the contract itself, the ownership, which is a right, is transferred to the
purchaser ...the purchaser is owner of the thing through the contract.' Marler The Law
of Real Property (1932) paras 213,436-43; Castel The Civil Law System ofthe Province of
Qutbec (1962) 129-33. Not until 1966 was the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure
amended to preclude imprisonment for violation of a civil obligation. c.c.P.,Art. I . The
existence of penal sanctions (in the truest sense of the word) to enforce contractual
obligations has been criticized by the federal Law Reform Commission, which
recognized that the offence, if retained in a revised Criminal Code, ought not to be
assimilated to the general law of theft. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal
Law, Thefl and F r a d (Working Paper ig, 1977) 59.
Supra note 246
Treitel, supra note 272, at 179. See Grossfeld, Money sanctions for breach of contract
in a Communist economy (1963) 72 Yale L. J. 1326, 1340-1. Farnsworth argues,
however, that 'even in communist countries ... breach of contract is not a crime.'
Farnsworth, supra note 5, at I 145, I 146.
In recent times the argument has been made that basic human and political rights
should be insulated from the market because of 'fundamental considerations of liberty
and human dignity.' Schulue The Public Use of the Private Interest (1977) 28. See also
Rawls A Theory of Justice, supra note 1g 1.
During the eighteenth century the task of assessing damages was left entirely to the
jury. '[Iln Courts of Law all the evidence in mercantile cases was thrown together; they
were left generally to a jury, and they produced no general principle.' Lickbarrow v
Macon (1787) 2 T.R. 63,73; loo E.R. 35,40. 'The amount to be given was in the discretion
of the petty jury; it was in the discretion of the attaintjury whether or not this amount
was too great.' Washington, supra note 233. By the middle of the eighteenth century
the courts were indirectly but effectively controlling the assessment of damages by the
jury through manipulation of the rules of evidence, and the exercise of the power of
review in so far as the jury acted in disobedience of the trial judge's charge. Ibid, at go,
91.
A similar practice was followed in the United States. See Horwitz, supra note 20, at
925, 926. One of the more important but often overlooked aspects of H a d h v
Barendale (1854)g EX. 34 I ; 156 E.R. 145, was the enhanced predictability of damages
through the increasedjudicial authority overjury damage assessment. Danzig, Hadley v
Barendab: A study in the industrialization of the law (1975) 4 J . of Leg. Stvdies 249,
272-4.
A point commonly made in cases of specific performance is that one piece of property
cannot be identical to another, for at the very least each occupies different places in
space. The consequences of spatial uniqueness in an era when canal transport
constituted the sole form of transportation were substantial. See Sedtadley Railroad
Transpwtation (1885) 3; Moulton Watenuays versus Railways (1926) 1 10, 1 19. Road
transport was in an abysmal state, and the railways did not flower until the
mid-nineteenth century. Jackman The Develqpment of Transpotlation in Modon Enghnd
(2nd ed 1962); DYOSand Aldcroft British Transport, An Economic Suruey from the
Seventeenth Centuty to the Twentieth (1969); Albert The Turnpike Road System in England
1663-1840 (1972). But see Chartres, Road carrying in England in the seventeenth
century: Myth and reality (1977). 30 Econ. Hut. Rev. (2nd series) 73.
The significance of proximity to a canal was incontravertible. See Sedtadley Railroad
Transpotlation (1885) 159; Danzig, supra note 280, at agg,z60. Turnbull, Pickfords and
the canal carrying trade, 1780- 1850 (1973) 6 Transport History 5; Pegrum Transportation and Publu Policy (1973) 40. As one railway official put it, 'the canals only carry from
one point to another, from A to B o r C, as a rule, whereas railways can carry from A to the
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rest of the alphabet.' Moulton Waterways versus Railways (1926) log. The importance of
locale and thus the concept of 'uniqueness' was not restricted to inter-urban markets.
One must, in reading the cases, keep in mind that even London did not have an urban
mass transportation system until the second half of the nineteenth century. Some '44
square miles held some 425,000 people (44 percent of the total population of London
at an average density of 149to the acre). By 1851 this ...area had extended to include ...
g square miles; it then housed 945,000 people.' Hall, The origins: urban growth in
Britain I 801-1939, in I Hall (ed) The Containment of Urban Land (1973) 76.
As notable a political and economic observer as Adam Smith has described the
transformation of the relevance of differences of geographic situation resulting from
efficient and accessible transportation facilitieswhich resulted in 'upon that account the
greatest of all improvements.' 1 Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations (Glascow ed, Cambell, Skinner, and Todd, eds, 1976) 163.
Vestiges of the connection between land ownership and political power do, however,
remain. For example, after Confederation property qualifications were often imposed
on candidates. See Spencer v Farthing (1915) 8 W.W.R. I 186 (Man. c.A.); Falconer v
Langley (1899) 6 B.C.R. 444; R . v Galloway (1886) 3 Man. R. 297. Similar qualifications
were sometimes imposed on voters. In re Kelso Municipal VotersList (1go7), I 2 B.C.R. 362
(registration under land registration statute necessary to vote); Peny v Morley (191I ) 16
W.L.R. 691 (holder of an unregistered agreement for purchase of land not entitled to
vote); In re Clark (1906) 3 W.L.R.31 I (applicant for homestead with first right to obtain
interest not entitled to vote). Some remnants of the connection exist even today. See
The Municipal Ebctions Act s.0. 1972, c 95, s 13.
At note 2 I supra
At note 239 supra
For example, the contractual entitlement to corporate shares, and, more particularly,
the right to sufficient shares to constitute the prospective owner the effective manager
of the corporate wealth represented by the assets of the corporation and influence of
the office, are specifically enforced virtually as a matter of course. Dobell v Cowichan
Copper Co. Ltd. (N.P.L.) et al. (1967) 61 W.W.R. 594 (B.c.s.c.) (injunction restraining
disposition of shares by defendant to anyone other than plaintiff); Gilbert v B a r n
(1958) 13D.L.R. (2d) 262.
Although the speculative nature of any attempt to assess accurately the pecuniary
value of 'control' has been proferred as the underpinning of equitable relief, another
equally plausible rationale might be an implicit recognition that the political and social
influence exercised by the modern corporation cannot be measured in dollars and
cents. See Note, Specific performance of contracts for a controlling interest in a
corporation (1995) 49 Ham.L. R . 1 2 2 ; Neef, Equity - Specific performance - Recent
trends in the specific performance of contracts to sell securities (1953) 51 Mich. L. R .
408,414-16. Thus it is not at all surprising that the specific performance of a right to
obtain corporate securities is now enshrined in legislation. For example, s 87(3) of the
Ontario Business CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1970, c 53, reads as follows: 'The right to obtain
or reclaim possession of a security may be specifically enforced by specific performance
or its transfer enjoined.'
University Council of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v Silva [1965] I W.L.R. 77
Supra note g. Waddams, supra note 2, at 427. 428; Emerald Resources Ltd. v Sterling
Oil Property Managnnent, supra note g, at 647. The fear that an order for specific
performance of a contract of employment would be unworkable was typical of
eighteenth-centuryjudges. A common concern was expressed by Fry LJ in De Francesco
v Barnum (18go), 45 Ch. D. 430, at 438: 'For my own part, I should be very unwilling to
extend decisions the effect of which is to compel persons who are not desirous of
maintaining continuous personal relations with one another to continue those personal
relations. I have a strong impression and a strong feeling that it is not in the interest of
mankind that the rule of specific performance should be extended to such cases. I think
the Courts are bound to be jealous, lest they should turn contracts of service into
contracts of slavery; and therefore, speaking for myself, I should lean against the
extension of the doctrine of specific performance and injunction in such a manner.'
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288 A related point which provides insight into and reinforces this rationale for the
evolution of property rules was the common law's outright denial, except in limited
cases which need not concern us here, of damage compensation in cases of contracts of
employment for anything but demonstrable economic loss. See Addis v Gramophone
Limited [igog] A.C. 488; Groom v Crocker [1g3g] 1 K.B. 194; Sedgwick Elements of the Law
of Damages (2nd ed 1909) 103. Hobbs v L.S.W. Railway (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. I I 1, 1 2 2
(inconvenience, annoyance, disappointment not compensible in damages); Hamlin v
G.N. Railway (1856), I H . a N. 408; 156 E.R. 1261 (damages not recoverable for injury to
feelings). Thus the loss of social stature or the failure to acquire political identity or
authority on the purchase of land were not compensable under traditional common
law rules. No impenetrable barrier existed to the development of an exception to this
rule which would recognize the kind of loss incurred on the failure of a land contract,
but the ephemeral nature of social prestige and the risks and uncertainty inherent in
the assessment of the value of the political attributes of land combined to nurture the
development of property rules rather than common liability rules to protect contractual entitlements.
289 Supra note 288
290 Re an Arbitration between Golomb and P&er W Co. (1931) 144 L.T. 583, at 588; Withers v
General Theatre Corporation [ig33] 2 K.B. 536; (1933) 149 L.T. 487 (damages recovered
for lost opportunity of enhancing and maintaining reputation); Tolnay v Critnion Film
Productionr [1g36] 2 All E.R. 1625 (damages recovered by playwright for lost publicity).
But see Collier v Sundny Referee Publishing Co. [igqo] 2 K.B. 647.
29 I See Moss v Chesham Urban Dittritl Counn'l (I 945) 172 L.T. 30 1.
292 Supra note 288
293 Bertram v Bechtel Pmjic Corporation Ltd. (unrep. ~6178,Whang), cited and discussed in
Szakats, Wrongful and unjustified dismissal: Damages and compensation, A Case for
Reform [1g7g] N.Z.LJ. 13.
294 [lg76] 3 All E.R. 161
295 Ibid, at 166
296 Tippet v Zntffnationul Typographical Union (1976). 71 D.L.R. (3d) 146, 149-150. Other
cases evincing a liberal attitude towards non-employment subsidiary losses including
relocation expenses and 'intangible but valuable loss of future benefits' have surfaced,
leading one commentator to remark, insightfully, that the decisions 'run contrary to
the principle of the employer's rights to terminate with notice'. Vos v Security Trust
Company Limited (1969) 68 W.W.R. 310; Johnston v Northwood Pulp Ltd. (1968) 70 D.L.R.
(2d) 15. Szakats, supra note 293, describes numerous cases decided by the New
Zealand Industrial Court granting compensation for 'distress of mind,' 'hurt feelings,'
'loss of dignity,' 'impairment of reputation,' and the like.
Generally, however, Canadian courts have taken the Addis v Gramophone, Limited
decision as gospel. See McMinn v Town of Oakuillc (1979) 85 D.L.R. (3d) 13I . In Abouna v
Foothih Provincial General Hosptal Board (No. z ) (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 333, the Alberta
Court of Appeal held as follows: '[Glenerally speaking, damages are limited in the
case of a fixed term contract to earnings which would have been made during the
balance of the fixed term, less anything which may be the result of mitigation, or
anticipated mitigation; or, in the case of indeterminate hiring, salary for a period
amounting to reasonable notice. Damages for loss of reputation in a suit for wrongful
dismissal cannot be claimed.'
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Peso Silver Mines Ltd. (N.P.L.) v Cropper [1g66]
S.C.R. 673; 58 D.L.R. (zd) I, has affirmed the Addis doctrine (per Cartwrightj, at 683-4):
'The learned trial judge awarded the respondent $10,000 which represented the
balance of his salary for the year ending December 16, 1964. He indicated, however,
that he would have fixed the damages at $6,500 were it not for the circumstances of the
respondent's dismissal, namely that the unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety
made against him and the fact of his dismissal so shortly after Charter had taken control
of the appellant could not fail to damage his reputation among mining men. I agree
with BullJ.A. that the claim being founded on breach of contract the damages cannot be
increased by reason of the circumstances of dismissal whether in respect of the
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respondent's wounded feelings or the prejudicial effect upon his reputation and
chances of finding another employment'.
A case in favour of awarding compensation for intangible losses is Thurbw v Alberta
Government Telephones 18 March 1963 (unreported), cited in Harrison, Termination of
employment (1972) 10 Alta. L.R. 250.
Yewens v Noakes (1880), 6 Q.B.D. 530
See Canto1 Ltd. v Brodi Chemicals Ltd. et al. (1979) 5 B.L.R. 177; Elsley v J.G. Collins Ins.
Agem'es Ltd. (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) I (s.c.c.) (imbalance of bargaining power may, in the
negotiation of a contract of employment, lead to oppression).
See Fry, supra note 5 I , at 2 19,386; Snell's Principles of Equity (27th ed 1973)582; Flight v
Bollund (1828) 4 Russ. 298; 38 E.R.817; Cooke v Gay (1956) 4 D.L.R. (2d) 146 (N.s.s.c.);
Pickering v Biship of Ely (1843)~
2 Y. & c. Ch. 249; Johnson v Shrewsbuty and Birmingham
Ry. (1853), 3 De. G.M. & G. 914.
5 Eliz., c 4. The act is set out in full in Smith A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant
(3rd ed 1870) 505-14 The legislation was modified over the years by a number of
statutes including 2 0 Geo. 11, c 19; 27 Geo. 11,c 6; 6 Geo. 111,c 25; 4 Geo. rv, c 29; 4 Geo.
IV,c 34; and 10 Geo. IV,c 52; the first schedule to the Master and Servant Act, 1867,
30 & 31 Vict., c 141, lists seventeen acts regulating employment contracts.
5 Eliz., c 4, s g
Ibid. Other sections of the act dealt with freedom of travel, certificates and testimonials
by masters confirming that the servant was not in breach of his service, the avoiding of
contracts in contravention of the act, special rules relating to service by women,
apprentices, and various procedural and jurisdictional issues.
Ibid s 47
2 0 GO.
11, C 19, S 1
See R.v Hoseaton (181 I ) 14 East. 605; 104 E.R. 734; Kirby v Simpson (1854) 1oExch. 358;
156 E.R. 482.
r o Geo. 11, c 19, s 2
6 Geo. 111, c 25, s I
Ibid. By 32 Geo. 111,c 57, s 13 an apprentice who left his employment was liable to be
whipped as well.
After 1824 two classes of case were contemplated. One was breach of a contract
without ever having entered upon performance; the other was breach of a continuing
employment relationship. The difference between the two was that the former would
not give rise to criminal liability unless it was signed by both parties. 4 Geo. IV,c 34. See
Smith, supra note 300, at 457; R. v Lmd (1850) 1 2 4 . 8 . 758; 116 E.R. 1055.
In 1867 the Master and Servant Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 141. consolidated some
seventeen earlier acts and continued the enforcement of employment contracts
through criminal sanctions. In 1875 the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act,
1875.38 & 39 Vict., c 13,s 5, created the offence of wilfully and maliciously breaking a
contract of service, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that the
consequences would endanger human life, cause serious bodily harm, o r expose
valuable personal o r real property to destruction or serious injury. The Employers and
Workmen Act, 1875.38 & 39 Vict., c go, s 3(3), expressly authorized the court to order
performance of contracts of service, but the breach was not a criminal offence, and the
court was one of civil jurisdiction. Ibid, ss 4,g.
See R h v Wood (185g), I L.T.(N.s.)30; 29 L.J.M.C. I . See also Youlev Mappin (1861)6 H .
& N. 753; 158 E.R. 311.
Brown and Beattie C a d i a n Labour Arbitration (1979) 64; Brown, Remedies in
arbitration: Fidelity to labour relations, in Hickling (ed) C u m Problem in Labour
Arbitration 1978 (1979)~at 169, 180-3. Recent decisions, however, cast some degree of
uncertainty on that unequivocal opinion. See Progressive Contracting Ltd. [1g78] I
W.L.A.C. 564 (Mazko); D o u g h Colkge Technical and Vocational Institute (1977) 16 L.A.C.
(2d) 139 (Munroe).
Authority to order reinstatement is now vested in labour arbitrators in all common
law provinces. T h e Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c 232, s 37(8); the Canada
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Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c L-I,s 157(d),as amended S.C.1972, c 18, s I ; The Alberta
Labour Act, S.A. 1973,c 33, as amended, s 143(2);Labour Code, S.B.C. 1973(2nd Sess.),
c 122, s g8(d), as amended S.B.C. 1975, c 33, s 27; Manitoba Labour Relations Act, S.M.
1972, c 75, s 69(6) (continuing consolidation, c LIO);Industrial Relations Act, R.S.N.B.
1973, c 1-4,s 76(4): Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.1970,c 191, s 2 6 ~ ( 7as
) amended, S.N.
1973,~
107,s 2; Tradeunion Act,s.~.s.1 9 7 2 , ~
1g,s4i(d);P.E.I. Labour Ac~,R.s.P.E.I.
1974. c L-I,s 36(7); Trade Union Act, s.s. 1972, c 137, s 25(3).
See Adams G7ieuance Arbitration of Discharge Cares: A Study of the Concepts of Inductrial
Discipline and Their Results (1978); Feller, A general theory of collective bargaining
(1972) 61 Cal. L.R. 663, at 750.
313 Zeller's (Western) Ltd. v Retail, Wholesalt W Deft. Store Union, Local 995 et al. (1973) 40
D.L.R. (3d) 761 ; Sheddon et al. v Ontario Major Junior League Hockey et al. (1979) 83 D.L.R.
( 3 4 734
314 S.S. 1944. c 69
3 15 [1g4g] A.C. 134; [I9481 4 D.L.R. 673, per Lord Simonds at 680,68 I
316 R.S.C.1970, C.L-I;as amended by S.C. 1977-8, c 27, s 21
3 17 See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 14 r v Hany Woods
Transport Limited (1976) 76 C.L.L.C. 16,055; Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
AFL-CIO-CLC et al. v Humpty Dumpty Foods Limited (1978), 78 C.L.L.C. 16; Canudian
Union of Brewery Workers and Curling O'Keefe Limited [1g75] 3 C.L.R.B.R.
148.
318 MacDonaldv Rose(1870) 17 Gr. 657 (Ont. Ch. D); Lumleyv Wagner(i852), I D e c . ~&
. c.
604; 42 E.R. 687; International Longshoremen's Association, Local 273 et al. v Maritime
Employer's Association et al. (1979) 89 D.L.R.(3d) 289 (s.c.c.); Pan@ Press Ltd. v Vancouver
Typographical Union Local 226 (1970) 15 D.L.R. (3d) 2 I 2; WinnipegBuildm'Exchange et al.
v Intmtional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 2085 et al. (1966) 57 D.L.R.
(zd) 141, affirmed [1967] S.C.R. 628. As Estey J put it in the Maritime Employer's
Association Care (at 308): 'The effect of an injunction to cease from continuing an illegal
strike is quite a different thing in reality from a mandatory order directing an opera
singer to sing.'
Legislative orders of specific performance of labour contracts are notorious.
Canudian Union of Postal Workers v Attorney-General of C a d (1979) 93 D.L.R. (3d) 148
(federal legislation ordering union members to work not contrary to Canadian Bill of
Rights).
3 19 Moore, The emergence of new property conceptions in America (1943) I J. Leg. W Pol.
Soc. 34.53 See Meyers Ownership of Jobs: A Comparative Study (1964).
320 See Hamilton, Property rights in the market (1943) i J . Leg. W Pol. Soc. lo, 15.
321 Hughes Men and Their Work (1958) 78
322 Olson The Logic of CollectiveAction ( I965) 137; Hughes, Professions ( I 963) 92 Daedaluc
655-7
323 Arnold The Folkhe of Capitalism (1937) ch 7
324 Reich, supra note 28. Reich, in a later article, defines 'entitlements' to include
franchises, professional licences, union membership, employment contracts, and
similar occupation-related benefits. Reich, Individual rights and social welfare: The
emerging legal issues (1965) 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1255. See also Glendon and Lev,
Changes in the bonding of the employment relationship: An essay on the new property
(1979) 20 Bart. Col. L.R. 457.
3-25 See Snaidmh v Family Finance Corp. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (due process protection from
garnishment afforded to defendant-employees);EmployeeandRetirenentZncomeSecurity
Act Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (vesting of pension rights).
326 The Employment Protection Act, ig75,23 & 24 Elk. 2, c 7 I , ss 7 I , 72; Freedland, The
Employment Protection Act 1975 - Individual aspects (1976). 39 Mod. L.R. 561,
570-1; Benedictus, Employment protection: New institutions and trade union rights
(1976) 5 Induthial L.J. i 2, 2 1; Arderman The Law of Unfair Dismissal (1978).
327 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, c 44, ss 67-71
328 See Employment Protection Act, 1975, 23 & 24 Eliz. 2, c71, ss 72(2)(b),72(3).
329 Kahn-Freund, in Labour and the Law (2nd ed 1977) 179 expresses the point this way:
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'Such is the precarious compromise between the policies to avoid direct compulsion
through the ultimate sanctions of contempt of court, and to make it as expensive as
possible for employers to encroach upon their employees' freedom of organization.'
See T h e Prescription Act, 1 8 3 2 , &
~ 3 Will. IV,c 71; T h e Real Property Limitation Act,
1833, 3 & 4 Will. IV, c 27; The Real Property Act, 1845, 8 & g Vict., c 106; The
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881,44 & 45 Vict., c 41.
T h e first registration statute introduced in England in 1862 was an undeniable failure;
only 41 I titles were registered under its provisions. See Whalen, supra note 256;
Simpson, supra note 140, at 254. See T h e Land Registry Act, 1862,25 & 26 Vict., c 53.
T h e act, which attempted to introduce registration of titles rather than registration of
deeds by memorial, was voluntary, and few land-owners were willing to risk discovery
of their insecure titles to their landed estates. The recommendations contained in the
Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Consider the S 4 e c t of the Registration of Title with
Refererue to the Sale and Tramfer of Land (Cmnd. 2 2 I 5, I 857), not entirely reflected in the
1862 act, were enacted in the Land Transfer Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c 87.
Dicey, supra note 33, at 226
See DiCastri Thorn' Canadian T m m System (1962) 16; McLeod, The Torrens system in
Ontario (1909) 29 Can. L.T. 695. Marketability of land still plays a role in land
registration reform. See Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Land Regutration
(1971) 1 I, 28-30; Thornhill, How to simplify our titles (1889) 5 Law Q. Rev. I I, 14.
Dicey, supra note 33, at 2 2 I, 222. One explanation for the failure of electoral reform in
1832 'was that there could be no revolution in the distribution of political power
without a revolution in the distribution of real property.' Turberville, supra note 76, at
407. Thus, before thoughts turned to the more direct route of extending the franchise
to all persons irrespective of wealth and property, reformers advocated the expropriation of private landowners as an assault on the property qualification which stood in the
way of parliamentary reform. Denman Studies in Land Economy, The Place of Property
(1978) 57. See Greenwood, Registration - or simplification of title (1890) 6 Law Q. Reu.
144; Holdsworth, The reform of the land law: An historical retrospect (1926), 42 Law
Q.Rev. 158; Simpson Land Law and Registration (1976) 88.
AS some would have it. See British W e s t i n g h e Electric Co. v Underground Railways
[ig12] A.C. 673,679.
Friedman, General theory of law and social change, in Ziegel (ed) Law andSocia1Change
(1973) 17. 2 1
Graveson, T h e movement from status to contract (194 I) 4 Mod.L.R. 261,262; see also
Kahn-Freund, A note on status and contract in British labour law (1967) 30 Mod.L.R.
635.
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